📰 Data opportunity at the G20
The Indian Government should present a holistic agenda that embeds data collection and sharing
•The global politics of data is rapidly evolving as leading and emerging digital economies like the European Union (EU), the U.S., India, Indonesia, and South Africa strive to protect, monetise, and leverage data collected within their territories for domestic purposes. The age of borderless data with limited or no government control, once an aspiration, appears behind us.
•Increasing privacy and security concerns coupled with economic interests have compelled governments to institute rules and standards that govern and restrict cross-border flows with natural implications for negotiations on global trade and commerce. Indeed, the sheer amount of data being generated and shared globally has necessitated governments to exert more control over the use, sharing, and cross-border flow of data. According to the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), data localisation laws have more than doubled from 2017 to 2021, indicating that states seek and want increasing levels of regulatory control over data.
Creation of single data market
•Data regulation efforts transcend data localisation. Relaxing its deference to self-regulation by firms, Joe Biden’s administration recently issued an executive order on promoting competition in the American economy that pushed for the use of antitrust policy to meet the challenges posed by the rise of dominant platforms, and surveillance. European policymakers have introduced a bevy of digital rules that place individual users centre-stage, and enhancing their data security. Through the proposed Data Act, the EU hopes to become an unparalleled data power by creating a single data market, setting robust standards and deploying the EU’s collective data for their own use.
•As a rising ‘data market’ with critical stakes in multilateral and regional negotiations on data, how can India negotiate data when it assumes leadership of the G20?
•The G-20 appears as a viable platform to discuss data, particularly sharing and transfer, given seemingly converging positions on data governance amongst major G-7 powers and emerging economies as the state finds a greater role in regulating data. Moreover, the G-20’s track record as the apex forum to discuss global economic issues gives it legitimacy and having the top (digital) economies makes it an appropriate forum to discuss data. The G20 does not create binding rules but serves as a platform to catalyse and inject new thinking around critical current issues.
Data sovereignty
•India was way ahead of the ‘data sovereignty’ curve, brandishing it to justify domestic policy-making and burnishing this stance at various international discussions, long before it became fashionable across northern jurisdictions. Since 2017, India has attempted to incubate governance of non-personal data, personal data, e-commerce regulation and artificial intelligence (AI) with a preference to harness “India’s data for India’s development.” These policies, including the recently withdrawn Personal Data Protection Bill, are works in progress but this does not take away from the vast ecosystem of actors — including experts, civil society, and industry actively engaging with and attempting to shape digital policy-making.
•To underscore political rhetoric and drive global data discussions at the G20, the Indian government should present a holistic agenda that embeds data collection and sharing within a broader framework that prioritises digital security, innovation, and citizen rights.
•For instance, the Reserve Bank of India’s data localisation directive has been in place for four years now. An empirical assessment of how this has impacted both start-ups, big technology companies, and users could serve as a useful example. Has localisation achieved requisite security and economic benefits? Or has it stifled digital innovation? Second, India’s digital economy stewardship must transcend data localisation by highlighting best practices on data protection, competition law, data stewardship, and responsible artificial intelligence both in India and other G20 countries. The ongoing effort to redraft the Personal Data Protection Bill and embed it within a ‘more comprehensive framework’ that addresses related concerns like cybersecurity must serve as an urgent domestic priority, and could lend weight to India’s G-20 data approach.
•By adding nuance to prevailing ‘data’ narratives and enabling countries with different views to express themselves and engage meaningfully on critical questions, India’s G-20 stint would mark a key phase in the global digital economy.
📰 Voters not looking for freebies: SC
Promises alone do not decide the outcome of elections for political parties, it says
•Voters, if given a chance, will prefer to earn a dignified earning through welfare schemes such as the MGNREGA and create public assets in rural India. Freebies do not always decide the outcome of elections for political parties, the Supreme Court said on Wednesday.
•A Bench led by Chief Justice of India N.V. Ramana said there have been instances of parties losing elections in spite of their promises of freebies. “I don’t think voters are looking for freebies. Given an opportunity, they (voters) will opt for dignified earning. For example, MGNREGA offered dignified earning and also created public assets in rural areas. So, I don’t think promises alone decide the outcome of elections... There are instances of parties not being elected despite their promises,” Chief Justice Ramana said.
