📰 Sticking to commitments
India must set an example by balancing energy use and climate goals
•Ahead of the 27th Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC (COP 27), in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, in November, the Union Cabinet has approved India’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), a formal statement detailing its action plan to address climate change. The 2015 Paris Agreement requires countries to spell out a pathway to ensure the globe does not heat beyond 2°C, and endeavour to keep it below 1.5°C by 2100. The subsequent COPs are a quibbling arena where countries coax, cajole and make compromises on the cuts they can undertake over multi-decadal timelines with the least impact on their developmental priorities. While the end product of the COP is a joint agreement, signed by all member countries, the real business begins after, where countries must submit NDCs every five years, mapping what will be done post 2020 to stem fossil-fuel emissions. India’s first NDC, in 2015, specified eight targets, the most salient of them being reducing the emissions intensity of GDP by 33%-35% (of 2005 levels) by 2030, having 40% of its installed electricity capacity sourced from renewable energy, and creating an additional carbon sink of 2.5-3 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent through forest and tree cover by 2030. Being a large, populous country, India has high net emissions but low per-capita emissions. It has also, by participating in COPs for decades, made the case that the existing climate crisis is largely due to industrialisation by the U.S. and developed European countries since 1850. However, years of negotiations, international pressure and clearer evidence of the multi-dimensional impact from climate change have seen India agree to move away from fossil fuels over time.
•At COP 26 in Glasgow in 2021, Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid out five commitments, or ‘Panchamrit’, as the Government references it, which included India increasing its non-fossil energy capacity to 500 GW by 2030 and achieving “Net Zero” by 2070, or no net carbon dioxide emitted from energy sources. However, the press statement on the Cabinet decision was silent on whether India would cut emissions by a billion tons and on creating carbon sinks. While India is within its right to specify its emissions pathway, it should not — at any forum — promise more than what it can deliver as this undermines the moral authority that India brings to future negotiations. India has expressed its intent, via several legislations, to use energy efficiently and many of its biggest corporations have committed to shifting away from polluting energy sources. Going ahead, these should be grounds for India, at its pace, to be an exemplar for balancing energy use, development and meeting climate goals.
‘Wrong notion about immunity from action by agencies when House session is on’
•Rajya Sabha Chairman M. Venkaiah Naidu said on Friday that members have a wrong notion that they have a privilege from action by the investigating agencies while the session is on.
•The Congress has been protesting against the alleged misuse of Central agencies such as the Enforcement Directorate (ED), the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Income Tax Department by the government to “frame” political rivals.
•The Congress members had on Thursday forced adjournments in the Upper House when Leader of the Opposition Mallikarjun Kharge said he had received summons from the ED to appear before the agency even while the House was in session. Priyanka Chaturvedi of the Shiv Sena too raised the issue of the arrest of Sanjay Raut by the ED saying that the Chairman should have been apprised of the situation.
•On Friday too, protests by the Congress members on the issue led to an adjournment by nearly 30 minutes.
•As the House assembled, Mr. Naidu said, “Going by what has happened in the past few days, I want to clarify one thing that there is a wrong notion among the members that they have a privilege from action by agencies while the session is on.”
•He said he had examined all the precedents and under Article 105 of the Constitution, MPs enjoyed certain privileges so that they can perform their parliamentary duties without any hindrance. “One of the privileges is that a Member of Parliament cannot be arrested in a civil case, 40 days before the commencement of the session or committee meeting and 40 days thereafter. This privilege is already incorporated under section 135A of the Civil Procedure Code.
•However, in criminal matters, MPs are not on a different footing than a common citizen. “It means that an MP does not enjoy any immunity from being arrested in a criminal case during the session or otherwise,” Mr. Naidu said.
•He recounted a ruling given in 1966 by Dr. Zakir Hussain that said, “Members of Parliament do enjoy certain privileges so that they can perform their duties. One such privilege is freedom from arrest when Parliament is in session. This privilege of freedom from arrest is limited only to civil cases and has not been allowed to interfere in the administration of criminal proceedings.”
