📰 Quad is a ‘force for good’: Modi
•The Quadrilateral alliance (Quad) is a “force for good”, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in his opening remarks at its summit in Tokyo on Tuesday. The event witnessed the launch of several initiatives, including a maritime project that will allow the tracking of “dark shipping” across the Indo-Pacific region.
•“Our confidence and determination are strengthening the democratic forces. Our cooperation at the level of Quad is aimed at an inclusive Indo-Pacific region. We increased cooperation during the COVID-19 regarding vaccine delivery, climate action, supply chain resilience, disaster response,” he noted.
•The summit among the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States took place exactly three months after Russia launched the invasion of Ukraine that has sent shockwaves across the geopolitical system, affecting energy, and food markets.
Silent about Ukraine
•Mr. Modi, however, remained silent about the Ukraine crisis in his opening remarks. A joint statement issued after the meeting addressed the concerns arising out of the crisis. It said the member countries “discussed respective responses to the conflict in Ukraine and the ongoing tragic humanitarian crisis and assessed its implications for the Indo-Pacific”.
•One of the several “implications” of the Ukraine crisis that has been discussed since Russia launched the attack has focused on possible Chinese military moves in the Indo-Pacific region. The summit’s concerns were played out almost simultaneously as a joint patrol by the Russian and Chinese forces took place near the Japanese territories, drawing global attention.
•Apart from the Ukraine crisis, the leaders also took note of the post-coup crackdown in Myanmar and called for the release of “all political detainees, including foreigners”. They also sought the “swift restoration of democracy”. In this regard, they welcomed the role of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair.
•“Quad has adopted a constructive agenda for the Indo-Pacific region. This will further enhance Quad’s image as a force for good,” Mr. Modi said. He congratulated the newly elected Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who flew to Tokyo a day after defeating incumbent Prime Minister Scott Morrison.
•The leaders of the Quad countries announced the formation of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), which will build a “faster, wider, and more accurate maritime picture of near-real-time activities in partners’ waters.”
•“The benefits of this (maritime) picture are vast: it will allow tracking of “dark shipping” and other tactical-level activities, such as rendezvous at sea, as well as improve partners’ ability to respond to climate and humanitarian events and to protect their fisheries, which are vital to many Indo-Pacific economies,” a factsheet regarding the summit announced.
The IPEF in its nascence relies more on promise than prospect of tangible outcomes
•In a sudden decision not previously intimated, India became one of a 13-nation economic initiative led by the U.S., on Monday, as President Joseph Biden unveiled plans for an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). The initiative is touted as a substantial step by the U.S. as part of its decade-old “pivot to Asia”, and an attempt at putting some “economic heft” into its Indo-Pacific presence that has been on the decline after its decision to quit the Trans Pacific Free Trade Agreement, the CPTPP, in 2017. Officials say the IPEF framework has four “pillars”: supply-chain resilience; clean energy, decarbonisation and infrastructure; taxation and anti-corruption; and fair and resilient trade. Mr. Biden’s visit to Japan and South Korea, attendance at the Quad summit and helming the IPEF launch is also aimed at reassuring the Eastern hemisphere about the U.S.’s focus. India’s joining is an equally strong statement of commitment to Indo-Pacific goals, and to broadening regional economic cooperation, particularly after it walked out of the 15-nation RCEP. It is significant that all IPEF members, other than India and the U.S., are a part of the RCEP free trade agreement, and yet have chosen to be part of the U.S.-led initiative.
•Despite the strong signalling from all sides, however, there are many aspects to the IPEF that bear further scrutiny. Monday’s launch only signals the willingness of the 13 countries to begin discussions on the contours. Much will depend, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi stressed, on how inclusive the process is. Second, U.S. officials have made it clear that it is not a free trade agreement; nor will it discuss tariff reductions or increasing market access, raising questions about its utility. Shorn of the rhetoric of Indo-Pacific cooperation, there must be more clarity on its framework. The four pillars also lend themselves to some confusion, drawing into question whether there is enough common ground among the 13 countries that are part of very different economic arrangements, as well as outliers (the U.S. and India), to set standards together, or be open to issues that vary for each country. The U.S.’s statement that the IPEF is essentially focused on “American workers” also raises questions on whether increasingly protectionist global trends will chafe. Each of the IPEF countries has considerable trade interests in China, with most having large trade deficits. So, it remains to be seen how much they will be willing to sign on with the IPEF. Already three ASEAN countries, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, have decided to stay out of the framework’s launch. Above all, given the fact that the U.S.’s previous initiatives (the Blue Dot Network and the Build Back Better Initiative) have made little headway in changing the region’s infrastructural needs, the IPEF faces a credibility challenge. Negotiators will need to move with both caution and clarity before making any big promises on its benefits for the region.