•The court was hearing a petition to curb the practice of offering or distributing “irrational freebies” at the cost of public money, especially in debt-ridden States during the run-up to elections.
•The court said its primary concern is about “the right way of spending public money”. The court indicated that promises of freebies come at a cost to the public exchequer. “At the end of the day, we must say there is no free lunch,” the Bench observed.
•The court is dealing with rival contentions raised in the case. On the one hand, the contention is that freebies are a waste of public money and a sure road to economic doom for the country, on the other, they are incentives and schemes to ensure public welfare.
•“But the question is what exactly qualifies as a ‘valid promise’? Can promise of subsidy on power, seeds and fertilizers to small and marginal farmers, free health care and drinking water be considered as freebies? Can we treat promises of consumer products, electronics free of cost for all as a welfare measure?” the court asked.
Welfare schemes
•Chief Justice Ramana said freebies should not be confused with welfare schemes introduced by States. The CJI said Article 38 of the Constitution mandates that States should ensure the welfare of the people, “minimise inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations”.
•“You cannot prevent a political party or an individual from making promises that are aimed at fulfilling this constitutional mandate, if elected to power,” the Chief Justice observed.
•Senior advocate P. Wilson, for Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, submitted that the Constitution empowered States to promulgate welfare schemes. The term ‘freebies’ cannot be interpreted to restrict States’ competence to provide welfare.
•The court said the parties involved, including the Centre and the State political parties, should come up with their opinions and recommendations on the issue of freebies which was getting more “complicated”. The court posted the case to next week. In the previous hearing, senior advocate Vikas Singh, for petitioner Ashwini Upadhyay, said States have a debt of ₹15 lakh crore. “Public money should not be misused by political parties whose only intention is to gain and retain power,” Mr. Singh said.
India needs a stable system of civil services to bolster responsive public administration
•It is now official. The Government of India (GOI) painfully admitted recently to what some of us already knew. Fewer and fewer All India Services (AIS) officers working in States were coming forward to opt for a tenure with the Centre. An overwhelming majority would like to be in the comfort zone of their State cadres and vegetate there rather than migrate — albeit even for one short spell of three to five years — to the country's capital and its neighbourhood to work for the Union Government.
•This is no reflection on the Centre’s ability or willingness to offer incentives to maintain the morale of Indian Administrative Services (IAS) and Indian Police Service (IPS) officers who choose to work for it on deputation.
Rigour routine of GOI
•There are many positives in working for the GOI. These include a psychological satisfaction of contributing to the formulation of national policy on many critical issues, such as education, health care or preservation of the environment. This throws up many opportunities for foreign travel and a chance to be deputed to work for international agencies. These prospects do not, however, seem to be attractive enough for many officers to crave for a posting in Delhi. Several factors account for this reluctance. These include the rigour of the GOI routine — long hours of work and the need for extreme clinical care in the preparation and submission of reports going up the hierarchy — sometimes up to the Prime Minister himself.
•Compound this with fewer creature comforts than what is available in a State environment as also the need to operate sometimes far away from one’s native State. There are only a few who are fortunate enough to be allotted to their home State or closer. Not surprisingly, many willing to go to Delhi on deputation are those assigned to the Northeastern States.
•Officers shying away from going to Delhi is not a new phenomenon, but is one that has lately assumed grave proportions. This is a serious situation if one reckons that the manpower demands of GOI ministries (at the level of Deputy Secretaries and Directors who generally come from the IAS) are growing. There is no doubt now as there is a lateral entry scheme meant for qualified personnel from the public and private sectors. Their number is too small to make even a marginal difference to the deteriorating vacancy position at the Centre.
•The case of the Indian Police Service (IPS) is equally bad. There are far too many vacancies in the Central Police Establishment comprising the paramilitary forces such as the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF) and Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), and investigating agencies like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and National Investigation Agency (NIA).
