📰 Norms eased for GM crop research
The guidelines circumvent challenges of using foreign genes to change crops profile
•The Department of Biotechnology (DBT) has issued guidelines easing norms for research into genetically modified (GM) crops and circumventing challenges of using foreign genes to change crops profile.
•The ‘Guidelines for Safety Assessment of Genome Edited Plants, 2022’ exempt researchers who use gene-editing technology to modify the genome of the plant from seeking approvals from the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC), an expert body of the Environment Ministry. The GEAC evaluates research into GM plants and recommends, or disapproves, their release into farmer fields. The final call however is taken by the Environment Minister as well as States where such plants could be cultivated. The Environment Ministry too has sanctioned this exemption.
•The GM plants that have usually come for such scrutiny are those that involve transgenic technology or introducing a gene from a different species into a plant, for instance BT-cotton, where a gene from soil bacterium is used to protect a plant from pest attack.
•The worry around this method is that these genes may spread to neighbouring plants, where such effects are not intended and so their applications have been controversial. Despite several kinds of transgenic crops having been researched and approved by scientific committees, none, save BT-cotton, has made it to fields because of stringent opposition from environmental activists as well as farmer organisations.
•The DBT, whose mandate is to promote biotechnology, in the guidelines, says the document is a “... road map for the development and sustainable use of genome editing technologies in India, specifying the biosafety and/or environmental safety concerns, and describing the regulatory pathways to be adopted while undertaking the genome editing of plants.”
Several approaches
•Genome editing involves the use of technologies that allow genetic material to be added, removed, or altered at particular locations in the genome. Several approaches to genome editing have been developed. A well-known one is called CRISPR-Cas9, which is short for clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats and CRISPR-associated protein 9.
•Just as foreign genes can be used to add properties to plants, gene editing too can be used to make plants express properties not native to them.
•The guidelines say that all requirements that researchers must adhere to to develop transgenic seeds will apply to gene-edited seeds except clauses that require permission from the GEAC.
‘Unintended consequences’
•Environmentalist groups have opposed this exception for gene-edited crops. “Gene editing is included in genetic engineering. Therefore, there is no question of giving exemptions to particular kinds of genome edited plants from the regulatory purview,” said a letter from Coalition for a GM-free India to Environment Minister Bhupendra Yadav. Gene editing techniques, the letter alleges, involves altering the function of genes and can cause “large and unintended consequences” that can change the “toxicity and allergenicity” of plants. “Without the necessary regulatory oversight, how will regulators and the public know about such changes? Who will be responsible for the resultant risk implications?” their letter queries. They have demanded that these exemptions be withdrawn.
•N. Raghuram, Professor, Biotechnology, at Guru Gobind Singh University, New Delhi, said there were a great many similarities in the techniques employed in transgenic technology and gene-editing technology. “Gene-editing is getting quite popular in biotechnology labs across the country. Gene editing can address some of the fears around the use of ‘foreign genes’ but it can only be used to express genes already present in a plant’s genome that are not manifest. But more importantly, it is not about technology but about how plants developed thus are sold or made available to farmers.”
CABA is revised for a period of three years
•The Central Advisory Board on Archaeology (CABA) that is meant to strengthen contacts between the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) and those in the field of archaeological research was re-constituted this week, over seven years since its last meeting.
•In a notification on Thursday, the ASI re-constituted the board with the Culture Minister as the chairperson and including officials from the Culture Ministry and ASI, MPs, nominees of State governments, representatives of universities, scientists and experts on Indus Valley script among the members.
•“With a view to promoting closer contacts of the Archaeological Survey of India with Indian Universities conducting Archaeological Researches and other Institutions carrying out studies related to application of archaeological principles, training future Archaeologists, and providing for closer association of learned societies in India and of the State Governments with the activities of the Archaeological Survey of India, the President is pleased to reconstitute the Central Advisory Board of Archaeology for a period of three years from the date of publication (sic),” the notification stated.