•Mr. Naidu asked the members to recall an observation made earlier by him in which he said, “No member should avoid appearing before any investigating agency when she or he is called upon to do so by citing reason of House duty. As lawmakers, it is our bounden duty to respect the law and legal procedures. It applies to all, in all cases, because you can only inform that the House is in session, seeking further date, but you cannot avoid the enforcement agencies or their summons or notices.”
📰 Lessons for India from the Taiwan standoff
New Delhi must note that Taiwan’s close economic links with China have not stopped Taipei from asserting its rights
•The brief visit by the United States House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan, against stern warnings issued by China, has the potential to increase the already deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and China, with major implications for Taiwan. For China, its claims about a rising superpower might ring hollow if it is unable to unify its claimed territories, in particular Taiwan. For the U.S., it is about re-establishing steadily-diminishing American credibility in the eyes of its friends and foes. For Taiwan, it is about standing up to Chinese bullying and making its red lines clear to Beijing. The crisis that began with the visit of Ms. Pelosi to Taipei is still unfolding and there is little clarity today on how it will wind down even though it is unlikely to lead to a full-scale invasion of Taiwan or a war between China and the U.S.
•For those of us in India watching the events as they unfold around Taiwan, there are valuable lessons to be learnt. To begin with, consider this. A small island of 23 million people has decided to stand up to one of the strongest military and economic powers on the planet, braving existential consequences. India is a far more powerful nation armed with nuclear weapons and with a 1.4 million standing military against whom China has only marginal territorial claims. And yet, India continues to be hesitant about calling China’s bluff.
•To be fair, there is growing recognition in New Delhi that it is important to meet the challenge posed by a belligerent China, but there appears to be a lack of clarity on how to meet this challenge. To that extent, the Taiwan crisis offers New Delhi three lessons, at the very least.
Unambiguous messaging
•The most important lesson from the Taiwan standoff for policymakers in New Delhi is the importance of articulating red lines and sovereign positions in an unambiguous manner. New Delhi needs to unambiguously highlight the threat from China and the sources of such a threat. Any absence of such clarity will be cleverly utilised by Beijing to push Indian limits, as we have already seen. More pertinently, Beijing, like everyone else analysing the Indian reactions to the standoff at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 2020, realises that one of the major reasons behind New Delhi’s rather muddled articulation of the Chinese aggression two years ago is domestic political calculations.
•Till date, India’s leadership has not clarified to the country what really went on at the border in 2020 and whether China continues to be in illegal occupation of Indian territory. When domestic political calculations prevent India’s leaders from acknowledging the China threat, it provides Beijing the cover of ambiguity to pursue its territorial claims vis-à-vis India.
•Moreover, Chinese Psy-Ops will continue to exploit the absence of a national position or narrative in India about the threat that China poses. Even worse, ambiguous messaging by India also confuses its friends in the international community: If India does not clearly articulate that China is in illegal occupation of its territory, how can it expect its friends in the international community to support India diplomatically or otherwise? In other words, India’s current policy of ‘hide and seek’ vis-à-vis China amounts to poor messaging, and confusing to its own people as well as the larger international community, and is therefore counterproductive.
Appeasement is bad strategy
•Taiwan could have avoided the ongoing confrontation and the economic blockade during Chinese retaliatory military exercises around its territory by avoiding Ms. Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, or perhaps even keeping it low key. Instead, it chose to go ahead with the visit, with high-profile meetings and statements in full public view, thereby making it clear to China that it is unwilling to back down from its declared aims, no matter what the consequences were. Appeasement of China, Taiwan knows, is not the answer to Beijing’s aggression.
•China today is a revisionist power, challenging the regional order; is intent on using force to meet its strategic objectives, and is desirous of reshaping the regional balance of power to suit its interests. With such a power, appeasement might work in the short term, but will invariably backfire over the long term. If so, we in India may be guilty of playing into Chinese hands by committing four mistakes.
