📰 Navy’s ensign pays tribute to Shivaji
Design sees fourth change since 1950; twin octagonal borders draw inspiration from royal seal
•Moving away from the colonial past, the Indian Navy on Friday adopted a new ensign inspired by the seal of Maratha king Chhatrapati Shivaji. It was unveiled by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the commissioning of aircraft carrier INS Vikrant here.
•“The President of India has approved the introduction of the new designs of the naval ensign, as also the distinguishing flags, masthead pennants and car flags for the Indian Navy,” the Navy said in a statement. “Formations, ships and establishments of the Indian Navy would be adopting the new naval ensign, as also the new distinguishing flags, car flags and masthead pennants.”
Devanagari script
•This is the fourth time the naval ensign has been changed since 1950.
•The earlier ensign had the national flag in the upper left canton, red vertical and horizontal stripes and a golden-yellow National Emblem superimposed on the intersection of the red stripes. The national motto ‘Satyamev Jayate’ engraved in Devanagari script, was included underneath the emblem.
•The statement said that resonant to the ongoing national endeavour to move away from the colonial past, the need was felt to transition to a new design that drew inspiration from the country’s history.
•The white ensign identified nationwide with the Navy, now comprises two main constituents — the national flag in the upper left canton and a navy blue-gold octagon at the centre of the fly side (away from the staff), it stated.
•The octagon is with twin golden octagonal borders encompassing the golden National Emblem (Lion Capital of Ashoka — under scribed with ‘Satyamev Jayate’ in blue Devanagari script) resting atop an anchor; and superimposed on a shield. Below the shield, within the octagon, in a golden-bordered ribbon on a navy blue background, is inscribed the motto of the Indian Navy ‘Sam No Varunah’ in golden Devanagari script.
•“The twin octagonal borders draw their inspiration from Shivaji Maharaj’s rajmudra or the seal of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, one of the prominent Indian kings with a visionary maritime outlook, who built a credible naval fleet that earned grudging admiration from European navies operating in the region at the time,” the Navy said.
📰 Vikrant is a reflection of self-reliant India, says Modi
Country’s first indigenous aircraft carrier commissioned into the Navy
•Security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean had long been ignored, but today this area is a major defence priority of the country, said Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday as he commissioned INS Vikrant, the country’s first indigenous aircraft carrier and the most complex warship ever built.
•“Vikrant is a unique reflection of India becoming self-reliant,” he said, adding that his government is working in every direction, from increasing the budget for the Indian Navy to increasing its capability.
•The ship is christened after India’s first aircraft carrier Vikrant, which played a vital role in the 1971 war. From 2013 to 2017, the Navy had fielded two aircraft carriers — the erstwhile Viraat acquired from the U.K. and the INS Vikramaditya from Russia which is currently in service.
•Once INS Vikrant becomes fully operational, Indian Navy will once again be able to deploy two full-fledged carrier groups significantly expanding its footprint across the Indo-Pacific.
•“So far, such aircraft carriers were only made by developed countries. India has taken a step towards being a developed country by being part of the league,” said Mr. Modi speaking at the formal commissioning ceremony which saw the presence of several naval veterans who commanded and served on the erstwhile Vikrant.
📰 Wind in the sail
INS Vikrant is a milestone; the focus now must be on a twin-engine deck-based fighter
•India commissioned its first indigenously designed and built aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, on Friday and joined a small group of countries which include the U.S., the U.K., Russia, France and China, that have the capability to design and build carriers with a displacement of over 40,000 tonnes. What India has demonstrated is the capacity to develop a carrier although it has been operating these ships for over 60 years. It took 17 years from the time the steel was cut and around ₹20,000 crore to make Vikrant a reality. Developing a viable domestic defence industry has been a priority for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the new aircraft carrier is a sign of India’s expanding atmanirbharta or self-reliance in defence. The new vessel has 76% of indigenous content overall but its critical technology has been imported, pointing to the need for persistence. The carrier in itself is an engineering marvel with an endurance of 7,500 nautical miles. It has around 2,200 compartments for a crew of around 1,600 that include specialised cabins to accommodate women officers and sailors, and a full-fledged speciality medical facility. Several technological spin-offs from the ship’s construction include the capacity to manufacture warship-grade steel, which India used to import. Its commissioning gives India and its emerging defence manufacturing sector the confidence to aim and sail farther.