•One organisation particularly affected is the CBI. When this is the case, ironically, the non-IPS direct recruits to the para military forces are permanently at war with the Home Ministry (MHA), demanding a greater share of the jobs in the higher echelons. The Cadre rules now in place do not permit such expansion of opportunities for the non-IPS officers. A major grouse of the latter is that none of them can ever rise to head the forces. The rationale is that they lack the experience at the grassroots of policing essential to operate in unison with the local civil authorities.
•The AIS structure is unique to India and is too delicate to handle during a crisis. No public administration practitioner or scholar abroad can comprehend its nuances.
The AIS appointments
•The selection of AIS officers is done through the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), which holds an annual examination that attracts 3,00,000 to 4,00,000 young aspirants, competing for less than 1,000 positions. The appointing authority for those shortlisted from the written examination, followed by an oral interview, is currently the Central government.
•Appointment officers are allotted to various States, the number of officers depending on each State's requirement. Thereafter, they spend most of their career in those States, intervened by short spells of deputation to the Centre. While they are functioning under a State government, disciplinary authority is vested in the former, except that a State cannot impose a major penalty on a delinquent AIS officer for any misconduct.
•Suspension of an officer from the service by a State government will have to be ratified by the Centre before the end of three months. This is meant to be a safeguard against any arbitrary action by a State government.
•I, however, know of a case of a totally unjustified harassment of a distinguished police officer who was harassed for reporting to the Indian government after the State went back on its earlier promise to relieve her to join a Central organisation. There was a short-lived tussle between the State and the Ministry of Home Affairs over this issue.
•A few years ago, we also witnessed such battles in other States too, especially West Bengal, where senior officers such as the Chief Secretary and Commissioner of Police were greatly embarrassed because the Chief Minister and GOI were out of steps with each other. It is in situations like these where the canons of prudent and mature governance are ignored that pose a threat to the foundation of All India Services.
Empowering the Centre
•Crass politics triumphing over enlightened public administration has become the order of the day. It is in this context that the Centre's dialogue with the States over amending the AIS rules assumes importance. Such amendment would empower the Centre to commandeer the services of any officer serving in the States to work for the former, with or without the concurrence of the State concerned or the consent of the particular officer.
•However, it is debatable whether the States will agree to this change. Intriguing times are, therefore, ahead of all of us who are convinced that we need a stable system of civil services to bolster democratic and responsive public administration in our country.
📰 What is causing Arctic warming?
Why is the Greenland ice sheet melting at an alarming rate? How is it affecting the monsoons?
•Due to global warming, any change in the surface air temperature and the net radiation balance tends to produce larger changes at the north and south poles. These changes are more pronounced at the northern latitudes and are known as the Arctic amplification
•In May 2021, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme had warned that the Arctic has warmed three times quicker than the planet
•For several years, the Greenland ice sheet has been melting at an alarming rate. Between July 15 and 17, 2022, the Greenland ice sheet saw a sharp spike in the rate and extent of melting
•A study by a group of Indian and Norwegian scientists have found that the reduced sea ice in the Barents-Kara sea region can lead to extreme rainfall events in the latter half of the monsoons, in September and October
•The story so far: On August 11, Finnish Meteorological Institute researchers published their study in the Communications Earth & Environment journal, concluding that the Arctic is heating four times faster than the rest of the planet. The warming is more concentrated in the Eurasian part of the Arctic, where the Barents Sea north of Russia and Norway is warming at an alarming rate — seven times faster than the global average. Other studies in 2021 (the American Geophysical Union) and in 2022 (Geophysical Research Letters) indicate that the Arctic amplification is four times the global rate. While earlier studies have proved that the Arctic is warming two or three times faster, recent studies show that the region is fast changing and that the best of climate models may not be able to capture the rate of changes and predict it accurately.
What is Arctic amplification? What causes it?
•Global warming, the long-term heating of the earth’s surface, hastened due to anthropogenic forces or human activities since pre-industrial times and has increased the planet’s average temperature by 1.1 degrees Celsius. While changes are witnessed across the planet, any change in the surface air temperature and the net radiation balance tend to produce larger changes at the north and south poles. This phenomenon is known as polar amplification; these changes are more pronounced at the northern latitudes and are known as the Arctic amplification.