📰 60% e-waste recycling likely by 2023
•Consumer goods companies and makers of electronics goods have to ensure at least 60% of their electronic waste is collected and recycled by 2023 with targets to increase them to 70% and 80% in 2024 and 2025, respectively, according to a draft notification by the Environment Ministry made public this week.
•The rules bring into effect a system of trading in certificates, akin to carbon credits, that will allow companies to temporarily bridge shortfalls.
•A wide range of electronic goods, including laptops, landline and mobile phones, cameras, recorders, music systems, microwaves, refrigerators and medical equipment, have been specified in the notification.
Public feedback
•India, which is unique among South Asian countries in that it has a formal set of rules for electronic waste management, first announced these rules in 2016 and amended them in 2018.
•The latest rules, which have been put up for public feedback, are expected to come into effect by August.
•Along with specifying targets, the rules lay out a system of companies securing extended producer responsibility (EPR) certificates.
•These certificates certify the quantity of e-waste collected and recycled in a particular year by a company and an organisation may sell surplus quantities to another company to help it meet its obligations.
•“The earlier rules stressed collection targets. Now we are emphasising the EPR, recycling and trading. This follows from the government’s objective to promote a circular economy,” Naresh Gangwar, Additional Secretary, Environment Ministry, told The Hindu.
•Companies will have to register on an online portal and specify their annual production and e-waste collection targets.
•The chief entity that will coordinate the trade of EPR certificates and monitor if companies are meeting their targets is the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB).
Dealing with delays
•Specifically, a steering committee to be headed by the Chairman of the CPCB will oversee the overall implementation of these regulations. Companies that don’t meet their annual targets will have to pay a fine or an “environmental compensation”, but the draft doesn’t specify the quantum of these fines. In fact, companies that fall short can meet a year’s target, even after three years. Those that meet their targets with a year’s delay will be refunded 85% of their fine, and 60% and 30% after the second and third year, respectively.
•In March 2020, the government said it more than doubled the electronic waste (e-waste) it recycled in 2018-19 over 2017-18. This translated to a 10% recycling rate in 2017-18 rising to a little over 20% in 2018-19.
•The EPR requires producers to set up e-waste exchange facilities to facilitate collection and recycling, and assign specific responsibility to bulk consumers of electronic products for safe disposal.
•The State governments have been entrusted with the responsibility of earmarking industrial space for e-waste dismantling and recycling facilities, undertaking industrial skill development and establishing measures for protecting the health and safety of workers engaged in the dismantling and recycling facilities for e-waste.
•The e-waste produced in India as per the data provided by the government is lower than estimates by international agencies.
•According to the Global E-Waste Monitor 2017, India generates about 2 million tonnes (MT) of e-waste annually and ranks fifth among e-waste producing countries, after the U.S., China, Japan and Germany.
•Most of India’s e-waste is recycled by the informal sector and under hazardous conditions and a thrust of the e-waste rules is to have more of this waste handled by the formal sector.
📰 Serving those who serve: On WHO honour for ASHA workers
Health workers need better remuneration and safety guarantee, not just awards
•Recognition very often goes to those at the top of the pecking order, and stays there. Credit seldom trickles down to the worker at the bottom. The World Health Organization’s act of recognising India’s ASHA (accredited social health activists) and the polio workers of Afghanistan is an attempt to right that wrong. It is a rare, and commendable doffing of the hat for workers at the very bottom of the rung, and gives credit where it is due. When WHO Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus announced the names of six Global Health Leader awardees at the opening session of the World Health Assembly, over one million ASHAs and eight volunteer polio workers found themselves being counted amidst people leading from the front. The other awardees are Paul Farmer, co-founder of the NGO Partners in Health, Ahmed Hankir, a British-Lebanese psychiatrist, Ludmila Sofia Oliveira Varela, a youth sports advocate, and Yōhei Sasakawa, WHO’s Goodwill Ambassador for Leprosy Elimination. Dr. Tedros who picks the awardees himself, said that the award recognises those who have made an outstanding contribution to protecting and promoting health around the world, at a time when the world is facing an unprecedented convergence of inequity, conflict, food insecurity, climate crisis and a pandemic.