•The Indian Navy’s ambition is to have three aircraft carriers — it already has INS Vikramaditya procured from Russia — and it has suggested that the expertise gained from building Vikrant could now be used to build a second, more capable, indigenous carrier. INS Vikrant will be the wind in the sail for India’s proactive maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region. At the commissioning ceremony in Kochi, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh reiterated India’s interest in “a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific” and Mr. Modi’s idea of ‘SAGAR’ or Security and Growth for All in the Region. A strong Navy is also critical to India’s ambition to grow its share in global trade, which is largely maritime — INS Vikrant significantly expands the Indian Navy’s footprint in the backdrop of increasing Chinese activity in the region and New Delhi’s closer cooperation with the U.S. While MiG-29K fighter jets will now be integrated into the fleet air arm of Vikrant, the Navy has taken an active interest in procuring either the French Rafale M or the American F/A-18 Super Hornet. This would need structural modifications in the ship which would allow operating these more capable aircraft from its deck. Meanwhile, the plans to develop India’s own twin-engine deck-based fighter continue to remain a distant dream. The focus, and priority now, should be in resolving the fighter jet conundrum while also taking a call on the second indigenous aircraft carrier to ensure that the expertise gained is not jettisoned due to strategic myopia.
With cybercrime on the rise, the central and State governments need to work in tandem
•There has been a steady spike in cases of cybercrime in the last five years. According to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), from 12,317 cases of cybercrime in 2016, there were 50,035 cases registered in 2020. In India, cybercrime is increasing with the increased use of information and communication technology (ICT). However, despite this alarming trend, the capacity of the enforcement agencies to investigate cybercrime remains limited.
•As far as the admissibility of electronic evidence is concerned, though there were some conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court of India earlier, the law was finally settled in Arjun Pandit Rao Khotkar vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal & Ors. The Court held that a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence (IE) Act was a mandatory pre-requisite for the admissibility of (secondary) electronic record if the original record could not be produced.
•With ‘police’ and ‘public order’ being in the State List, the primary obligation to check crime and create the necessary cyberinfrastructure lies with States. At the same time, with the IT Act and major laws being central legislations, the central government is no less responsible to evolve uniform statutory procedures for the enforcement agencies. Though the Government of India has taken steps that include the setting up of the Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C) under the Ministry of Home Affairs to deal with all types of cybercrime, much needs to be done to plug the infrastructural deficit.
No procedural code
•There is no separate procedural code for the investigation of cyber or computer-related offences. As electronic evidence is entirely different in nature when compared with evidence of traditional crime, laying down standard and uniform procedures to deal with electronic evidence is essential. The broad ‘guidelines for the identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence’ are given in the Indian Standard IS/ISO/IEC 27037: 2012, issued by the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS). This document is fairly comprehensive and easy to comprehend for both the first responder (who could be an authorised and trained police officer of a police station) as well as the specialist (who has specialised knowledge, skills and the abilities to handle a wide range of technical issues). The guidelines, if followed meticulously, may ensure that electronic evidence is neither tampered with nor subject to spoliation during investigation.
•A significant attempt has been made by the higher judiciary in this field also. As resolved in the Conference of the Chief Justices of the High Court in April 2016, a five-judge committee was constituted in July 2018 to frame the draft rules which could serve as a model for the reception of digital evidence by courts.
•The committee, after extensive deliberations with experts, the police and investigation agencies, finalised its report in November 2018, but the suggested Draft Rules for the Reception, Retrieval, Authentication and Preservation of Electronic Records are yet to be given a statutory force.
Shortage of technical staff
•Second, there have been half-hearted efforts by the States to recruit technical staff for the investigation of cybercrime. A regular police officer, with an academic background in the arts, commerce, literature, or management may be unable to understand the nuances of the working of a computer or the Internet. He can at best, after proper training, act as a first responder who could identify digital evidence and secure the scene of crime or preserve digital evidence till the arrival of an expert. It is only a technically qualified staff who could acquire and analyse digital evidence.
•It is relevant here to mention that the Court, during the trial of the infamous State of Goa, through C.I.D. C.B., North Goa, Goa. vs Tarunjit Tejpal took objection to the fact that the investigating sub-inspector, who seized the relevant CDs, did not know the meaning of the term ‘hash value’.
•Similarly, in the Aarushi murder case of Noida, reported as Dr. (Smt.) Nupur Talwar vs State of U.P. and Anr., the Allahabad High Court observed that the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN) expert was not provided with the details of the Internet logs, router logs and laptop logs to prove whether the Internet was physically operated on the fateful night. Even the certificate under Section 65B of the IE Act (which is statutorily required), was undated, and hence rejected by the trial court.