•Among the many global warming-driven causes for this amplification, the ice-albedo feedback, lapse rate feedback, water vapour feedback and ocean heat transport are the primary causes. Sea ice and snow have high albedo (measure of reflectivity of the surface), implying that they are capable of reflecting most of the solar radiation as opposed to water and land. In the Arctic’s case, global warming is resulting in diminishing sea ice. As the sea ice melts, the Arctic Ocean will be more capable of absorbing solar radiation, thereby driving the amplification. The lapse rate or the rate at which the temperature drops with elevation decreases with warming. Studies show that the ice-albedo feedback and the lapse rate feedback are responsible for 40% and 15% of polar amplification respectively.
What do the previous studies say?
•The extent of Arctic amplification is debated, as studies show various rates of amplification against the global rate. Studies have shown that the Arctic was warming at twice the global rate prior to the beginning of the 21st century. With revised figures, the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change released a ‘Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate’ in 2019, which said that the “Arctic surface air temperature has likely increased by more than double the global average over the last two decades.”
•In May 2021, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) warned that the Arctic has warmed three times quicker than the planet, and the chance of the sea ice completely disappearing in summers is 10 times greater, if the planet is warmer by two degree Celsius above the pre-industrial levels. The report also said that the average annual temperature in the region increased by 3.1 degrees Celsius compared to the 1 degree Celsius for the planet.
•However, recent studies have shown that the mean Arctic amplification saw steep changes in 1986 and 1999, when the ratio reached 4.0, implying four times faster heating than the rest of the planet.
What are the consequences of Arctic warming?
•The causes and consequences of Arctic amplification are cyclical — what might be a cause can be a consequence too.
•The Greenland ice sheet is melting at an alarming rate, and the rate of accumulation of sea ice has been remarkably low since 2000, marked by young and thinner ice replacing the old and thicker ice sheets. The Greenland ice sheet saw a sharp spike in the rate and extent of melting between July 15-17 this year. The unusual summer temperatures resulted in a melt of 6 billion tonnes of ice sheet per day, amounting to a total of 18 billion tonnes in a span of three days, enough to cover West Virginia in a foot of water.
•Greenlandic ice sheet holds the second largest amount of ice, after Antarctica, and therefore it is crucial for maintaining the sea level. In 2019, this was the single biggest cause for the rise in the sea level, about 1.5 metres. If the sheet melts completely, the sea level would rise by seven metres, capable of subsuming island countries and major coastal cities.
•The warming of the Arctic Ocean and the seas in the region, the acidification of water, changes in the salinity levels, are impacting the biodiversity, including the marine species and the dependent species. The warming is also increasing the incidence of rainfall which is affecting the availability and accessibility of lichens to the reindeer. The Arctic amplification is causing widespread starvation and death among the Arctic fauna.
•The permafrost in the Arctic is thawing and in turn releasing carbon and methane which are among the major greenhouse gases responsible for global warming. Experts fear that the thaw and the melt will also release the long-dormant bacteria and viruses that were trapped in the permafrost and can potentially give rise to diseases.
What is the impact on India?
•In recent years, scientists have pondered over the impact the changing Arctic can have on the monsoons in the subcontinent. The link between the two is growing in importance due to the extreme weather events the country faces, and the heavy reliance on rainfall for water and food security.
•A study titled ‘A possible relation between Arctic sea ice and late season Indian Summer Monsoon Rainfall extremes’ published in 2021 by a group of Indian and Norwegian scientists found that the reduced sea ice in the Barents-Kara sea region can lead to extreme rainfall events in the latter half of the monsoons — in September and October. The changes in the atmospheric circulation due to diminishing sea ice combined with the warm temperatures in the Arabian Sea contribute to enhanced moisture and drive extreme rainfall events. In 2014, India deployed IndARC, India’s first moored-underwater observatory in the Kongsfjorden fjord, Svalbard, to monitor the impact of the changes in the Arctic Ocean on the tropical processes such as the monsoons.
•According to the World Meteorological Organization’s report,‘State of Global Climate in 2021’, sea level along the Indian coast is rising faster than the global average rate. One of the primary reasons for this rise is the melting of sea ice in the polar regions, especially the Arctic. The Arctic amplification furthers the idea that “what happens in the Arctic does not remain in the Arctic” and can substantially affect tropical processes far south.
