📰 A direct approach to conservation
The mobilisation of private and public finance for Payments for Ecosystem Services lacks lustre
•Incentives for biodiversity protection and sustainable use include biodiversity-relevant taxes, fees, levies, tradeable permits, and Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES). Through these economic instruments, governments can affect both public and private financing flows for biodiversity. Mobilisation of biodiversity finance through pesticide levies, admission fees to natural parks, hunting and fishing permit fees, and the trade-in energy-saving certificates has gained governmental support and political will, but the mobilisation of private and public finance for PES has lacked lustre.
•Lack of academic research, governmental support, and political will have vexed environmental economists. Despite a solid theoretical foundation and the ability to tether investments more directly to outcomes, the debate revolves around the same issues from two decades: monetisation of environmental benefits, lack of additionality (how much environmental service would have been provided without conditional payments), and so on. In this article, I answer whether this is a missed or a lurking opportunity for biodiversity financing in India.
Increasing ecosystem services
•PES is one way to conserve and increase ecosystem services. It works through the establishment of performance contracts. People who can help provide the desired ecosystem service are rewarded based on their actions, or the quantity and quality of the services themselves. PES presents a unique scope for incentivising local land stewards to manage threatened ecosystems. It has the potential to achieve the dual goals of conservation and poverty alleviation towards the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals. This places PES as one of the pivotal economic instruments for conservation.
•However, PES has not achieved much attention either in the research or policy mandate in the Indian subcontinent. This is in sharp contrast to the successful implementation of PES in Latin American and African countries. In the Western Cape, South Africa, the CapeNature Stewardship Programme protects biodiversity on private lands. Kitengela, Kenya’s Wildlife Conservation Lease Programme, maintains open areas for wildlife and grazing on personal grounds. In terms of raising money, PES programmes such as Costa Rica’s Pago Por Servicios and Ecuador’s Socio Bosque were among the few to mobilise significant finances.
•Why have such economic incentives for ecological restoration not received academic, research, and policy prioritisation? A research paper published in Science by Ferraro and Kiss in 2002 argues that any successful PES programme is one that overcomes the impediments to implementation. Such limitations include a solid institutional mechanism capable of simultaneous transfer of funds from buyers to suppliers, monitoring through investment in local capacity building, cost efficiency, the scope for development benefits, and maintaining the sustainability of funds. A local monitoring mechanism is the key to successfully implementing a PES programme. A study (Sardana 2019) conducted in the Kodagu district of Karnataka to restore native trees that grow in the understory of coffee plantations shows a successfully designed local institutional mechanism for PES implementation. However, the PES mechanism is yet to be implemented or even tested for efficacy. The results of such studies offer support for potential research funding in restoration financing. Impact evaluation studies that evaluate financial instruments’ performance in attaining biodiversity are also important. The OECD (2019) Biodiversity: Finance and the Economic and Business Case for Action highlighted the importance of evaluating financial instruments’ performance in attaining biodiversity goals. According to recent OECD research, few thorough impact evaluation studies have been done for terrestrial biodiversity and fewer for ocean/marine biodiversity. The OECD advocates comprehensive impact evaluations and the formulation of strategic criteria to help determine which policies or initiatives warrant more scrutiny.
•Additionally, a strong policy thrust, such as the TEEB India Initiative highlighting the economic consequences of the loss of biological diversity, would help prioritise ecosystem restoration financing through a direct approach. A global initiative such as the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative to mobilise private sector finance to benefit people and the environment would help maintain the funds. The cheapest way to receive anything you desire is to pay for it directly. This would allow the country to effectuate the nation’s commitments to achieving the 2030 agenda for sustainable development and the Paris Agreement on climate change.
The crisis in Maharashtra and even earlier instances are grim reminders of what the Tenth Schedule can and cannot do
•In the din of India’s electoral politics, floor crossing by legislators rarely goes out of public discourse. The practice of legislators from changing political parties during their term continues unabated in Indian legislatures despite the Tenth Schedule having been inserted into the Constitution in 1985. Commonly known as the ‘anti-defection law’, it was meant to arrest the practice of legislators from changing political affiliations during their term in office. The political crisis in Maharashtra, and many others before it, are grim reminders of what the Tenth Schedule can and cannot do.