•The ASHAs were honoured for their “crucial role in linking the community with the health system, to ensure those living in rural poverty can access primary health care services....” These workers, all women, faced harassment and violence for their work during the pandemic, well documented in the media. While the pandemic rewrote the rules, creating danger where mere routine existed, it must be stressed that in general, their job, which takes them into difficult-to-reach places and hostile communities, confers a measure of privations. Even as they contribute to better health outcomes, this workforce continues to protest across the country, for better remuneration, health benefits and permanent posts. The eight volunteer polio workers of Afghanistan (four of them women) were shot and killed by gunmen in Takhar and Kunduz provinces in February 2022. Their work was crucial in a country where wild polio virus type 1 is still circulating, WHO recorded. Clearly, certain kinds of basic public health work are fraught with perils in several continents across the world. It is the duty of the governmental agencies that employ them to ensure their welfare, safety and security. While cheerleading about the award is rightfully reaching a crescendo, what matters is how the Indian government serves its last mile health workers who are its feet on the ground, once the dust raised by their unexpected recognition has settled down.
📰 The controversy around the Jagannath temple Heritage Corridor Project
•The Puri Heritage Corridor Project is a ₹3,200 crore redevelopment project of the the 800-year-old Jagannath temple in Puri by the Odisha government to create an international heritage site.
•In February, when the OBBC started excavation work within 75 metres of the temple to build public amenities, experts objected to the use of heavy machinery for digging, citing the possibility of an adverse impact on the 12th century temple.
•The ASI later observed that there was “every possibility that the OBCC during the excavation or soil removal might have destroyed the archaeological remains of the heritage site”.
Special Correspondent
•The story so far: The Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) on May 17 said that a sculpture of a lion, which possibly dates back to the Ganga dynasty, was found during excavation for the controversial heritage corridor project around the 12th century Jagannath Temple in Puri, Odisha. This is the third such lion sculpture found during the excavation work. The Odisha government’s ambitious temple corridor project in Puri has become a subject of intense political controversy in the State.
What is the controversy?
•The Puri Heritage Corridor Project is a ₹3,200 crore redevelopment project of and around the 800-year-old Jagannath temple in Puri by the Odisha government to create an international heritage site.
•Plans for the corridor had been in the making since 2016, with the State Assembly unanimously passing a resolution for the effective implementation of the project in February last year. Soon after, the plan was approved by the Shree Jagannatha Temple Administration (SJTA). The Odisha government has listed three objectives for the revamp of the area around the temple — the security of the temple, the safety of devotees, and the creation of a religious atmosphere for devotees. In all, 22 development projects are planned under the scheme.
•In February this year, when the Odisha Bridge and Construction Corporation (OBBC) started excavation work within 75 metres of the Jagannath temple to build public amenities such as toilets and cloakrooms, experts and members of civil society objected to the use of heavy machinery for digging, citing the possibility of an adverse impact on the 12th century temple. Questions started being raised about whether the construction around the temple had the due permissions and clearances.
•The Jagannath temple has been designated a monument of national importance by the ASI and is a centrally protected monument. As per the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains (Amendment and Validation) Act (AMSAR), construction is prohibited within a 100-metre periphery of a protected area. The area extending to 200 metres around the monument in all directions is called a regulated area. If construction has to be undertaken in the regulated or prohibited area, permission from the National Monuments Authority (NMA) is required. Notably, the term “construction” as defined in the AMSAR Act does not include the construction of public toilets, urinals, and “similar conveniences”. It also does not include works for the supply of water, electricity or “provision of similar facilities for publicity”.
•Raising concerns about the structural safety of the temple in the wake of the excavation in the prohibited area of the temple, Dilip Baral, a resident of Puri, filed a plea with the Orissa High Court in March.
•BJP MP Aparajita Sarangi also raised the issue in a Parliament session in March. Calling the work around the temple “illegal”, she said: “It is a matter of great concern.... Massive demolition and construction works are taking place within 100 and 200-metre area of the temple. No permission from NMA and ASI has been taken. The work which is a threat to the temple must stop.”
