📰 India, France carry out second joint patrol in Southern Indian Ocean
Maritime domain awareness and anti-submarine cooperation have emerged as priority areas in the region
•The navies of India and France concluded their second joint patrolling in the South-Western Indian Ocean last week, while an Australian P-8 maritime patrol aircraft is expected in India next month on a reciprocal visit, underscoring India’s continued focus on expanding maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
•Diplomatic sources told The Hindu that during the five days from May 9 to 13, an Indian Navy P-8I aircraft was deployed from the French island of La Reunion to carry out “joint surveillance and patrolling operations” with the French Navy in the South-Western Indian Ocean.
•Two French Floréal-class surveillance frigates, the Floréal and the Nivôse, took part in the deployment, with focus on anti-smuggling, a diplomatic source said. “In order to increase the level of interoperability, French sailors were taken onboard the P-8I,” the source said.
•Noting that it is the second time that France and India have carried out “joint patrolling” out of La Reunion, the source added, “This type of operation demonstrates how Indo-French naval cooperation serves as net security provider in the region.”
•In a statement last week, the Indian Navy said, “During the deployment... the P8I aircraft will engage with French warships operating in the region and undertake coordinated surveillance missions in the area to enhance maritime safety and security in the Southern Indian Ocean, including the Mozambique Channel.”
Cooperation among Quad countries
•In the backdrop of increasing Chinese naval presence in the IOR, maritime domain awareness (MDA) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) cooperation has emerged as a top priority for India and the Quad countries both in a bilateral and also in the Malabar naval exercise.
•Last month, an Indian Navy P-8I from INAS 312 ‘Albatross’ squadron was in Darwin, Australia, where it participated in coordinated operations in “ASW and surface surveillance” to enhance MDA with P-8 aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). “An Indian Navy P-8I Neptune worked with one of our P-8A Poseidons in mid-April over several days to conduct coordinated maritime surveillance patrols in the waters to our north, in another chapter of the enduring India-Australia security partnership,” the RAAF said on LinkedIn.
•The RAAF is expected to pay a reciprocal visit likely in June, defence and diplomatic sources said.
•In January this year, an Indian Navy P-8I participated in the multinational ASW Exercise Sea Dragon-22 at Guam in the U.S. that saw the participation of the Quad countries, Canada, and South Korea.
•Indian Navy operates 12 Boeing P-8Is in two squadrons located at Arakkonam in Tamil Nadu and INS Hansa, Goa. A proposal for six more aircraft has been deferred for now by the Defence Ministry. “P-8I gives Indian Navy the reach and capability to undertake ASW missions far away and also flexibility which has been demonstrated on several occasions,” a defence source noted.
French focus on Indo-Pacific
•France, which has territory in the Indian Ocean, has articulated its focus on the Indo Pacific. French Minister for the Armed Forces Florence Parly during her visit to India in December made a reference for expanding cooperation in the region and said that there were many tensions in the Indian Ocean, especially in the eastern part of Africa and it is a “joint responsibility to make sure that we can contribute to ease up the tensions there.”
•Talking of the European Union’s efforts in the Indian Ocean, Ms. Parly had said that they tested something called the ‘maritime coordinated presence’ in the Gulf of Kenya and that they would like to extend this concept of having maritime coordinated to the Indo-Pacific. “As a first example we are thinking of something in Indian part of this area because we see that the Mozambique canal is a very hot place to be protected, it is a place where terrorist organisations are present and could put at risk commercial maritime routes and could also spread out in other areas,” she stated.
•The Indian and French navies regularly undertake coordinated operations under the Varuna series of bilateral exercise. In March-end this year, India and France co-led the maiden edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Maritime Exercise 2022 (IMEX-22) off Goa with the aim of enhancing interoperability in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations among member navies.
•Under the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy and broader maritime cooperation, the Indian Navy undertakes joint exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surveillance with Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius and coordinated patrols (CORPAT) with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia.
