📰 The selfishness and graft of the rich drive inequality
The central argument of Almåsa et al., that this is seen in countries with weak institutions, is corroborated in India
•G.K. Chesterton, the writer, asserted in The Flying Inn (1914): “The rich are the scum of the earth in every country”. Perhaps not all but many.
•Our contention is that their selfishness, criminality and corruption aggravate inequality. Much experimental evidence corroborates this hypothesis.
Some insights
•A particularly compelling case for ‘Selfish Rich Inequality’ is constructed by Almåsa et al. (2022), based on an analysis of the Gallup World Poll of 2018; that is, whether the rich are richer than the poor because they have been more selfish in life than the latter. They demonstrate that the non-productive grabbing behaviour of the rich is typical of countries with weak institutions, stemming from a weak rule of law, malfunctioning bureaucracy and corruption. Hence, people in such countries are more likely to believe that the rich have become richer because they have been involved in selfish grabbing activities. Support for the selfish rich inequality hypothesis rises with the level of corruption and decreases with an individual’s rank in the country’s income distribution. This study’s final analysis shows that popular belief in selfish rich inequality is positively associated with broad agreement that inequality in their country is unfair and that the government should aim to reduce it.
•A distillation of our econometric analysis using the Gallup World Poll Data of 2018 for India, along with the Fairness-Across-The-World module provided by FAIR–The Choice Lab, NHH Norwegian School of Economics, offers rich insights. Note that this is an analysis of respondents’ beliefs and not the actual behaviour of the rich. Also, as these responses are focused on the rich inequality hypothesis, we cannot disentangle these from beliefs about selfishness of the rich per se; we restrict our analysis to the inequality hypothesis.
•As the age of the respondent rises, the belief in the rich inequality hypothesis becomes stronger. We also find that religiosity of an individual reinforces this belief.
•State-level characteristics yield rich insights too. State affluence is measured in terms of net state domestic product per capita. There is a strong negative association between the rich inequality hypothesis and state affluence. Or, more specifically, significantly larger respondents in more affluent states do not support this hypothesis. Whether better employment opportunities, health care and schooling more than offset the beliefs in this hypothesis are plausible. However, if more affluent states also are those with higher income inequality (measured as a ratio of share of the top 1% in total income divided by the share of the bottom 50% a la Piketty (2014), it is confirmed that significantly more respondents believe in the inequality hypothesis. In other words, if growth is not inclusive, it engenders resentment against the rich and a strong belief in the hypothesis in question.
Criminality and corruption
•In a variation, if state influence is interacted with the incidence of crime (measured as the number of convictions per lakh of population), a significantly large number of respondents corroborate the rich inequality hypothesis. Or, a significantly large number of respondents are prone to believe that in an affluent state infested with criminality, the rich get richer through illegal, grabbing activities (rich traders, for example, evade local taxes by bribing officials).
•However, it is intriguing that the state corruption index, obtained from the India Corruption Report (2019), is negatively associated with the rich inequality hypothesis, implying that more respondents in highly corrupt States reject this hypothesis. It is of course plausible that more corruption you observe in your community and elsewhere makes you immune to corruption among the rich. However, respondents in States which are more corrupt and display greater extreme inequality are more likely to believe in corruption of the rich and thus corroborate the hypothesis in question.
States, their governments
•The overall state political and economic environment conditions the principal (voters)–agent (public institutions in a State including the State government, judiciary and the police) relationship. The lower the trust/confidence in the agent, the harder it is to sustain growth, and maintain accountability and transparency. The National Democratic Alliance regime, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has overcentralised decision-making and pursued, aggressively, Hindutva, negating, if not destroying, State autonomy. While minorities have been humiliated, assaulted and killed, often without provocation, there are also serious allegations of promoting crony capitalism. So, it is not just some billionaires who have flourished but their criminality and corruption have been sidestepped, if not ignored altogether.