•Responding to Ms. Sarangi, BJD MP Pinaki Misra said that no digging was being done. “Only four toilets are being constructed... No additional construction is taking place,” he said.
What has the ASI said?
•After the petition was filed in the High Court, the ASI was directed to conduct a joint inspection of the site along with the State government. In its affidavit submitted to the court in May post the survey, the ASI observed that there was “every possibility that the agency OBCC during the excavation or soil removal might have destroyed the archaeological remains of the heritage site”. It pointed out that the construction work fell partly within both the prohibited and regulated areas of the centrally protected monument.
•The ASI had found that the ongoing construction work had “no valid permission or no objection certificate (NOC) issued by the competent authority”.
•Moreover, the apex conservation agency said: “It was informed during the discussion that no heritage impact assessment studies have been conducted before commencement of the project. No Ground Penetrating Radar Survey (GPRS) has been conducted to ascertain the archaeological and historical importance lying buried in the subsoil of 75m radius (Construction Zone) of Centrally Protected Monuments.”
What is the stand of the Odisha government?
•The Odisha government refuted the ASI report in court, saying that it had acquired an NOC from the NMA in September 2021. The NOC was granted for constructing a cloakroom, three toilets, an electrical facility, a pavement, and a shelter pavilion in the 75-metre zone as it did not come under “construction” as per the AMSAR Act. The NMA had no objection as long as the work was carried out under ASI supervision. However, the ASI said that no such permission was taken from it.
•In a move seen by the opposition as a “cover up”, the government on May 21, started a GPRS to trace any archaeological treasure beneath the soil.
📰 A new road for India’s fiscal federalism
•On May 19, in Union of India vs Mohit Minerals, the Supreme Court of India delivered a ruling which is likely to have an impact far wider than what the Centre might have imagined when it brought the case up on appeal. At stake was the validity of a levy imposed on importers, of Integrated Goods and Services Tax (IGST) on ocean freight paid by foreign sellers to foreign shipping lines. The Gujarat High Court had declared the tax illegal. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling through Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s judgment and held that the levy constituted double taxation — that is, that the importer, which was already paying tax on the “composite” supply of goods, could not be asked to pay an additional tax on a perceived “service” that it may have received.
Just recommendations
•In making this finding, the Court proceeded on a technical reading of various laws, in particular the provisions of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act. That reading, in and by itself, has limited implications. But the Court also made a slew of observations, which, if taken to their logical conclusion by State legislatures, could potentially transform the future of fiscal federalism in India. It held, for instance, that both Parliament and the State legislatures enjoy equal power to legislate on Goods and Services Tax (GST), and that the Goods and Services Tax Council’s recommendations were just that: recommendations that could never be binding on a legislative body.
•Reacting to the ruling, the Union Ministry of Finance has claimed that it “does not in any way lay down anything new”, and that it “does not have any bearing on the way GST has been functioning in India, nor lays down anything fundamentally different to the existing framework of GST”. But a close reading of the judgment belies this suggestion. Until now, governments across India have treated the GST Council’s recommendations — even where they disagreed with them — as sacrosanct, because they believed that this was indeed the law. What Mohit Minerals holds, though, is that State governments, on a proper construal of the Constitution, need to hardly feel circumscribed by any such limitation. As such, according to the Court, State legislatures possess the authority to deviate from any advice rendered by the GST Council and to make their own laws by asserting, in the process, their role as equal partners in India’s federal architecture.
Advent of Articles
•When, in July 2017, the Union government introduced the GST regime through the 101st constitutional Amendment, it did so based on an underlying belief that tax administration across India needed unification. ‘One Nation, One Tax’, was the mantra. To give effect to this idea, many entries in the State list of Schedule VII of the Constitution were either deleted or amended. No longer could State governments, for example, legislate on sale or purchase of goods (barring a few exceptions, such as petroleum and liquor) through the ordinary legislative route. Instead, a power to legislate on GST was inserted through a newly introduced Article 246A. This provision overrode the general dominion granted to Parliament and State legislatures to bring laws on various subjects and afforded to them an express authority to make legislation on GST.