What is the key role of CDS? Why is the government looking to streamline the post and the functions of the Department of Military Affairs?
•It’s now over five months since the country’s first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat was killed in a chopper crash in the Nilgris in Tamil Nadu along with his wife and 12 other military personnel onboard. The Government is yet to announce a successor to the country’s top military post. The reason for the delay, official sources say, is because the Government is reassessing the concept of the post as well as the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and is looking to streamline the setup.
What is the role of the Chief of Defence Staff?
•The Government’s decision in 2019 to create the post of a CDS, a long-pending demand to bring in tri-service synergy and integration, is the biggest top-level military reform since independence.
•In December 2019, the Union Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi had given approval to create the post of CDS in the rank of a four-star General with salary and perquisites equivalent to a Service Chief and then Army Chief Gen. Rawat was appointed to the post.
•The CDS would is also the Principal Military Adviser to the Defence Minister and Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC).
•In addition, the DMA was created as the fifth department in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) with the CDS functioning as its Secretary.
•The broad mandate of the CDS includes bringing about jointness in “operations, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance of the three Services, within three years of the first CDS assuming office.”
•He will act as the Principal Military Adviser to Defence Minister on all tri-Services matters. However, the three Chiefs will continue to advise the Defence Minister on matters exclusively concerning their respective Services,” a Government statement had said while adding that the CDS will not exercise any military command, including over the three Service Chiefs.
•The CDS is also meant to bring about synergy and optimise procurements, training and logistics and facilitate restructuring of military commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/ theatre commands. The CDS will also evaluate plans “for ‘Out of Area Contingencies’, as well other contingencies such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR),” officials had stated. The specialised tri-service divisions — special operations, defence cyber and defence space — were also brought under the ambit of the CDS.
•Interestingly, while capital procurements are still with the DoD, the prioritisation is with the CDS. In the last three years, the Government had also announced a series of measures to cut down on defence imports and promote indigenous defence manufacturing.
Why the rethink?
•Official sources said that with the experience of the last few years of having a CDS, there is a rethink that the appointment of a CDS in itself wasn’t enough and there are several issues with respect to roles and responsibilities, issues of equivalence among others. “This made the Government pause, look back and reassess the entire reform process,” one official said on condition of anonymity. There is also dichotomy in the roles and responsibilities with the several hats worn by the CDS and also overlap in responsibilities between the DMA and DoD, officials stated while also adding that there is also a rethink on the ambitious timelines set for the creation of theatre commands and also the number of commands and their envisaged format.
•While several options are being looked at, one of the ways to go forward would be to have a CDS with operational powers who will after due legislative changes have theatre commanders report to him while the Service Chiefs will look after the raise, train and sustain functions of respective Services, an official said. In this direction, it is being looked at if the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC) can function as the Secretary DMA reporting directly to the CDS.
What has been the progress on theatre commands?
•An ambitious agenda was set for the first CDS to reorganise the Indian armed forces into integrated theatre commands, which would be the biggest reorganisation of the military in 75 years and fundamentally change the way the three services operate together. Extensive studies were carried out by the Vice Chiefs of three Services on the theatre commands — land-based Western and Eastern theatre commands, maritime theatre command and an integrated air defence command. Gen. Rawat had stated that the Army’s Northern Command would be left out of the ambit for now and integrated at a later stage.
•However, differences continue to remain on certain aspects with the Air Force having some reservations with regard to the air defence command and the naming and rotation of the theatre commands among others. Additional studies were ordered, which are currently underway but the overall process has stalled in the absence of a CDS and continued differences.
📰 Stop distributing iron fortified rice in Jharkhand, say activists
Excess iron can cause health issues in large tribal populations ailing from sickle cell anaemia, thalassemia and tuberculosis
•Distribution of iron fortified rice through government schemes as a “silver bullet” to curb anaemia must stop in States like Jharkhand, which have large tribal populations that suffer from sickle-cell anaemia, thalassemia, and tuberculosis, for whom an overload of iron can create adverse health issues, warn activists, who in a fact-finding exercise discovered that neither field functionaries nor beneficiaries had been educated about the potential harms, and there were no warning labels despite the food regulator’s rules on fortified foods.