Law on defections, ‘mergers’
•Instances of floor crossing have long gone unchecked and unpunished. In part, this can be attributed to the exemption given to mergers between political parties which facilitate bulk defections. In 2019, MLAs in the Goa Legislative Assembly from the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP), crossed over to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The Speaker of the Assembly as well as the Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissed the pleas seeking disqualification of these MLAs. Both these authorities held that because the MLAs formed two-thirds of their respective legislature parties, disqualification under the Tenth Schedule was not possible. In other words, there was a “deemed merger” of the INC and the MGP with the BJP.
•The second paragraph of the Tenth Schedule allows for disqualification of an elected member of a House if such member belonging to any political party has voluntarily given up membership of their party, or if they vote in the House against such party’s whip. Paragraph 4 creates an exception for mergers between political parties by introducing three crucial concepts — that of the “original political party”, the “legislature party”, and “deemed merger”. A “legislature party” means the group consisting of all elected members of a House for the time being belonging to one political party, whereas an “original political party” means the political party to which a member belongs (this can refer to the party generally, outside of the House). Interestingly, Paragraph 4 does not clarify whether the original political party refers to the party at the national level or the regional level, despite the fact that that is how the Election Commission of India recognises political parties.
•How does Paragraph 4 then approach mergers? Paragraph 4 is spread across two sub-paragraphs, a conjoint reading of which suggests that a merger can take place only when an original party merges with another political party, and at least two-thirds of the members of the legislature party have agreed to this merger. It is only when these two conditions are satisfied that a group of elected members can claim exemption from disqualification on grounds of merger.
The reality
•Paragraph 4 , however, is drafted in such a convoluted way that it renders itself open to multiple interpretations. The second sub-paragraph (of Paragraph 4) says that a party shall be “deemed” to have merged with another party if, and only if, not less than two-thirds of the members of the legislature party concerned have agreed to such merger. Given that in most cases there is no factual merger of original political parties at the national (or even regional) level, Paragraph 4 seems to be creating a “legal fiction” so as to indicate that a merger of two-third members of a legislature party can be deemed to be a merger of political parties, even if there is no actual merger of the original political party with another party. At least that is how High Courts in India are interpreting the merger exception.
•In statutory interpretation, “deemed” has an established understanding. The word “deemed” may be used in a law to create a legal fiction, and give an artificial construction to a word or a phrase used in a statute. In other cases, it may be used to include what is obvious or what is uncertain. In either of these cases, the intention of the legislature in creating a deeming provision is paramount.
•What could Parliament’s intention have been in creating a legal fiction under Paragraph 4? The merger exception was created to save instances of the principled coming together of political groups from disqualification under the anti-defection law, and to strike a compromise between the right of dissent and party discipline. In the absence of mergers of original political parties, the deeming fiction could, presumably, be used as a means to allow mergers of legislature parties. However, reading Paragraph 4 in this manner would empower legislature parties to solely merge with another party, and thus, practically ease defection. Defection gets easier in smaller legislative assemblies, where even a sole member can account for two-thirds of the legislature party’s strength to cross the floor without attracting disqualification.
•On the other hand, what happens if both sub-paragraphs of Paragraph 4 are read conjunctively? For a valid merger then, an original political party has to first merge with another political party, and then two-thirds of the legislature party must support that merger. Practically speaking though, this would yield potentially absurd results. Given the politics of current times, stark differences in parties’ respective ideologies, and deep-seated historical rivalries, it is unimaginable how a merger between major national or regional parties would materialise.
•Neither of these two interpretations complement the ‘mischief’ that the Tenth Schedule was expected to remedy — that of curbing unprincipled defections which endanger the foundations of our democracy. Presently, while individual Members of Legislative Assemblies remain vulnerable to disqualification for crossing the floor, group defections remain exempt. The criticisms levelled against the exemption given to splits in political parties – that it facilitated defection by groups – applies equally to mergers.
Revisit, if not delete
•In a situation where either reading of Paragraph 4 in its current form yields undesirable results, its deletion from the Tenth Schedule is a possible way forward. This thought is hardly novel, for the Law Commission in 1999 and the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution ((NCRWC) in 2002 made similar recommendations. Till that happens, an academic revisiting of the Tenth Schedule by the Supreme Court, so as to guide future use of the anti-defection law, is timely and should happen soon. That would do a world of good for democracy in India.