•In addition, the 101st Amendment also established, through Article 279A, a GST Council. This body comprises the Union Finance Minister, the Union Minister of State for Finance, and Ministers of Finance from every State government. The Council was given the power to “make recommendations to the Union and States” on several different matters. These include a model GST law, the goods and services that may be subjected to or exempted from GST and the rates at which tax is to be levied. In framing the manner in which the Council’s votes are to be reckoned with, the Union government was granted a virtual veto.
•As I wrote in these pages when the Amendment was first introduced, there was some amount of confusion on whether the Council’s decisions would be binding. The use of the word “recommendations” suggested on the one hand that its decisions would be advisory, at best. But, at the same time, the fact that Article 279A directed the establishment of a mechanism to adjudicate disputes between governments on decisions taken by the Council suggested that those governments would, in fact, be bound by any advice rendered to them. If the former reading was to be deployed, the purpose behind the introduction of a common GST would be in jeopardy. But the latter interpretation effectively entailed a destruction of the well-laid plans of the Constituent Assembly. Fiscal responsibilities that had been divided with much care and attention between the Union and the States would now stand dissolved.
Not a symmetrical compact
•In its judgment in Mohit Minerals, the Supreme Court has provided what ought to be seen as the final word on this conundrum. Although States had until now proceeded on a tacit belief that the GST Council’s recommendations were binding, such an approach, in Justice Chandrachud’s words, would run counter both to the express words of the Constitution and the philosophical values underlying the language deployed. Our federal compact, the judgment holds, is not symmetrical, in that there are certain areas of the Constitution that contain a “centralising drift” — where the Union is granted a larger share of the power — and there are other areas where equal responsibility is vested.
•Article 246A, which was introduced by the 101st Amendment, is one such clause. The provision provides concomitant power both to the Union and to the State governments to legislate on GST. It does not discriminate between the two in terms of its allocation of authority. That allocation, according to the Court, cannot be limited by a reading of Article 279A, which establishes a GST Council, and which treats the Council’s decisions as “recommendations”. “If the GST Council was intended to be a decision-making authority whose recommendations transform to legislation,” wrote Justice Chandrachud, “such a qualification would have been included in Articles 246A or 279A.” But in the present case, no such qualification can be found.
In perspective
•The Court’s ruling does not mean that a legislature — whether Parliament or the States’ — cannot through statutory law make the Council’s recommendations binding on executive bodies. Indeed, insofar as the laws today make such a mandate, rulemaking by the executive would necessarily have to be bound by the Council’s advice. But a constitutional power, in the Court’s ruling, can never be limited through statute. Such curbs must flow only from the Constitution. And in this case, in the Court’s analysis, no restrictions on legislative power can be gleaned on a meaningful reading of the Constitution.
•Today, because of the ruling in Mohit Minerals, State governments will be free to exercise independent power to legislate on GST. It is possible that this might lead to conflicting taxation regimes, with the idea of ‘One Nation One Tax’ rendered nugatory. But as the Court puts it, “Indian federalism is a dialogue between cooperative and uncooperative federalism where the federal units are at liberty to use different means of persuasion ranging from collaboration to contestation.”
•GST was conceived as a product of what some described as “pooled sovereignty”. But perhaps it is only in an administrative area, animated by contestation, where we can see synergy between different sovereign units, where our nation can take a genuine turn towards a more “cooperative federalism”.
📰 Inadequacies of the Civil Registration System
Facts do not support the argument that India has a robust system of registering births and deaths
•The World Health Organization (WHO)’s estimate of excess deaths due to COVID-19 in India triggered several responses. Among them was the response of several State Health Ministers, who slammed the WHO and asserted that India has a “robust, legal and transparent system for data collection and COVID mortality surveillance”.
•This new-found love for the Civil Registration System (CRS), which was rarely being used as a source of vital statistics, is surprising. The claim was not even made by the Office of the Registrar General of India (ORGI), which is well aware of the drawbacks of the system, but by politicians. As such, I thought it necessary to place in the public domain some of the facts relating to the quality and completeness of birth and death registrations in the country.
Actual levels of registration
•The registration of births and deaths is governed by the Registration of Births and Deaths (RBD) Act, 1969. While the State governments are responsible for the establishment and management of the registration system, the Registrar General of India (RGI), who is appointed by the Central government, coordinates and unifies the activities of registration.