•Therefore, it is essential that State governments build up sufficient capacity to deal with cybercrime. It could be done either by setting up a separate cyberpolice station in each district or range, or having technically qualified staff in every police station.
•Further, the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000 insists that offences registered under the Act should be investigated by a police officer not below the rank of an inspector. The fact is that police inspectors are limited in number in districts, and most of the field investigation is done by sub-inspectors. Therefore, it will be pragmatic to consider a suitable amendment in Section 80 of the Act and make sub-inspectors eligible to take up investigation of cybercrimes.
Upgrade cyber labs
•Third, the cyber forensic laboratories of States must be upgraded with the advent of new technologies. Offences related to crypto-currency remain under-reported as the capacity to solve such crimes remains limited. The central government has proposed launching a digital rupee using blockchain technology soon. State enforcement agencies need to be ready for these technologies. The Centre helps in upgrading the State laboratories by providing modernisation funds, though the corpus has gradually shrunk over the years. While most State cyber labs are sufficiently equipped to analyse hard disks and mobile phones, many are yet to be notified as ‘Examiner of Electronic Evidence’ (by the central government) to enable them to provide expert opinion on electronic records. Since there is now a state-of-art National Cyber Forensic Lab and the Cyber Prevention, Awareness and Detection Centre (CyPAD) of the Delhi Police, there may be an extension of professional help to States in getting their labs notified.
Need for localisation
•Most cybercrimes are trans-national in nature with extra-territorial jurisdiction. The collection of evidence from foreign territories is not only a difficult but also a tardy process. India has extradition treaties and extradition arrangements with 48 and 12 countries, respectively. In most social media crimes, except for the prompt blocking of an objectionable website or suspect’s account, other details do not come forth quickly from large IT firms. Therefore, ‘data localisation’ must feature in the proposed Personal Data Protection law so that enforcement agencies are able to get timely access to the data of suspected Indian citizens. Also, the police still get CyberTipline reports on online Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) from the U.S.’s non-profit agency, the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). It would be a step forward if India develops its in-house capacity and/or makes intermediaries accountable to identify and remove online CSAM for immediate action by the police.
•In fact, the Centre and States must not only work in tandem and frame statutory guidelines to facilitate investigation of cybercrime but also need to commit sufficient funds to develop much-awaited and required cyber infrastructure.
📰 The NPT is beginning to look shaky
Sustaining it requires facing up to today’s political realities such as the growing rivalries in a multipolar nuclear world
•The Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded last week in New York. Marking 52 years of a treaty that every speaker described as the ‘cornerstone of the global nuclear order’ — it was originally planned for its 50th year for 2020, but the conference was delayed due to COVID-19 — it should have been a celebratory occasion, yet, the mood was sombre. And after four weeks of debate and discussion, the delegates failed to agree on a final document.
NPT’s success and weakness
•To manage the disappointment, some staunch believers claimed that the success should not be defined in terms of a consensus outcome! It is true that since 1970, when the NPT entered into force, only four of the 10 review conferences (in 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010) have concluded with a consensus document, the review years were: 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2022. Ironically, even the critical 1995 Review Conference that decided to extend the NPT into perpetuity, broke down weeks later over the review process.
•However, there was one key difference in 2022. In the past, the divergences were over Iran, Israel, West Asia or between the nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots. The three depositary states (the United States, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R./Russia) were always on the same page. The difference in 2022 was that it pitched Russia against the West; it was the inability to find language to address the nuclear safety crisis at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine, under Russian occupation since March, that ultimately led to the failure.
•The NPT was negotiated during the 1960s to reconcile three competing objectives — controlling the further spread of nuclear weapons beyond the P-5 countries (the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the U.K, France and China) that had already tested; committing to negotiating reductions of nuclear arsenals leading to their elimination; and sharing benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. The first was strongly supported by the nuclear-haves; the latter two were demands made by the nuclear have-nots.
•Over the years, the non-proliferation objective has been achieved in large measure. Despite apprehensions that by the 1980s, there would be close to 25 nuclear powers, in the last 50 years, only four more countries have gone on to test and develop nuclear arsenals — India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan (South Africa developed nuclear weapons but the apartheid regime destroyed them and joined NPT in 1991 before relinquishing power to majority rule). After the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, non-proliferation remained a shared priority for the major powers and the International Atomic Energy Agency, set up originally to promote international co-operation became better known as the non-proliferation watchdog.