📰 Speeding major cause of death: Lancet study
Of the total 1,31,714 deaths due to road accidents, speeding accounted for 91,239 or 69.3%, says Ministry report of 2020
•Steps taken to check vehicle speed on roads in India could alone have the biggest impact on ensuring road safety by saving 20,554 lives annually, says a new Lancet study, which underlines that interventions focusing on four key risk factors such as speeding, drunk driving, non-use of crash helmets and seat belts could prevent 25% to 40% of the 13.5 lakh fatal road injuries worldwide every year.
•This is the first study that gives country-specific estimates of the effect of addressing the four main road safety risk factors through interventions for 185 countries.
•In India, interventions to check speeding could save 20,554 lives and promotion of crash helmets could save 5,683 lives. Encouraging the use of seat belts can also save 3,204 lives in the country.
•The estimate for drunken driving was not available for India because either the percentage of total deaths due to alcohol consumption in the country was not reported or calculations were found to be unstable.
Under-reported figures
•The report uses mortality data from Global Burden Diseases, 2017, which are based on modelling and estimated 2,18, 876 deaths due to road injuries in India in 2017, while the Government of India’s figures which suffer from under-reporting stood at 1,47,913 for the year.
•According to the Road Transport and Highway Ministry’s 2020 report, there were a total 1,31,714 deaths due to road accidents, where speeding accounted for 69.3% of deaths ( 91,239), non-wearing of helmets resulted in 30.1% deaths (39,798) and non-use of seat belts caused 11.5% of deaths (26,896).
•Steps undertaken to reduce speeding such as infrastructure changes and electronic speed control could save an estimated 3,47,258 lives globally each year, while measures to tackle drunk driving such as enhanced enforcement could save a further 16,304 lives. An estimated 1,21,083 and 51,698 lives could be saved by enforcing rules on wearing seat belts and motorcycle helmets, respectively.
•Improving seat belt use would have a particularly large effect on reducing road deaths in the United States by saving an estimated 14,121 lives every year and 13,228 lives could be saved in China. Tackling speeding would be the single most effective measure to reduce road fatalities in most countries, preventing an estimated 88,374 deaths in China, 22,353 in the U.S. and 17,898 in Brazil.
Worrying statistics
•Road traffic injuries (RTIs) are the eighth leading cause of death globally for all ages and the first cause in the 5-29 years age group.
•Close to 14 lakh people die each year, and up to 5 crore are injured by road traffic injuries.
•India accounts for almost 10% of all crash-related deaths, while accounting for only 1% of the world’s vehicles.
•“Given the existing challenges in the field of road safety and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, achieving the ambitious goal of the second Decade of Action for Global Road Safety will be a challenge and will require the global road safety community to act on the implementation of evidence-based actions in different countries. By providing country-specific estimates on the potential lives saved by road traffic interventions, this study highlights the urgency of implementing of a safe systems approach in which specific interventions can effectively address road injury deaths by 2030,” the paper says.
•The second decade of Action for Road Safety 2021-2030 sets an ambitious target of preventing at least 50% of road traffic deaths and injuries by 2030 and the Union Road Transport and Highways Minister Nitin Gadkari aims to halve the numbers for India by 2024.
📰 The Indian challenge in Afghanistan
Intra-Afghan tensions rather than any hostility towards India could impede implementation of projects
•India’s record as a ‘first responder’ is improving by the day. Just 24 hours after a massive earthquake hit Afghanistan, the Indian Air Force moved in with tonnes of relief. That is impressive. It is also badly needed, given that the worst earthquake in 20 years hit a region that has been at war for decades. Desperate people are always open to adopting any means to survive. Apart from India, other countries will soon weigh in with aid. This might be the time to either make friends or renew hostility with old enemies.
The quake
•The massive earthquake was centred around Khost along the Afghanistan- Pakistan border, and measured 5.9 on the Richter Scale. Clearly, the Pakistan side would have suffered as well, though there has been no reportage on this in the Pakistani media. Like other news from the tribal areas, this one also appears to have been damped down. The proximity to the affected area also meant that Pakistan was able to send relief aid quickly. Trucks decked with banners entered Afghanistan declaring that the aid was from “the people of Pakistan”. Iran also sent relief material by air. Both these efforts and the Pakistan Foreign Ministry’s statement expressing condolences were reported by Xinhua There was nothing about India’s effort. There was also nothing on Qatar, which is in negotiations to manage Kabul, Kandahar and Herat airports.