•In order to probe the outcomes of drastic policy shifts, we have classified States into those ruled by the BJP and others. We do not find any association between BJP-ruled States and the rich inequality hypothesis. However, when we interact BJP-ruled States with the corruption index, we get the striking result that the association between the hypothesis in question and the interacted variable is positive. In other words, more respondents in BJP-ruled States with high corruption corroborate the rich inequality hypothesis. So, while the BJP is not responsible for the inequality associated with the rich, in an environment of high corruption with the BJP as the ruling party, more respondents corroborate this hypothesis.
Issue of trust in institutions
•To conclude, the central argument of Almåsa et al. (2022), that the rich are richer because they engage in non-productive grabbing behaviour in countries with weak institutions, stemming from a weak rule of law, malfunctioning bureaucracy and corruption, is largely corroborated in India. Whether it is feasible to strengthen public institutions in the present context seems a tall order. Indeed, as argued by us elsewhere, our trust in these institutions may be fast approaching a cliff effect, marking a very rapid erosion and a sharp worsening of the inequality driven by the selfishness, criminality and corruption of the rich.
The moral content of democracy cannot be eroded and India expects better compliance of the law by its lawmakers
•The political developments in Maharashtra throw up troubling questions about how the political class is emasculating the anti-defection law which was described by the Supreme Court of India as “constitutional correctives against a legislatively perceived political evil of unprincipled defections induced by the lure of office and monitory inducements”. Almost with the farsight of a clairvoyant, the Supreme Court drew the attention of citizens to the very danger of subversion of democracy by unprincipled defection.
•The ongoing developments in Maharashtra have once again brought before the country the reality of what the Supreme Court also described as the political evil of unprincipled defection. But the greatest irony is that the order of the Supreme Court, on June 27, on petitions from the dissidents in the Shiv Sena, gives undue advantage to the dissident legislators. The Court has granted them a longer time to submit replies than the rules mandate. This order is going to set in motion certain political developments which will resurrect in a big way what the Supreme Court characterised as political evil; it was to prevent this that the anti-defection law was enacted in 1985.
Important thrust areas
•To put the issue in perspective, let us quickly run through the thrust areas of this law. It was enacted as the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, in 1985, under Rajiv Gandhi’s premiership. It was actually the culmination of long years of debate, deliberations, disagreements, formulations and reformulations, with finally a consensus. The law as it was enacted provided for the disqualification of a legislator belonging to a political party if he voluntarily gave up his membership of his party or if he defied the whip of his party by voting contrary to its directions in the legislative house. Initially, there were two exceptions provided in the schedule which would exempt a legislator from disqualification. The first exception was a split in their original political party resulting in the formation of a group of legislators. If the group consisted of one third of such legislators of that party, they were exempted from disqualification. This exception was deleted from the schedule through a Constitution Amendment Act of 2003 because of frequent misuse of this provision.
•The second exception was ‘merger’ which can be invoked when the original political party of a legislator merges with another party and not less than two thirds of its legislators agree to such a merger. So, if a legislator shows that his original party has merged with another party and he and his colleagues who constitute two thirds of the legislators of that party have agreed to the merger, then he and his colleagues will be exempted from disqualification.
Interpretation of ‘merger’
•It is this exception contained in paragraph four of the schedule which has been taken recourse to by a large number of legislators across States and even in Parliament to defect to the ruling party. These legislators interpreted for themselves the term ‘merger’ to mean the merger of two thirds of legislators. They convinced themselves that the merger of their original party is not necessary, mainly because it is not a possibility. Politics being the art of the possible, they believed that what is not ordinarily possible can be conveniently ignored.
•Now, this story is being repeated in Maharashtra. But there is a little difference here. It appears that the dissidents of Shiv Sena believed that if they get the two third number they can form a separate group and topple the government and then form a government with the help of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Although the Maharashtra Chief Minister has resigned and the direction of the Governor to hold a floor test has become infructuous, the issue arising out of the anti-defection petitions is still live and needs to be addressed by the next Speaker.