•According to a report prepared jointly by the Alliance for Sustainable and Holistic Agriculture (ASHA-Kisan Swaraj) and the Right To Food Campaign, Jharkhand, where fortified rice is being distributed under Central government-funded schemes such as the public distribution system (PDS); PM-Poshan (erstwhile mid-day meal scheme) at schools; and Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS or anganwadi services), consent is not being obtained from beneficiaries.
•PDS dealers and frontline workers too have not been informed beforehand about the potential harmful effects of fortified rice for certain categories of the population.
•The fact-finding team discovered that among the beneficiaries who received fortified rice in the State were also patients diagnosed with thalassemia, sickle cell disease, and tuberculosis, and there may be many more who have been not diagnosed yet.
•Thalassemia, sickle cell anaemia and malaria are conditions where there is already excess iron in the body, whereas TB patients are unable to absorb iron. Consumption of iron-fortified foods among patients of these diseases can reduce immunity and the reduce functionality of organs.
•Jharkhand is an endemic zone of sickle cell disorder and thalassemia, with a prevalence of 8%-10%, which is twice the national average. Jharkhand is also an endemic zone for malaria — in 2020, the State ranked third in the country in malaria deaths.
•“The Right to Informed Choices about one’s food is a basic right. The right to know what one is consuming is also a basic right. In the case of rice fortification, it is seen that no prior informed consent was ever sought from the recipients,” notes the report.
•The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India’s (FSSAI) Food Safety and Standards (Fortification of Foods) Regulations 2018 require that fortified food packets must mandatorily display the fortification logo (+F), and that every package of food fortified with iron shall carry a warning statement that people with thalassemia may consume it under medical supervision, and persons with sickle cell anaemia are advised not to consume iron fortified food products. The rule came into effect from March 2022.
•Often, these warnings were missing from gunny sacks, and even when they were present, they carried little import as rice is often distributed loosely or without packaging in the PDS.
•There are also instances of women cooking the rice, including in schools and anganwadis, picking out by hand and discarding the fortified rice kernels that are mixed with regular rice kernels as they are easily identifiable, and referred to them as “plastic rice”.
•In 2019, the Union government initiated a pilot scheme for fortified rice and its distribution under the PDS for three years in 15 districts of 15 States till March 2022 to deal with the high levels of anaemia in India. In 2021, Prime Minister Narendra Modi revealed that fortified rice would be supplied in all food schemes of India by 2024. The Union Cabinet on April 8, 2022 approved phased expansion of rice fortification across the country by March 2024. Though the usage of fortified rice has been scaled-up, there is no evaluation report yet of the pilot started in 2019.
•The report recommends that even a screening process before the distribution of iron fortified rice is unlikely to be of help as households are unlikely to cook two different types of rice for those who can consume this kind of rice and those who can’t, and, therefore supply and distribution of iron fortified rice should stop in Jharkhand, and the State government must reject rice fortification in government food schemes as an approach to tackling malnutrition.
•The report recommends instead promoting diet diversity by adding millets, pulses and eggs to the PDS.
•“There is a need for precision because no nutrient taken in excess will do you good. Universal fortification is not the answer for nutrition deficiencies,” said Dr. Anura Kurpad, Professor, St. John’s Medical College and Hospital, Bengaluru, who has also argued that ”layering” of government schemes, such as the distribution of iron-folic acid tablets at anganwadi centres and schools as well as iron fortified salt in some States may lead to excessive consumption of iron leading to health risks.
📰 The repo rate in India
How does the repo rate work? How does it affect the country’s inflation and what are the factors that influence its efficacy?