•Stressing “historical and civilizational relationship ties” with the Afghan people, Delhi announced the arrival of a technical team to “closely monitor and coordinate the efforts of various stakeholders” for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. This followed the arrival of a delegation led by a senior official to Afghanistan. Afghan officials welcomed not only aid, but called for the restarting of small projects across the country. Prior to this, there were reports that Indian aid was being hoarded and diverted back to Pakistan. This meant that only a fraction of some 50,000 MT of wheat and medicines was actually reaching the country. Delhi seems to have asked for aid to flow through the Iranian route, instead of across Pakistan, so that it would reach Afghanistan. Iran is on board, as was evident during Foreign Minister Dr. Hossein Amir Abdollahian’s recent visit to Delhi, where issues discussed included provision of aid to Afghanistan.
Providing relief
•Meanwhile, countries are responding to the United Nations’ appeal for aid. That includes Taiwan, which has offered $1 million despite not being a member of the world body due to Beijing’s objections. Japan, South Korea, and the UAE have also responded to the UN’s appeal. The U.S. and its primary agency, the United States Agency for International Development, made brief and similar statements without making any specific commitment. U.S. aid stands at $512,208,314 in the current financial year, after the U.S. Treasury Department broadened the types of activities authorised under U.S. licences, and the UN Security Council allowed sanctions exemption for delivery of humanitarian aid. However, the U.S.’s response indicates the difficulties involved given the broken Afghan banking and financial systems and lack of infrastructure. A range of institutions is involved in actual aid delivery, and U.S. instructions are that all aid should be in cash, since no banks will do business or accept letters of credit to the Afghan central bank (DAB). UN organisations also provide cash, and aid agencies have long had to use reliable local hawala networks for transfers. The main benefit to this is that money is spent within the country, rather than in physical aid sourced from the neighbourhood. The trouble is that a notoriously strait jacketed Finance Ministry will never agree to large-scale Indian aid being spent in this manner. Cash transfers to the DAB are possible, but its own reach to the furthest parts of the country is doubtful.
•While ‘buy local’ may work with food and immediate aid, the requirements for reconstruction, particularly in the present case, will have to be sourced from Pakistan. Pakistan cement companies such as Lucky Cement made their fortunes out of U.S. construction in Afghanistan, of everything from airfields to culverts, when operations were ongoing. A 2004 study reported not just the huge amounts of money being made by all those concerned, but also revealed that Afghan companies were being sidelined in favour of Turkish or Chinese ones in the country.
•Also, most UN activity for Afghanistan is slotted through Pakistan. U.S. listings show that major UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration are present in Pakistan, where they are funded to source supplies. This includes smaller NGOs such as Red Crescent or the hundreds of others operating on the ground. Any Indian attempt at reconstruction has to take this reality on board. India also needs to encourage Afghan cement plants and related industries, and ensure optimal use of coal, which is now being exported to Pakistan at cheap prices.
The security issue
•Then there exists the ever-present issue of security, which was apparent from the recent attack on a gurdwara in Kabul, apparently by the Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K). The IS-K is a group of many parts, with a presence in the north, along the Pakistan border, and in Kabul. In the north, the Russians accuse the Americans of assisting the group, while in Kabul, the IS-K’s worst attack was against withdrawing U.S. troops in August 2021. In recent times, IS-K has become strongly anti-India, along with al- Qaeda, which put out a video where chief Ayman Al Zawahari was seen praising a Karnataka girl for defending the hijab. Even more vicious language was used in the threat made against Nupur Sharma, former BJP spokesperson, for her controversial remarks against the Prophet. A recent UN report notes that both groups are operational, and may see increased recruitment of young men with no alternatives.
•India has around 400 projects in all the 34 provinces of Afghanistan. With the Taliban offering protection to foreign embassies, and acting quickly in the recent gurdwara bombing, it is possible that the Indian effort will continue unimpeded. It is also important to remember that the Taliban have never actively been anti-India. Difficulties in implementation are more likely to arise from intra-Afghan tensions rather than any hostility to India.
•Tara Kartha is former officer from the National Security Council Secretariat, where she served for nearly 20 years, working largely on Pakistan and Afghanistan