•The board would also include “five persons nominated in their personal capacities by the Government of India” and former Director-Generals of ASI, the notification said. According to a source, the process of nominating the five persons was on and the recommendations would be sent for approval by the Government of India.
•The board will meet once a year and its functions would include advising the Centre on “matters relating to archaeology” referred to it by its members. “It may also make suggestions on such matters for the consideration of the Government,” the notification said. It also set up a Standing Committee of the board to be chaired by the ASI D-G.
•While it was not clear when the previous board’s tenure had ended, the CABA last held a meeting on October 17, 2014 with 53 members, including 13 State government nominees in attendance, according to a reply by Culture Minister G. Kishan Reddy in the Lok Sabha on December 20, 2021. Mr. Reddy had said: “As the tenure of earlier Board has expired, a five member Standing Committee of CABA assists the ASI as an interim measure.”
•In another reply to the Lok Sabha on March 14, Mr. Reddy reiterated: “The meetings of the CABA could not be held as it was being reconstituted. However, regular meetings of Standing Committee of CABA were held regularly.”
📰 A timely reminder: On Supreme Court’s GST verdict
The Centre should be more conciliatory towards States’ fiscal dilemmas and GST concerns
•Pronouncing its verdict on a protracted dispute over the levy of Goods and Services Tax (GST) on ocean freight charges paid by importers, the Supreme Court on Thursday held that such a tax was untenable. Its 153-page judgment has also dwelt at length on the nature of the recommendations of the GST Council, the constitutional body set up to oversee the operations of the indirect tax regime. Invoking the spirit of cooperative federalism, the Court has held that both the Union and State legislatures have “equal, simultaneous and unique powers” to make GST laws, and the recommendations of the Council, where they have a one-third and two-thirds voting share, respectively, are not binding on them. While amending the Constitution to pave way for the tax system that subsumed multiple central and State levies, Parliament had intended for the Council’s recommendations to only have ‘a persuasive value’, as per the Court. This has sparked fears that individual States can start vetoing the Council’s recommendations that they do not agree with, and refuse to implement them, thus threatening the ‘One Nation, One Tax’ edifice of a reform that took years to bring about. Opposition-ruled States have hailed the verdict as upholding their rights vis-à-vis what a few termed as the ‘arbitrary imposition’ of Centre’s decisions in the Council. The Finance Ministry has sought to quell anxiety by indicating that the Court has only elaborated on the Council’s existing arrangement and the status quo would continue. States can already reject the Council’s decisions but none has chosen to so far, it said.
•While North Block undertakes a detailed review of the verdict, it is pertinent that it had argued that if the Council’s recommendations were not binding, it would lead to an impasse and the entire GST structure would crumble. This does not hold water, the Court averred. That it has struck down a tax notified two days prior to the launch of the GST regime just as it is on the verge of completing five years, is perhaps, a fortuitous nudge for introspection on its journey and the way ahead. At worst, it can trigger more contestations in Council meetings, and at best, infuse a fresh sense of responsibility among members. The Centre could strive to be more conciliatory towards States’ concerns and fiscal dilemmas, especially as their assured compensation clock winds down next month, rather than seek to bulldoze over thorny predicaments with the tacit support of NDA-ruled States in the Council. The Council should also meet more often to nurture the critical fiscal federalism dialogue in the right direction and minimise trust deficits. There are many pending reforms that require the Centre to work more cohesively with States to take India’s economy forward and lift those left behind — including, but not limited to, an overhaul of land and labour markets as well as the agrarian sector.
📰 The neighbourhood in turmoil, lessons for India
The impact of the changes on Indian policy will offer New Delhi a better understanding of future domestic challenges
•In late 2016, a senior Indian government official, in a meeting with the envoy of a neighbouring country, spelt out the consequences that the country would face if it crossed the Narendra Modi government’s newly “muscular foreign policy”. At the time, the Government had put Pakistan on notice on terror attacks, and cancelled Foreign Secretary-level talks; in Sri Lanka, the Rajapaksa government, that had been seen cozying up to China was voted out, with some reports that Indian intelligence played a role in facilitating opposition talks; and in Nepal, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli's coalition government had fallen apart, with a similar nudge reported from New Delhi.