•The law imposes the condition of merger of the original political party (namely, the Shiv Sena) which is not likely to happen now or in the future. If there is no merger of the original party, then these dissidents cannot claim any exception from disqualification no matter whether they are two thirds or three fourths. However, a recent judgment of the Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court (Girish Chodankar vs The Speaker, Goa State Legislative) that held that the merger of two thirds of Members of the Legislative Assembly is deemed to be the merger of the original party seems to have given them a ray of hope. This judgment, unfortunately, does not reflect the correct law and needlessly complicates it. Nevertheless, this judgment too emphasises the need for merger with another party. So, the legal position is if the dissidents do not merge with another party they will be disqualified now or later. They cannot operate as a separate group in the Assembly because the law does not permit them to do so.
On disqualification
•Now, disqualification petitions have been filed by the Shiv Sena against 16 of the dissidents under paragraph 2(1)(a) on the ground that they have voluntarily given up the membership of the party. The question of whether they have voluntarily given up the membership of the party is decided on the basis of the conduct of a member. In Ravi S. Naik vs Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court had said “an inference can be drawn from the conduct of a member that he has voluntarily given up the membership of the party to which he belongs”. Wilful non-participation in a crucial meeting of a party whose government is facing a serious crisis because of them, may, in the present circumstances, offer the ground for disqualification.
Point of intervention
•However, the notice of no-confidence against the Deputy Speaker has added another piece to the jigsaw puzzle. The intervention by the Supreme Court too has thrown up some crucial questions regarding the operation of the anti-defection law.
•The first question is whether the Court can intervene at a stage prior to the decision by the Deputy Speaker. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had held in Kihoto Hollohan (1993) that judicial review cannot be available prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker nor at an interlocutory stage of the proceeding. Giving longer time to the dissidents to submit replies is contrary to this decision. The mandatory period for replying to the charge is seven days under the rule. The court gave them 15 days. It is an intervention at the interlocutory stage which was barred by the Constitution Bench.
•Another question of considerable importance is whether the Deputy Speaker can decide the disqualification petition when a no-confidence motion is pending against him. The Supreme Court had held in Nabam Rebia (2016) that the Speaker shall not decide the disqualification cases till the no-confidence motion against him is disposed of. In the Maharashtra case, the Deputy Speaker who had assumed the duties of the Speaker because of the vacancy in the office of the Speaker, did not admit the notice of no-confidence because he had doubts about the authenticity of the notice. The House rules clearly say that the notice of no-confidence against the Speaker/Deputy Speaker needs to be admitted in the first place which is done only by the Speaker. Rules do not recognise any other authority for admitting a notice. But it is the House which takes the final decision on the motion. If the notice of no-confidence does not contain specific charges, it can be disallowed by the Speaker. Therefore, in this case, there is no occasion to say that the Speaker cannot be a judge in his own cause. Disallowing a notice does not prevent Members from giving another notice complying with the requirements of the rule. Further, the notice can be given only if the House is summoned. When the notice was given, the Assembly was not convened. So, the notice against the Deputy Speaker can have no validity under the rules. Therefore, it cannot be said that the notice is pending against the Deputy Speaker.
An observation, its spirit
•The anti-defection law is facing many challenges. Since it deals with the political class, the challenges are grave. The law, though not perfect, is a serious attempt to strengthen the moral content of democracy. Piloting the Bill on the Tenth Schedule, then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, said, “There are lots of areas in this Bill which are grey. We are covering new grounds… it is better for us to tread cautiously than to make serious errors and repent later. There will be shortcomings in this Bill but as we see and identify those shortcomings we will try to overcome them.”
•Parliament needs to recapture the spirit of this observation. The anti-defection law needs to be strengthened and not weakened. The nation expects better compliance of the law by the lawmakers.