•First, India’s policy of meeting/hosting Chinese leaders while the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continue(d) to violate established territorial norms on the LAC is a deeply flawed one. Recall the stand-off at Demchok and Chumar during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in 2014, and the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, earlier this year, to India again, even as Chinese troops continue to be in occupation of Indian territory. While one could argue that diplomacy must go on despite the problems on the border, there is indeed a danger of Beijing viewing such diplomacy as examples of India’s acquiescence despite provocations.
•The second mistake is unilaterally catering to Chinese sensitivities even during the standoffs between the two militaries. For instance, the parliamentary delegation visits and legislature-level dialogues between India and Taiwan have not taken place since 2017, coinciding with the Doklam standoff which took place that year. Why bother respecting Chinese political sensitives around Taiwan or Tibet when it is in illegal occupation of Indian territory, and seeks more territory from India?
•The third mistake was the soft-peddling of the Quad (Australia, Japan, India and the United States) when China objected to it. During the 2000s, India (as well as Australia) decided to soft-peddle the Quad in the face of strong Chinese objections. It is only in the last two years or so that we have witnessed renewed enthusiasm around the Quad. In retrospect, appeasing Beijing by almost abandoning the Quad was bad strategy.
•Perhaps the gravest mistake India has made has been the non-acknowledgement of the PLA’s intrusion into Indian territory in 2020, and its capture and occupation of Indian territory along the LAC since. Let us be clear: unwilling to acknowledge China’s illegal occupation of Indian territory along the LAC, for whatever reason, amounts to an ill-advised appeasement strategy, which must end.
Flawed argument
•It is often argued that the growing economic and trading relationship between India and China is reason enough to ensure that tensions between the two sides do not escalate, and that the two sides must find ways of co-existing peacefully. While it appears to be a sound argument, let me pose that argument somewhat differently: is the economic relationship reason enough for India to continue to ignore recurring Chinese incursions on the LAC and keep making territorial compromises? Put differently, given that the economic relationship is a two-way process and that, as a matter of fact, the trade deficit is in China’s favour, China too has a lot to lose from a damaged trade relationship with India. More so, if the Taiwan example (as well as the India-China standoff in 2020) is anything to go by, trade can continue to take place despite tensions and without India making any compromises vis-à-vis its sovereign claims.
•Consider this. Mainland China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, and China has an annual trade deficit of around $80 billion to $130 billion with Taiwan. More so, investments from Taiwan to China were to the tune of $198.3 billion by 2021, whereas investments from mainland China to Taiwan were only $2.5 billion from 2009 to 2021. In other words, Taiwan knows that despite the sabre-rattling by Beijing, given the economic interdependence between the two sides, China is unlikely to stop trading with Taiwan for, after all, China is dependent on the semiconductors produced in Taiwan in a big way.
•In other words, the close economic relationship with China has not stopped Taiwan from asserting its rights, nor has it backed down under Chinese threats. So, should India, a far bigger economy and a military power, buckle under Chinese pressure worrying about the economic relationship with China? India for sure should do business with China, but not on China’s own terms.
📰 Addressing the challenges in new-age digital commerce
Online Dispute Resolution, or ODR, can help mitigate litigation risk and provide insights into consumer problems
•India’s consumer behaviour has experienced a radical transformation at the most fundamental levels. The rise in smartphone use fuelled by affordable data plans has catalysed an online revolution in the country. The novel coronavirus pandemic has further accelerated the process of digital inclusion, and it is now not only routine to transact online and have food, personal care items or anything else delivered at the one’s doorstep, but it is also common to learn online, have medical consultations online, and even resolve disputes online.
•These realisations have given India the opportunity to disrupt the status quo with its innovative abilities. Systems such as the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) and Aadhaar, the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and the Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission have reengineered markets.
•Despite the rapid advancement of digital platforms on the one hand and the pervasiveness of the Internet-enabled phone on the other, small enterprises such as local kirana stores have not gained from this. Online purchases from “near and now” inventory from the local store remain in a digital vacuum. This is because, to sell on numerous platforms, sellers must maintain a separate infrastructure, which only adds costs and limits participation. The distinct terms and conditions of each platform further limit the sellers’ flexibility. Consequently, small and medium-sized businesses have lost their freedom to choose and participate in the country’s e-commerce system at their will and on their terms. Alarmingly, centralising digital commerce transactions on a single platform creates a single point of failure.