•The story so far: On May 4, the Reserve Bank of India, in a surprise move, announced that the bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) had held an ‘off-cycle’ meeting at which it had decided unanimously to raise the “policy repo rate by 40 basis points to 4.40%, with immediate effect”. Citing ‘inflation that was rising alarmingly and spreading fast’ globally, amid geopolitical tensions, RBI Governor Shaktikanta Das said that the MPC had judged that the ‘inflation outlook warranted an appropriate and timely response through resolute and calibrated steps to ensure that the second-round effects of supply side shocks on the economy were contained and long-term inflation expectations were kept firmly anchored’. Mr. Das added that the RBI’s monetary policy response would help preserve macro-financial stability amid increasing volatility in financial markets.
What is the repo rate?
•The repo rate is one of several direct and indirect instruments that are used by the RBI for implementing monetary policy. Specifically, the RBI defines the repo rate as the fixed interest rate at which it provides overnight liquidity to banks against the collateral of government and other approved securities under the liquidity adjustment facility (LAF).
•In other words, when banks have short-term requirements for funds, they can place government securities that they hold with the central bank and borrow money against these securities at the repo rate.
•Since this is the rate of interest that the RBI charges commercial banks such as State Bank of India and ICICI Bank when it lends them money, it serves as a key benchmark for the lenders to in turn price the loans they offer to their borrowers.
Why is the repo rate such a crucial monetary tool?
•According to Investopedia, when government central banks repurchase securities from commercial lenders, they do so at a discounted rate that is known as the repo rate. The repo rate system allows central banks to control the money supply within economies by increasing or decreasing the availability of funds.
How does the repo rate work?
•Besides the direct loan pricing relationship, the repo rate also functions as a monetary tool by helping to regulate the availability of liquidity or funds in the banking system. For instance, when the repo rate is decreased, banks may find an incentive to sell securities back to the government in return for cash. This increases the money supply available to the general economy. Conversely, when the repo rate is increased, lenders would end up thinking twice before borrowing from the central bank at the repo window thus, reducing the availability of money supply in the economy.
•Since inflation is, in large measure, caused by more money chasing the same quantity of goods and services available in an economy, central banks tend to target regulation of money supply as a means to slow inflation.
What impact can a repo rate change have on inflation?
•Inflation can broadly be: mainly demand driven price gains, or a result of supply side factors that in turn push up the costs of inputs used by producers of goods and providers of services, thus spurring inflation, or most often caused by a combination of both demand and supply side pressures.
•Changes to the repo rate to influence interest rates and the availability of money supply primarily work only on the demand side by making credit more expensive and savings more attractive and therefore dissuading consumption. However, they do little to address the supply side factors, be it the high price of commodities such as crude oil or metals or imported food items such as edible oils.
What other factors influence the repo rate’s efficacy?
•There is also another aspect to consider. Repo rate increases impact the real economy with a lag.
•In February 2021, the RBI in its annual ‘Report on Currency and Finance’ observed that “the challenge for an efficient operating procedure [of monetary policy] is to minimise the transmission lag from changes in the policy rate to the operating target”, which in this case is the mandate to keep medium-term inflation anchored at 4%, and bound within a tolerance range of 2% to 6%.
•The RBI noted in the report that there were several channels of transmission, ‘the interest rate channel; the credit or bank lending channel; the exchange rate channel operating through relative prices of tradables and non-tradables; the asset price channel impacting wealth/income accruing from holdings of financial assets; and the expectations channel encapsulating the perceptions of households and businesses on the state of the economy and its outlook’.
•“These conduits of transmission intertwine and operate in conjunction and are difficult to disentangle,” the central bank added, underscoring the challenges monetary authorities face in ensuring that changes to the repo rate actually help in achieving the policy objective.