•Based on a comparison with the vital rates obtained from the sample survey called the Sample Registration System (SRS), the RGI estimated that the country registered about 92.7% of births and 87.8% of deaths in 2019. Corresponding figures for 2020 are not available. Past studies on the SRS indicate that the vital rates are underestimated by 2-3%. This would mean that the levels of registration are probably closer to 90% for births and 85% for deaths.
•The number of births and deaths registered in a year include those of earlier years. Some births and deaths are registered only in the following year. This is so even in normal circumstances. For instance, a birth/death in December can be registered in January as 21 days are available for reporting events for registration.
•Events reported after 21 days can be registered under the RBD Act. Data provided in the 2020 annual report show that the number of births and deaths registered one year after occurrence is quite high. For example, in Bihar, of the 30.4 lakh births registered in 2020, nearly 7.2 lakh had occurred in 2019 or earlier. In Uttar Pradesh, of the 48.5 lakh births registered in 2020, 5.8 lakh had occurred earlier. More than 15% of the births registered had occurred in earlier years in Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, Rajasthan and Assam. In Nagaland, the figure was as high as 90%.
•In the case of deaths, the proportion of delayed registration was lower. Among the larger States, more than 10% of the deaths registered in 2020 had occurred in earlier years in Assam (13.3%), Jharkhand (14.7%), Rajasthan (15.3%), Uttarakhand (14.8%) and Uttar Pradesh (13%).
•To register a birth or death reported after a year of its occurrence requires an order of a First Class Magistrate issued after verifying the facts about the birth or death. In several States, this function has been given to the Sub-Divisional Magistrates. In 2020, about 20.5 lakh births and 7.6 lakh deaths that had occurred over a year earlier were registered. This does not include data for Maharashtra, Delhi, and Sikkim. In 2019, the corresponding figures were 21.6 lakh births and 5.3 lakh deaths. Assuming about 250 working days in a year, on average more than 11,000 delayed registrations are ordered by the Magistrates every day. I am not convinced that these orders are issued after verifying the facts, as required by the law. It may also be noted that this number did not change much in 2020 despite lockdowns.
•A robust system should be able to ensure the registration of almost every birth and death within a short time after its occurrence. If we remove from the 2020 data, or the data for any year, the events registered with substantial delay, say three months or more, the picture of completeness would be very different.
COVID-19 impact on registration
•COVID-19 resulted in prolonged lockdowns. These could have significantly affected the efficiency of the CRS in the following manner. One, the registrars could not work during lockdowns in many areas. Two, people could not travel to the registrar’s office to report the births/deaths that had occurred at home within the prescribed time. Three, in case of a delay of more than 30 days in reporting, the procedure of getting an affidavit or a Magistrate’s order as required under Section 13 of the RBD Act is cumbersome. Since it is a requirement under the Act, it could not be relaxed through executive orders. Four, in some States, the functionaries handling registration were deployed on COVID-19-related duties and could not register the events.
•The impact of these would not have been uniform across the country as some areas had longer periods of lockdowns or travel restrictions.
•One can reasonably expect that a large number of births and deaths that had occurred in 2020 would have been reported for registration in 2021 or even later. It is likely that a reasonable number of deaths, especially among women and children, may not get registered at all because the family may not require the death certificates for settling inheritance, insurance claims, etc. Female deaths formed only 39.8% of the total registered deaths in 2020. This was slightly lower than the corresponding figure of 40.4% recorded in 2019. The percentage of female deaths registered was lowest in Nagaland (26.7%) and highest in Kerala (44.9%). The fact that these numbers are so low points to the need for improvements in the registration system. It is also well known that child deaths have very low levels of registration. This can easily be seen by comparing the registered infant/child deaths with an estimate based on the rates from the SRS. COVID-19 may have worsened the situation to some extent, but it also acted as an eye-opener on the importance of the CRS.
•Only about 20% of the deaths have a Medically Certified Cause of Death (MCCD) that conforms to the WHO standard. In other cases, the cause of death is provided by the attending medical practitioner in case of deaths in medical facilities and by the person reporting the death in domiciliary deaths. The State governments have not issued statutory notifications to increase the coverage of MCCD.
Not a strong defence
•Thus, the CRS has several shortcomings. These facts do not support the argument that India has a robust system of registering births and deaths. The CRS is yet to mature into a robust and resilient system that can ensure that every birth and death is registered even in normal times, let alone during a pandemic.