Wider choice and access
•Given this objective, the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) of the Government of India established the Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC) to level the playing field by developing open e-commerce and enabling access to small businesses and dealers. The ONDC network makes it possible for products and services from all participating e-commerce platforms to be displayed in search results across all network apps. For instance, a consumer shopping for a product on an e-commerce app named “X” would also receive results from e-commerce app named “Y”, if both X and Y integrated their platforms with the ONDC. This achieves the dual objective of wider choice for consumers on the one hand and access to a wider consumer base for sellers on the other.
•The ONDC began its pilot in five cities in April 2022, i.e., New Delhi, Bengaluru, Coimbatore, Bhopal and Shillong. Currently, the pilot has expanded to 18 cities, and there are immediate plans to add more cities. With India’s e-commerce industry set to reach $200 billion by 2027, this shift from a platform-centric paradigm to democratisation of the nation’s online market will catalyse the inclusion of millions of small business owners and kirana businesses.
Better outcomes
•Disputes will be the obvious by-product of this e-commerce revolution. Therefore, it is imperative to support this initiative with a modern-day, cost-effective, timely and high-speed dispute resolution system. The framework must adequately and efficiently cater to facets such as participants residing or operating in different geographic regions and the mass prevalence of low-value online transactions. Online Dispute Resolution, or ODR as it is popularly called, has the propensity to work alongside the incumbent setup and deliver quick, affordable and enforceable outcomes. The ODR is not restricted to the use of legal mechanisms such as mediation, conciliation and arbitration in an online environment but can be tailormade for the specific use case keeping the participants in mind. While the ODR commonly involves case management systems, integration of communication technologies such as email, SMS, WhatsApp, Interactive Voice Response, audio/video conferencing, overtime and with appropriate data sets in place, it can also involve advanced automation, the use of technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning to enable resolutions at the same time as it would take to initiate a transaction over the network.
•From making dispute resolution simple to handling complex multi-party disputes; from 24x7 accessibility from the remotest regions to availability in regional languages; from enabling a safe and secure online infrastructure to ensuring minimal touchpoints, the ODR can not only digitise the entire value chain but can also facilitate an enhanced user experience.
•Many e-commerce companies have turned to the ODR with the realisation that in order to maximise transactions it is important to ensure a positive dispute resolution experience. For example, the eBay Resolution Center uses the ODR and resolves over 60 million disputes between small traders every year through a platform that enables dealers and purchasers to directly communicate and, for the most part, without the assistance of a third party. Alibaba, one of the world’s largest retailers and e-commerce companies, too has adopted the ODR to resolve disputes arising out of transactions over the platform.
There is growing adoption
•The ODR is no more a distant dream for India as well. Governments, regulators and private enterprises have been adopting and encouraging its use. For instance, the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) has mandated platforms in the UPI ecosystem to adopt the ODR for complaints and grievances connected to failed transactions. Ingram, SEBI SCORES (or the Securities and Exchange Board of India SEBI COm plaints REdress System), RBI CMS (or the Reserve Bank of India Complaint Management System), MahaRERA (or the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority), MSME Samadhaan (or the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Delayed Payment Monitoring System), and RTIOnline (or the Right to Information Online) are other examples of ODR systems that are widely used in the country.
•The ODR will help mitigate litigation risk and provide valuable insights into problems faced by consumers. The courts and consumer forums can do away with matters which do not warrant their intervention, thus easing the judicial logjam. Consumers are provided with another choice for effective redress of their grievances, thereby building trust, confidence and brand loyalty. A dispute resolution framework that includes a customised ODR process can play a role in the network achieving its steep five-year target of adding $48 billion in gross merchandise value to India’s e-commerce market, a network of 90 crore buyers and 12 crore sellers with the least hiccups.