📰 Home and abroad
PM Modi’s G-7 commitments on protecting freedoms will face scrutiny in India
•Geopolitics trumped economics at the annual summit of the world’s “most industrialised” countries, as the G-7 is known, at the German resort of Schloss Elmau, a summit Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended, along with other special invitees from Argentina, Indonesia, Senegal, and South Africa. While the G-7 countries did have some economic initiatives on their agenda, including the launch of a $600 billion U.S.-led Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), commitments on fighting climate change, funding renewable energy changes, mitigating inflation and managing the continued global crisis over the COVID-19 pandemic, it was clear that most of the deliberations took aim at the twin challenges seen from Russia and China. The 28-page communiqué alternated between outlining the challenges to the international order that emanate from Moscow’s war in Ukraine (including tightening sanctions, the impact on energy markets, and cybersecurity threats), and Beijing’s “expansive maritime claims”, rights violations, and unsustainable debt creation in lower income countries. The G-7 countries issued separate statements on support for Ukraine, food security and a ‘Climate Club’. In addition, the G-7 and special invitee “partner countries” issued a statement on “Resilient Democracies”, committing to free and fair elections, protecting freedom of expression, and gender empowerment. The message for Russia and China was made even more pointed at the subsequent NATO Summit in Madrid, where the U.S.’s Transatlantic allies invited the U.S.’s Trans-Pacific allies to discuss security challenges.
•Given the targeted nature of the G-7 outcomes, India had its work cut out as a balancing power. Prime Minister Narendra Modi made it clear that it is the developing world that needs the most support, including to weather the “knock-on” effects of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The Government sought to distance itself from the PGII, pitched as a G-7 counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and made it evident that India had only signed on to the statements on “Resilient Democracies” and a “Just Energy Transition”, and not the many statements castigating Russia and China, much like Mr. Modi had, at the earlier BRICS summit, stayed away from President Putin and President Xi’s stringent criticism of the West. On the global stage, the G-7 outcomes mean New Delhi will have to continue to walk a tightrope between these two blocs that are growing more polarised and inimical towards each other. On the Indian stage, Mr. Modi’s G-7 commitments will be scrutinised for his pronouncements on democracy, and his written assurance that his government will protect civic society, freedoms of expression and “thought, conscience, religion or belief”, which are facing challenges within the country.
📰 A road safety quartet and the road ahead
What are the key observations made by the new analytical series on road safety published inThe Lancet?
•A new analytical series on road safety worldwide, published by The Lancet, proposes that India could cut accident-related deaths by 25 to 40% based on evidence that preventive interventions produce good outcomes when applied to well-known risk factors.
•Using the Global Burden of Disease data, a statistical model was constructed to estimate the number of lives that could be saved with interventions in the respective areas for each country. An average of 20,554 lives could have been saved in India with a reduction in speeds, 5,683 with helmet interventions and 3,204 with seatbelts.
•The authors of The Lancet point out that legislation without enforcement ends in failure. India amended its law on motor vehicles in 2019, but its implementation by State governments is not uniform or complete.
•The story so far: In spite of several years of policymaking to improve road safety, India remains among the worst-performing countries in this area with a toll of 1,47,913 lives lost to road traffic accidents in 2017 as per Ministry of Road Transport and Highways statistics. The National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) figure for the same year is 1,50,093 road accident deaths. Further, India’s data on road crash mortality are seen as an undercount, and the Global Burden of Disease report for 2017 estimates, based on verbal autopsy sources, that there were 2,18,876 deaths. The persistently high annual death toll brings into question the country’s ability to meet Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3.6, which aims to halve the fatalities and injuries from road traffic accidents by 2030. The United Nations is holding a high-level meeting on Global Road Safety on June 30 and July 1, 2022 to review the progress and challenges.
What are the new findings on road safety?
•A new analytical series on road safety worldwide, published by The Lancet, proposes that India and other countries could cut accident-related deaths by 25 to 40% based on evidence that preventive interventions produce good outcomes when applied to four well-known risk factors — high speed, driving under the influence of alcohol, not using proper helmets, not wearing seat-belts and not using child restraints. Globally, about 14 lakh people die in traffic accidents annually, and nearly five crore are injured; over half of those killed are pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists; Low and Middle Income Countries (LMIC) bear the maximum burden of road fatalities and injuries, with high economic costs — an average of three to five per cent of GDP — suffered by these countries in 2014.