📰 A war that is shrinking India’s geopolitical options
The main worry now is about how to manage a China that is attempting to consolidate the region under its influence
•What was initially assumed in New Delhi to be a quick confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, the war in Europe is now raging on with no end in sight, and with its long-term implications yet unknown. As for India, the initial phase of diplomatic rush is over and its geopolitical options are shrinking as the war drags on.
Diminishing options
•For several weeks during late March and April, it seemed as though the Ukraine war presented a number of geopolitical options for New Delhi to choose from. The high-profile visits to New Delhi, the entreaties of these leaders for Indian support for their positions in the ongoing war, and India’s balancing act all seemed to propel the country to the centre stage of global attention.
•And yet, instead of enhancing New Delhi’s ability to make strategic choices in its broader region, the Ukraine war may actually limit the number of options available to New Delhi for at least three reasons: one, Russia as a key strategic partner is no longer available to India for balancing purposes. Arguably, into the third month of its Ukraine invasion, Moscow is more dependent on India today than the other way round. Two, Russia’s sudden absence from the Asian balance of power equations has further enhanced Chinese influence in the region. By the time the war ends, whatever may be the shape of the global balance of power, the regional balance of power would have irretrievably shifted in Beijing’s favour. Three, given that the United States and its western partners are more interested on the Ukraine theatre today, their focus on China is already taking a hit, if not yet on the Indo-Pacific. These factors, ipso facto, will limit India’s regional geopolitical options.
•India’s biggest dilemma today is not whether or not to continue its engagement with Russia. That it would engage Russia in the immediate to medium term is clear. However, as a second-order fallout of the Russian misadventure, New Delhi has other dilemmas to worry about in the medium to long term.
Growing China challenge
•Managing the China challenge continues to be New Delhi’s biggest concern. For sure, the China challenge is not a product of the Ukraine war per se, but it has further complicated the China conundrum for India. While the Ukraine war has strengthened and revitalised the U.S.-led military and political coalition globally, it is bound to weaken the American influence in the Southern Asian region. While this process started even before the war, the war will quicken this process especially given how its preoccupations with the European theatre will further shrink its interest in the Southern Asian theatre. China is the biggest beneficiary of the U.S./western retrenchment from the region which gives it a free hand in it. So, for New Delhi, Moscow is no longer available for its pursuit of its regional interests, and the U.S.’s ability to produce favourable geopolitical outcomes for India in the region is shrinking as well.
•For New Delhi then, the worry is no longer about how to please both sides in this war, but how to manage a China that is attempting to rapidly consolidate the region under its influence. How has it performed on that count so far? Take the recent visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi. Reports indicated that the External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, and the National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval, impressed upon Mr. Wang that the normalisation of diplomatic and political ties can only happen after the disengagement of troops from the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). But Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decision to attend the BRICS Summit in China could potentially take the sting out of New Delhi’s stern messaging to Beijing. In other words, the harsh tone adopted by Mr. Jaishankar and Mr. Doval when responding to Mr. Wang’s normalisation offer could arguably be weakened by Mr. Modi’s attendance at the BRICS summit, even if virtually. But then, was it possible for New Delhi, faced with limited geopolitical choices in the region resulting from the Ukraine war, to have shrugged off the Chinese diplomatic overture?
Exploiting China-Russia ties
•While there is little doubt that in the longer run, a war-fatigued and weakened Russia will become a junior partner to China, India today does have an opportunity to get Moscow to nudge Beijing to stop its irredentism on the LAC. Consider this. If the Chinese side, taking advantage of the Ukraine distraction, heats up the LAC, India would have to turn to the West and the U.S. for support (political, diplomatic, intelligence, etc.). This would invariably hurt Russian interests. So it would make sense for Moscow to request Beijing not to activate the LAC while the Ukraine war is still on. Mr. Wang’s visit to New Delhi and his request to India to get back to business as usual is perhaps an indication that Beijing also seeks to calm the tempers on the LAC. While China may have other reasons for seeking ‘normalcy’ with India (such as creating an impression that China is consolidating the South Asian region under its leadership when the West and the U.S. are busy with Ukraine), for Russia, it is important that two of its Asian friends — China and India — do not clash at least while the war is still on.