•While the law and a registration system are in place, it is necessary that the State governments put in more effort to ensure that all births and deaths are registered and more deaths have medically certified causes. This would require coordinated action by several departments of the State that have a stake in the CRS. It is also necessary to publish data in a timely manner so that so that it can aid the formulation of policies and programs backed by evidence.
📰 The executive seems more fragile than hurt sentiment
There seems to be an increased use of Section 153A IPC and Section 295A IPC, going by data and anecdotal evidence
•In yet another brute show of power, Dr. Ratan Lal, a Dalit academician, was arrested for an ‘objectionable’ post on the Gyanvapi mosque row. He is alleged to have promoted disharmony or enmity between religious groups (Section 153A in the Indian Penal Code) and intentionally and maliciously hurt religious sentiments (Section 295A in the IPC). His arrest adds to the trend of increased use of the two provisions.
•The latest annual report of the National Crime Records Bureau records more than four jumps (458%) of cases registered under Section 153A since 2014; it almost doubled in the last two years. This does not necessarily mean hurtful comments surged all of a sudden, as conviction could only be secured in merely 20.4% of cases. Though no separate data is available on Section 295A, anecdotal evidence suggests its increased use by the executive.
Legislative history
•The increased use of these penal provisions draws our attention to the circumstances in which they were enacted. In 1927, when Section 153A was already in existence, Section 295A was brought on the demand of a religious minority community which alleged that a pamphlet titled ‘Rangeela Rasul’ published objectionable content against its founder.
•The Legislative Assembly debates at the introduction of Section 295A expressed concern about its subjectivity that could be misused. The rationale behind the provision was to deal with intentional insults to religion or outraging religious feelings. At best, the Assembly members found it a temporary remedy for a temporary aberration, not one that would be in active use a century later.
•A more direct measure was incorporated through Section 295A, which would not require proving that the speech promoted enmity or hatred between classes; now, a hurt sentiment would be enough. It can be argued that it safeguarded the spirit of tolerance amidst religious diversity. But its enhanced misuse raises the question: safeguard for who and against what?
•The debates sensed and cautioned against a looming threat over free speech. It was anticipated that it could be misused to suppress honest, candid, and bona fide criticism, and hinder historical research towards social reform. If individuals were allowed to register complaints about a hurt religious sentiment, the courts would be flooded with frivolous cases. Then there would be a sweeping class of offences, where it cannot be objectively adjudicated if a crime has been committed.
Some safeguards
•However, there were statutory safeguards that required deliberate intention and malice; and judicial rulings that needed looking at — words used, intent, and effect to ascertain criminality. Only a deliberate and aggravated form of religious insult would attract the rigor of the provision.
•The judiciary laid down two ways to measure the effect — one by establishing a link between speech and public disorder, and by measuring the effects from the standards of a reasonable man, and not from one who fears all hostile viewpoints. However, no attempt was made to translate the safeguards into practice, which could have shielded the dear ethos of free speech. A half-hearted attempt left us with a law that cannot be enforced appropriately and is being let loose to chase the dissenter.
Element of subjectivity
•Unlike bodily harm that can be verified, sentimental hurt cannot be tested against strict measures. The element of subjectivity overrides it as a sentiment’s vulnerability could widely vary, even among those of the same religion.
•A critical inquiry of orthodox practices and superstitious beliefs encourages social reforms. The need for an intelligent counter is required much more amid the aggressive assertion of religious beliefs by the socio-political hegemon. Even the 1927 Joint Select Committee appreciated the argument that a religious insult inflicted in good faith, with the object of steering reform, would bring the follower’s required attention to the critique.
•India’s Constitution celebrates diversity with the guarantee of free speech. With that aspirational pledge, should not the answer to hurt religious sentiment be tolerance, and not rampant criminalisation? This may be an unreal expectation in times of widespread hate and disharmony. It is anomalous for a pluralistic, democratic, and secular nation that runs on counter-discourses to criminalise speech for hurting fickle religious sentiments.
•Even the statutory safeguards of ‘deliberate intention and malice’ cannot be objectively determined. The police do not get into the legislative nuances before registering a criminal case or making an arrest. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum critiqued the law by saying that it invites thugs to suppress speech on anything they dislike; she added that given India’s political climate, several would take up this ugly invitation. A hazy legal paradigm criminalising hurting religious sentiment facilitates the ruling dispensation’s strategy to stifle all dissent and use the law to fuel divisive politics.