•India amended its law on motor vehicles in 2019, but its implementation by State governments is not uniform or complete. A National Road Safety Board was constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, with advisory powers to reform safety. The focus of State governments, however, remains conventional, with an emphasis on user behaviour (drivers and other road users), education and uneven enforcement. Low emphasis is placed on structural change such as raising engineering standards for roads, signages, signals, training for scientific accident investigation, raising policing skills and fixing responsibility on government departments for design, creation and maintenance of road infrastructure.
How can four factors improve safety outcomes?
•The authors of The Lancet study used common predictors for individual countries, such as GDP per capita, population density, and governmental effectiveness measured through the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and built a statistical estimate of how interventions on the identified risk factors would influence injuries and death.
•Using the Global Burden of Disease data, a statistical model was constructed to estimate the number of lives that could be saved with interventions in the respective areas for each country. An average of 20,554 lives could have been saved in India with a reduction in speeds, 5,683 with helmet interventions and 3,204 with seatbelts. The savings for curbs on driving under the influence of alcohol were not quantified because the country does not report the percentage of such fatalities.
•In addition, the study series in The Lancet also calculates that 17% of road traffic injury-related deaths in LMICs could be avoided if trauma care facilities improved. This is significant as several accidents take place in rural areas on highways, and victims are taken to poorly-equipped district hospitals or medical college hospitals.
•While positive user behaviour — slower travel, wearing of helmets, seat belts and so on — could save thousands of lives, the structural problems linked to unplanned motorisation and urbanisation remain. In India, speedy highway construction without reconciling fast and slow-moving traffic, presence of ramshackle vehicles, rampant wrong-side driving, absence of adequate police forces to monitor vehicles and curb drunk driving, and poor trauma care in non-urban centres contribute to high death and disability rates.
•According to the Transport Ministry, more than 65% of those killed in road accidents in 2019 were in rural areas. Yet, the substantial death toll in densely populated urban centres — 32.9% — indicates that better engineering and enforcement can easily cut fatalities in the current decade, in the run up to the SDG goal year of 2030. This would be in consonance with the World Health Organization’s (WHO) decade of action on road safety, recognising it as a major public health issue, launched last year.
What can be done to cut death and injury rates?
•The ambitious amendments to the Motor Vehicles Act in 2019 (MV Act) have not yielded significant results, although the restrictions on vehicular movement for COVID-19 temporarily slowed the rising graph of fatalities and injuries. In many countries, post-COVID-19 driving has turned more unruly, leading to a rise in pedestrian deaths.
•Major interventions in India, first suggested by the Sundar Committee (2007) and ordered by the Supreme Court in S. Rajasekaran vs Union of India have not made a dent in the problem. The measures include setting up of an apex national body for road safety, and fixing decentralised responsibility at the district level.
•The Sundar Committee pointed out that India lacked a technically competent investigation arm that could determine the cause of accidents; the National Road Safety Board Rules, 2021, provide for the formation of technical working groups covering, among other things, crash investigation and forensics. There is little clarity on whether the States have formed such units to aid traffic investigation, or whether the insurance industry has pressed for these to accurately determine fault. In the absence of scientific investigation, perceptions usually guide the fixing of liability. The MV Act stipulates only a fine up to one lakh for failure to follow norms and stipulations by the designated authority, contractor, consultant or concessionaire, leading to death or disability, and there is little evidence that even this has been enforced after a public inquiry.
•The authors of The Lancet point out that legislation without enforcement ends in failure. Moreover, while proven interventions are proposed by WHO, absorptive capacities vary in LMICs. This is evident even in fast-growing India, since no single department bears responsibility to make roads safe. In the short term, slowing down traffic, particularly near habitations, segregating slower vehicles, enforcing seat belt and helmet use and cracking down on drunken drivers could produce measurable gains.