•The message the official conveyed was that New Delhi would use all its levers to prevail over any uncooperative South Asian neighbour. However, the tough messaging did not find much favour over time. By the Modi government’s second term, it had made peace with a much more consensual, conciliatory policy in the neighbourhood — visibly improving ties with each country (minus Pakistan) through high-level visits, extending development aid and lines of credit, and enabling a rush of soft power diplomacy.
A change in approach
•The contrast between India’s response to the events in 2016 to the present is stark, after five neighbouring democracies underwent non-electoral changes at the top, namely Myanmar, Nepal, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The first difference is that New Delhi has not been held responsible in any of its neighbouring capitals for attempting to interfere in their political processes. Second, South Block has abandoned its uniformly muscular “one size fits all” approach to the region.
•While in Myanmar, the Modi government continued engagement and even strengthened ties with the military junta that overthrew the government led by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, in Afghanistan it severed ties with the Taliban that took power in Kabul by force after Afghan President Ashraf Ghani left the country. In Nepal where Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba came to power after the Supreme Court dismissed K.P. Oli, and Sri Lanka, where public protests forced Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa to resign and President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to appoint rival and Opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe as the new Prime Minister, New Delhi has been largely supportive of the processes. Whereas in Pakistan, it has virtually ignored the swearing-in of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif after Imran Khan lost the vote of confidence.
People more than leaders
•A second lesson that seems to have been learnt is that New Delhi’s messaging now is focused on people in the neighbourhood rather than just those in power. In Afghanistan, for example, the Modi government spent months in careful negotiation with Pakistani officials to ensure it could send 50,000 MT of wheat meant for the Afghan people, despite the fact that it has no diplomatic engagement with either Islamabad or Kabul otherwise. In Sri Lanka, a Ministry of External Affairs statement said that India would “always be guided by the best interests of the people of Sri Lanka expressed through democratic processes”, a subtle pitch both to the people and to democratic processes in the region. A third lesson is perhaps the toning down of rhetoric on domestic issues in the neighbourhood — the Government’s public reaction to Durga Pooja violence against Bangladesh’s Hindu minority last year was much more nuanced than its messaging during the push ahead for the Citizenship (Amendment) Act in 2019. Some have even suggested that the continued delay in framing rules for the CAA since then has more to do with concern for ties with Dhaka than with the COVID-19 pandemic.
A neutral position will not do
•There are, however, other lessons that New Delhi must learn from the regime changes in the neighbourhood, and some of them apply to the Indian context as well. This is after all, the Indian subcontinent, set in the Indian Ocean, and what happens here cannot leave India untouched. Therefore, a silent or “neutral” position cannot mark the Modi government’s response to the changes in the way it has with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or China’s moves in Hong Kong or the South China Sea region. India faces the direct impact of almost every South Asian country in crisis, in terms of the need for aid and loans or a possible influx of refugees, as movements that develop in one neighbouring country are often mirrored in another. Therefore, they must be watched more closely.
•The first lesson to be learnt is that populism does not pay in the long run. While the potent combination of hyper-nationalism, religious majoritarianism, and a strident anti-elitism can bring “men of the masses” such as Mahinda Rajapaksa, K.P. Oli, and Imran Khan to power (as they promise an alternative to corrupt, dynasti regimes), it does not necessarily keep them there. It is a mistake for any government to conflate an electoral win and a mandate for governance with a carte blanche for ruling a country.