📰 This maritime partnership is still a work in progress
It is far from clear whether India-U.S. ties are headed towards a comprehensive partnership in the Indian Ocean littorals
•The docking of the USNS Charles Drew, a United States Navy dry cargo ship, for repairs at an Indian facility in Chennai last week, marks an important first in the India-U.S. military relationship. Although bilateral strategic ties have advanced considerably over the past decade, reciprocal repair of military vessels was still a milestone that had not been crossed. With the arrival of Charles Drew at the Larsen and Toubro (L&T) facility at the Kattupalli dockyard, India and the U.S. seem to have moved past a self-imposed restriction.
Signs of a broader template
•As some see it, a renewed sense of optimism now drives India-U.S. relations. During the bilateral 2+2 dialogue held in April this year, the two countries agreed to explore the possibilities of using Indian shipyards for the repair and maintenance of ships of the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC). In the weeks following that meeting, the MSC carried out an exhaustive audit of Indian yards, and cleared the facility at Kattupalli for the repair of U.S. military vessels.
•The docking of a U.S. military vessel at an Indian facility has both functional and geopolitical implications. Functionally, it signals a more efficient leveraging of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) — the military logistics agreement India signed with the U.S. in 2017. Thus far, India-U.S. cooperation under the pact had largely been confined to the exchange of fuel and stores during joint exercises and relief operations. With the arrival of a U.S. military vessel at an Indian dockyard, the template of logistics cooperation seems to have broadened. There is a good possibility now that India would seek reciprocal access to repair facilities at U.S. bases in Asia and beyond.
•Many in India, meanwhile, are seeing the U.S. ship’s docking as a global endorsement of Indian shipbuilding and ship-repair capabilities. In recent years, New Delhi has sought to showcase its private shipyards, in particular the L&T, which has developed significant ship design and construction capability at its yards in Hazira (Gujarat) and Kattupalli. At a time when the Indian Navy has taken delivery of the INS Vikrant, the country’s first indigenously constructed aircraft carrier, the spirits of Indian shipbuilders are already riding high. As Indian observers see it, the presence of the USNS Charles Drew in an Indian dockyard is a boost for ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ and ‘Make-in-India’.
The political signal
•Politically, too, the development is noteworthy, as it signals a consolidation of the India-U.S. partnership, and the Quadrilateral (India, Japan, Australia and the United States) Security Dialogue. Despite its intention to strengthen logistics exchanges among Quad members, New Delhi has desisted from offering foreign warships access to Indian facilities. Notwithstanding the odd refuelling of foreign warships and aircraft in Indian facilities, India’s military establishment has been wary of any moves that would create the impression of an anti-China alliance. Yet, Indian decision makers evidently are willing to be more ambitious with the India-U.S. strategic relationship. New Delhi’s decision to open up repair facilities for the U.S. military suggests greater Indian readiness to accommodate the maritime interests of India’s Quad partners.
•For Washington, the strategic implications of the docking in India are no less tangible. This is an incremental step forward in the U.S. moving to bolster its military presence in the Eastern Indian Ocean. Recent assessments of the evolving security picture in the Indian Ocean point to the possibility of China’s military expansion in the Asian littorals, holding at risk U.S. and European assets. Reportedly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been readying to play a more active security role in the region. New Delhi’ s offer of repair services for U.S. military vessels could kickstart a process that would culminate in India opening up its naval bases for friendly foreign warships. At a time when New Delhi has shied away from backing the U.S. position in the Russia-Ukraine war, greater India-U.S. synergy in the Indian Ocean littorals could galvanise the supporters of closer bilateral ties. It would revive talk about the bilateral as a defining partnership in the Indian Ocean, and of India’s potential to counter China in the Indian Ocean. Coming on the heels of the delivery of the first two U.S. manufactured MH-60R (Multi Role Helicopters) to India (with a third craft due to arrive later this month) the visit of the USNS Charles Drew has given Indian and U.S. observers much to be optimistic about.