•Progress on the other two aspects took a back seat; no meaningful discussions or negotiations on nuclear disarmament have ever taken place in the NPT framework. In fact, in the early 1980s, there was a growth in nuclear arsenals. Arms control talks between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R./Russia did take place and the two countries did succeed in bringing down their collective arsenals from a high of nearly 65,000 in the early 1980s to less than 12,000 warheads. But this process too has ground to a halt.
•The first signal was the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 on the grounds that it unduly constrained its missile defence activities. Limits imposed by the ABM Treaty had been a critical element in creating mutual vulnerability as a means of underwriting deterrence stability. It was a unipolar world with the U.S. as the dominant power. Russia gradually responded by embarking on its nuclear modernisation.
•In 2019, the U.S. notified Russia of its decision to quit the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that had obliged both countries to get rid of all ground-launched missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km. The U.S. blamed Russia for cheating on its obligations and pointed out that China’s missile developments created new security threats that needed to be addressed. The U.S. was now facing two strategic rivals.
•The only surviving arms control treaty between Russia and the U.S. is the New START Treaty that imposes a ceiling on operational strategic nuclear weapons of 700 launchers and 1,550 warheads each. It expires in 2026 and there are no signs of any follow-on discussions.
•Attempts by the Donald Trump administration to invite China to join in the arms control process were rejected. Given growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait, any prospects for such talks have only receded.
•All that the five nuclear-weapon-states party to the NPT could manage at the conference was a reiteration of the 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev declaration that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. The statement remains valid but clearly sounded hollow in the face of growing strategic rivalry between China, Russia and the U.S., rising nuclear rhetoric, and modernisation plans for nuclear arsenals being pursued.
Nuclear modernisation
•While the Joe Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review is awaited, the U.S.’s 30-year nuclear modernisation programme, intended to provide ‘credible deterrence against regional aggression’ is already underway. This has been used to justify developing and deploying more usable low-yield nuclear weapons.
•Russia (and China too) is developing hypersonic delivery systems that evade missile defences as well as larger missiles that do not need to travel over the Arctic. Also on the cards are nuclear torpedoes and new cruise missiles. Last year, satellite imagery over China revealed that at least three new missile storage sites are being developed. Analysts suggest that China may be on track to expand its arsenal from current levels of approximately 350 warheads to over 1,000 by 2030. Such a dramatic expansion raises questions about whether this marks a shift in the Chinese nuclear doctrine that has relied on a credible minimum deterrent and a no-first-use policy for the last six decades.
•Developments in space and cyber domains are blurring the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, leading to nuclear entanglement and rendering command and control systems vulnerable. This, in turn, compresses decision-making time and creates incentives for early use, raising nuclear risk.
•At the conference, France, the U.K. and the U.S. wanted to draw a distinction between “irresponsible” nuclear threats of an offensive nature and “responsible” nuclear threats for defensive purposes but Russia (and China) stymied western efforts. When the nuclear have-nots suggested a universal condemnation of all threats of nuclear use, all five nuclear-haves joined together to resist such moves. This reflects an emerging divide.
Other treaties, their state
•Frustrated by the absence of progress on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear have-nots successfully negotiated a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, also called Ban Treaty) in 2017 that entered into force in January 2021. All 86 signatories are nuclear have-nots and parties to the NPT. The TPNW creates a new legal instrument and at their meeting in June in Vienna, the TPNW states committed to pushing for ‘stigmatising and de-legitimising’ nuclear weapons, condemning all nuclear threats and ‘building a robust global peremptory norm against them’. Expectedly, the nuclear-haves and their allies ignored the Vienna meeting but will find it increasingly difficult to overlook this political reality as more and more NPT colleagues call their bluff.
•The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was concluded in 1996 but has yet to formally enter into force because two major powers, the U.S. and China, have yet to ratify it. While it is true that they do observe a moratorium on nuclear testing, modernisation plans could soon run up against the CTBT.
•Nobody wants a breakdown of the NPT but sustaining it requires facing up to today’s political realities. The rivalries in a multipolar nuclear world create new challenges, different from what the world faced in a bipolar era of the 1960s when the NPT was concluded. Without addressing the new challenges, the NPT will weaken and with it, the taboo against nuclear weapons that has held since 1945.