•The second is that the popularity of a leader can decline sharply and suddenly for one or a combination of reasons: K.P. Oli won a landslide victory in 2017 where his Left Alliance secured majorities in both houses, and formed governments in six of seven provinces; Imran Khan won all five National Assembly seats he fought in the 2018 elections, and while his party did not win a majority of seats, it won the popular vote; and the Rajapaksa-led Sri Lanka People’s Party (SLPP) ruling coalition won 150 of 225 parliamentary seats in 2020. That these popular mandates could be cast aside in just a few years is a stark reminder that nothing is forever, especially in a democracy.
•It is also clear that during the crises that Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka faced, the leaders who stepped into the breach may not have had the same political prowess or oratory presence as the leaders they replaced, but were acceptable both domestically and internationally because they had experience and education on their side. Mr. Deuba became Prime Minister for the fifth time, for example, Mr. Sharif had the longest tenure as Chief Minister of Pakistan’s Punjab in three terms before he became Prime Minister, and Ranil Wickremesinghe was appointed Prime Minister for the sixth time.
The economy matters
•The next lesson is one that United States President George H.W. Bush learned in 1992 despite the Iraq war and his pitch to patriotism, as Bill Clinton defeated him in an election where the big slogan was “It’s the economy, stupid”. In Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, the defeat of populists has come not so much at the hand of the Opposition parties, but by the slowdown in growth, jobs and rising inflation. India had already seen six successive quarters of straight losses in December 2019, and most of the neighbourhood was floundering as well, when COVID-19 was first reported. In the years that followed, the COVID-19 pandemic enforced lockdowns, and the resultant slowdown in the global economy made GDP figures in the region plummet. More recently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and sanctions by the West have made food and fuel prices soar. In such a situation, the change in power in these three countries took only a small push, from the military, the courts, or from street protests. New Delhi must not only study the causes of the economic mismanagement that brought change in the neighbourhood but must also survey the impact of new vulnerabilities on smaller neighbouring countries that could be exploited by global powers as they seek a more direct influence in the region. Given the common challenges the region faces, New Delhi must find newer ways to energise regional groupings such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) Initiative, and even to reconsider SAARC, in order to discuss shared approaches to reviving tourism and exports, supporting South Asian expatriate labour abroad, and building common pools of food and fuel stocks to soften inflationary blows on the South Asian economy.
📰 Talking peace, negotiating with the Maoists
Despite past experience and specific conditions, the Chhattisgarh government and the Maoists can work out a plan
•Recently, the Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh, Bhupesh Baghel, while meeting the people during his State-wide tour, announced that the State government was ready for peace talks with the Maoists provided they laid down arms and expressed their faith in the Constitution of India.
Some conditions
•In its response, through its spokesperson (pseudonym, Vikalp), the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC) of the CPI(Maoist) alleged (in a pamphlet issued on May 5, 2022) that the offer was dodgy, and wanted the Chief Minister to clarify his stand on the Maoist’s conditions for creating a conducive atmosphere in which to hold peace talks. The spokesperson also made other accusations and criticised the State government for not implementing the PESA or Provisions of Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 in Chhattisgarh. The major conditions the Maoists want include: a lifting of the ban on their party, the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) and people’s organisations; withdrawal of security forces from camps, and the release of jailed leaders in order to participate in the talks. As the State government did not change its earlier stand, there has been no progress.
•Earlier, in 2010, then Home Minister P. Chidambaram, tried to bring the Maoists to the negotiating table, with the line, “If you call a halt to violence, we are prepared to talk to you.” In response, Azad, alias Cherukuri Rajkumar (now deceased), a central politburo member and spokesperson of the Central Committee, CPI (Maoist), in an exclusive interview (11,400 words) to The Hindu (‘A ceasefire will create conducive atmosphere for talks’, April 2010), had it in writing what his party’s three pre-conditions to a dialogue with the Union government were.