CMF cooperation
•Meanwhile, the Indian Navy has formally commenced its cooperation with the Bahrain-based multilateral partnership, Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), as an ‘associate member’. This comes months after India had announced its intention to join the grouping in furtherance of its regional security goals. India’s political and military leadership is seeing this as a demonstration of Indian commitment towards the collective responsibility of ensuring security in the shared commons.
•Indian analysts, however, ought not to overread developments, as extrapolating from perceived trends can often be misleading. The reality is that the India-U.S. relationship is still some way from crossing a critical threshold. For all the hype in the media surrounding India’s membership of the CMF, the modalities of the engagement are still being worked out. The Indian Navy, it seems, has stopped short of formally joining the group, of which the Pakistan Navy is a key member. According to the CMF website, “associate members provide the assistance that they can offer, if they have the time and capacity to do so, whilst undertaking national tasking”. This is not unlike India’s earlier model of cooperation, whereby the Indian Navy worked alongside CMF and other security forces in the Western Indian Ocean on a need-to basis — all while operating independently, and under the broader banner of the United Nations. Despite increased engagement with the U.S. Navy, India’s liaison officer at the U.S. Navy component (NAVCENT, or the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command) in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is still the military attaché at the Indian Embassy in Bahrain.
Limited in scope now
•Even with the docking of the U.S. vessel at Kattupalli, Indian analysts ought to recognise that the U.S. military sealift command has no warships. The MSC is charged with delivering supplies to U.S. bases, and deals only with transport vessels of the U.S. Navy. The agreement with India for the repair of U.S. military vessels is limited to cargo ships. U.S. decision makers are unlikely to seek Indian facilities for repair and replenishment of U.S. destroyers and frigates in the near future until New Delhi is clear about the need for strategic cooperation with the U.S. Navy.
•By many accounts, then, the India-U.S. maritime relationship remains a work in progress. There has doubtless been some movement ahead, but it is far from clear whether navy-to-navy ties are headed towards a wide-ranging and comprehensive partnership in the Indian Ocean littorals.
📰 Finding a home
The established adoption process should not be bypassed to increase the numbers
•Policy intervention without knowledge of the ground realities often ends up as an exercise in self-gratification for those in authority and results in little or no benefit for the intended target group. Wanting to do good must be matched by knowing the right thing to do in the circumstance, and in the case of children, be guided by child-centric policies. Whether the recent recommendation of a parliamentary panel to bring more abandoned children into the adoption process will fulfil these parameters is an issue that warrants further discussion. A recent report, “Review of Guardianship and Adoption Laws”, by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances and Law and Justice has pointed to the huge mismatch between the number of people wanting to adopt children and the number of children legally available for adoption, and suggested that the way to remedy that would be to ensure that “orphan and abandoned children found begging on the streets… are made available for adoption at the earliest”. To do so, it has suggested periodic district surveys to identify children who are orphaned/abandoned. The report argued that in a country with millions of orphans, only 2,430 children were available for adoption. It is true that there are always more people wanting to adopt children than the number of children actually available for adoption; it has been so historically, but the increasing chasm, as the report indicates, will undoubtedly have to be addressed. According to the report, there were 27,939 prospective parents registered with the Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA) as on December 2021, from nearly 18,000 in 2017. There were 6,996 orphaned, abandoned and surrendered children residing in childcare institutions considered adoptable, but only 2,430 were declared legally free for adoption by Child Welfare Committees. It claimed that the waiting time for adoption had increased to three years from one year, in the past five years. The total number of children adopted in 2021-22 was only 3,175.
•But the process of adoption in the country was tightened — procedurally and legally — in response to rampant malpractices and inter-country adoption rackets. CARA was installed as the nodal body for in-country and inter-country adoptions, to monitor and regulate the process, ensuring through stringent rules that the adoption is in the best interests of the child, and no illegality is involved. While the parliamentary committee has interpreted that there is automatic happiness when a child in an institution is placed in a home, it is important to exercise caution. No doubt, the country should take care of its children orphaned due to circumstances, but even as it acknowledges that institutionalisation may be detrimental over the long term, it should pay equal attention to the finer aspects of child care, and allow itself to be guided by a child-centric philosophy. There are no shortcuts in ensuring orphaned children come to no harm.