•On raging criminalisation of free speech, senior advocate Indira Jaising said that repeated use of law to stifle dissent reflects state policy. “It is not a ‘misuse’; it is being used the way the enforcement agencies want it,” she added. The executive is seemingly more fragile than a citizen’s hurt religious sentiment. It sends out a clear message that be it a stand-up comic script, a remark on the belief of walking barefooted in reverence, or taking beef to school, India is no longer the country to hold and express opinions challenging the state-backed majoritarian rhetoric.
📰 Lessons from Russia for India
No amount of advanced technology can compensate for low morale and training, weak command, poor tactics and strategy
•Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had many impacts, but one area which merits more attention is whether it has produced effects sufficient to alter our understanding of warfare. A perusal of the evidence suggests that there is not any significant change in the nature of warfare. However, there are some key takeaways which have implications for the Indian military, which uses a significant amount of Russian-origin weapons systems.
Three claims
•There are at least three claims made by proponents that the conflict has heralded a shift in warfare. The first is that the battle tank has been rendered obsolescent, because of the highly effective performance of anti-tank missiles such as the American-built Javelin or Advanced Anti-Tank Weapon System in visiting destruction upon Russian T-90s. But tanks have withstood past obituaries. Immediately after World War I, which witnessed the emergence of the battle tank, there were voices, especially in Britain, pronouncing the death of the tank, because it could not punch through German defences. This conclusion proved misleading because the Germans saw considerable merit in the tank and employed it to devastating effect in the form of the Blitzkrieg in World War II. Fundamentally, at a tactical level, for the tank to be effective requires the use of infantry in close support of armoured operations. As was the case in past wars in which the tank suffered losses, this is still absent in Russia’s strategy, which explains why the Russians have suffered such heavy tank losses. As a standalone capability, the tank provides advantages in the form of a trinity of elements – firepower, mobility and protection. No weapons platform for ground operations can serve as a credible substitute.
•A second claim is that emerging technologies such as cyber and digital technology, Artificial Intelligence, remotely piloted systems such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and space-borne capabilities have rendered obsolescent legacy platforms such as fighter planes, warships, and artillery weapons. Emerging technologies cannot be a substitute for legacy platforms; they can at best enhance their performance. If precision firepower is to be delivered against adversary targets, legacy systems will matter for launch of ordinance. Emerging technologies can enable better Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, help optimise situational awareness, reduce decision time for commanders from detecting threats to responding to them, and augment sensor to shooter capabilities. The devastating losses incurred by the Russian ground forces from drone and anti-tank attacks operating in Battalion Tactical Groups, comprising largely armour and artillery units and little infantry, seem to have convinced proponents that there is a change in the nature of warfare. Infantry plays a key role in providing protection to any advancing tank column and retaliating when threatened. This doesn’t herald a change in warfare, it is just poor tactics.
•Finally, the failure of the Russians to effectively apply air power botched the invasion from the outset. This has convinced proponents that air power is not consequential. Indeed, Suppression of Enemy Air Defences should be the foremost requirement for any invading force. Russia’s failure to neutralise Ukrainian air defences remains a glaring weakness. Active Ukrainian air defences have compelled the Russians to revise their military aims and confine their military operations to Donbas and the Black Sea coast.
•Russia’s invasion left long lines of communications and military columns that could not be supplied and reinforced. This left them exposed to lethal interdiction by Ukrainian forces. A corollary to this is the low morale among Russian soldiers consisting of a large number of conscripts and poor command. Military effectiveness is critically a function of troop morale and command competence. These two vital variables have very little to do with technology or logistics.
Key takeaway
•The key takeaway for India from Russia’s unimpressive military performance is to invest more in sensors, electronic warfare, greater digitisation, satellite communications and unmanned systems not just for reconnaissance and surveillance, but also attack missions. This does not require dispensing with legacy platforms, but rather making them more lethal and effective. India will also need greater missile forces to enhance its offensive capability. The Indian armed forces will need to be proficient at combined arms warfare. No amount of advanced technology can substitute or compensate for low morale and training, weak command, poor tactics and strategy.