•He clarified that the condition of ‘withdrawal of all-out war’ (as the first condition) was nothing but a cessation of hostilities by both sides simultaneously, i.e., mutual ceasefire and not unilateral ceasefire by the Maoists. Second, for peaceful legal work by the Maoists, lifting of the ban on the party (the second condition) was necessary. The third condition was that the government should adhere to the Constitution and end the illegal murders in the name of encounters, tortures and arrests. In order to hold talks, it was necessary for the government to release some leaders (also a part of the third condition) or else, there would be no one to talk to since the entire party was illegal.
•This interview and the stand by Ganapathi ( then party general secretary) on talks with the government were also published in the Maoist magazine, ‘People’s March’. Swami Agnivesh, the peace broker between the government of India and the Maoists, forwarded Mr. Chidambaram’s letter of May 11, 2010 (addressed to Swami Agnivesh) to Azad which specifically mentioned the Maoists promise ‘no violence for 72 hours’ to initiate talks. Azad responded to Swami Agnivesh (May 31, 2010) and reiterated the party’s stand. However, Azad was killed in an encounter with the Greyhound commando force of the Andhra Pradesh police on July 2, 2010 and the process of trust building derailed.
Why talks failed
•In the State Assembly election campaign in 2004, the Congress party promised to revive the peace process (that had broken down during Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N. Chandrababu’s regime) if voted to power in Andhra Pradesh. To initiate talks, the State government lifted the ban on the party in May 2004. Consequently, there was four-day peace dialogue in October 2004 between the representatives of the People’s War (PW) party and government representatives at the initiative of the Committee of Concerned Citizens. A mutually acceptable team of mediators (led by former civil servant S.R. Sankaran) was constituted and an agreement on a ceasefire (eight clauses) was reached. The PW party (which had just merged with the Maoist Communist Centre of India, and other splinter Maoist groups in September 2004 to form the CPI(Maoist)), proposed a 11-point charter of demands such as legislation on land ceiling; creation of a separate state of Telangana; and questions associated with armed action by either side. Matters of land reform figured prominently in the discussions. While the State representatives raised the issue of laying down arms, this was not the agreed agenda and the issue was held in reserve for the second round of talks.
•‘Clause 7’ (of the ceasefire agreement) which permitted the Maoists to undertake propagation of their politics without carrying weapons, had become problematic. Though the Maoists at the peace talks had handed over their weapons to their cadres while leaving the jungles, media pictures of activity by their armed squads made the police uneasy. The talks ended with an agreement on a ceasefire till December 16, the government promised to consider the main demand of land distribution among the landless, and talks again in November. Later, the Chief Minister declared that there would be no talks with the Maoists unless they agreed to lay down arms. The Andhra Pradesh Home Minister levelled allegations against the Naxalites about extortion for their meetings and construction of their memorials. Thus the peace process collapsed mid-way and the ban was re-imposed on the CPI(Maoist) and its sister organisations.
•Using this background, it can be reasonably implied that the Maoist’s demand of withdrawal of armed police forces can be met by a mutually agreed ‘ceasefire’, with its limited meaning of abjuring violence by the Maoists and the halting of anti-Maoist operations by security forces for some period. The State government cannot afford the risk of moving out security forces as a pre-condition for initiating peace talks.
Government actions
•Second, the release of jailed Maoist leaders need not be made a pre-condition by the Maoists, as most senior Maoist leaders are at large; there is no senior cadre in Chhattisgarh’s jails. Moreover, the Chhattisgarh government has not only withdrawn criminal cases against many tribals but has also ensured expeditious trial of Naxal cases. The government is also hard at work to implement PESA.
•However, with regard to the third condition, of lifting a ban on the CPI(Maoist), the PLGA and its front organisations, some concessions may be thought of to let the talks happen. Further, it cannot be denied that the Maoists misused the ceasefire during the 2004 peace talks in Andhra Pradesh; Azad admitted in the interview, “We used it to take our politics widely among the people in the State and outside.” Therefore, moving forward with the lessons learned, suitable modalities may be worked out if both sides are serious about peace talks.