•While this may be a useful way to manage the Chinese aggression on the LAC in the short term, this will depend on how China views its dynamics with Russia and that of Russia with India. Herein lies the challenge for India. If China were to stabilise the LAC at the nudging of Russia, it would also expect India to go slow on the Indo-Pacific, something India can ill-afford to do.
•While, under normal circumstances, India could have utilised the many inherent contradictions between Moscow and Beijing, the Ukraine war has suspended those contradictions even if for the time being. More so, there is little India can do to enhance its geopolitical engagement with Russia until the war is over.
Consolidating Kashmir’s calm
•India’s north-western continental strategy, in particular towards Afghanistan and Central Asia, too will get complicated due to the Ukraine war. On the face of it and for the time being, things seem advantageous to India. Consider this. For over a year now, the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan is calm and the violence in Kashmir has come down. The primary reason behind the current calm is because Pakistan was at first busy with consolidating its gains from the return of the Taliban, and now dealing with the unpleasant fallout from the Taliban’s return to Afghanistan. More pertinently, New Delhi’s presence from Afghanistan has entirely disappeared. So, to put it rather bluntly, it appears that the calm in Kashmir and along the LoC is a quid pro quo for the Indian withdrawal from Afghanistan. This might appear to be a good bargain; but it may not be so in the longer run. If this is a bargain New Delhi accepts, it will not only mean giving up its strategic interests in Afghanistan but also reducing its engagement in the Central Asian region as well at a time China is making feverish inroads into the region, right in the backyard of the Russian sphere of influence.
•The consequences arising out of the Ukraine war will contribute to it as well. Had Moscow not been caught in the Ukraine war, it would have fended off Beijing’s attempts to take over its backyard (in one sense, China is doing to Russia using economic means what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been doing to Russia using military means). During the December summit, India and Russia had decided on a number of initiatives focusing on Central Asia and Afghanistan. They are unlikely to be revived anytime soon, ceding further ground to China and Pakistan.
•The combined geopolitical impact of the ill-timed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia’s Ukraine war, and the rapid expansion of Chinese influence goes to show how New Delhi’s geopolitical choices have suddenly shrunk due to the Ukraine war.
📰 The technical higher education market dissected
The AICTE should place the safeguarding of students’ interests before the commercialisation of education
•In India, the technical higher education sector — dominated by private players — can be best understood only in market terms: be it the exponential growth in institutions or in enrolment as well the dynamics of the decisions made by the regulatory bodies. It is no accident that much of the growth in the technical higher education has been after 1991, when the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) became functional in its present avatar.
Supply exceeds demand
•During the three decades immediately preceding the present (1961 to 1991), the number of technical higher education institutions had increased five times to go up from 53 to 277. During the same period, enrolment in technical higher education had increased six times — 0.37 lakh to 2.16 lakh. Importantly, most of the growth has been in the government sector. During the past three decades (1991-2020) the institutions have gone up by 40 times (at 10,990), with the intake capacity rising 15 times to touch 32.85 lakh. Much of this expansion has been in the private sector.
•Going by the number of students who appear for the joint entrance examination and other entrance tests conducted by various agencies and different higher educational institutions, the total demand for technical higher education appears to be no more than 20 lakh. Clearly, supply far exceeds the demand for technical higher education, probably in the hope that the supply would create its own demand.
•It is no wonder that a large number of technical institutions have been saddled with sunk costs due to their inability to fill their sanctioned seats. Their capacity utilisation has been falling for a long time now to become 53.53% in 2020-21, as compared to 62.32% in 2012-13. Declining demand notwithstanding, these institutions have been adding more capacity, though some market corrections seem to have happened during the past few years. The number of institutions and intake capacity in 2021-22 have come down to 8,997 and 30.87 lakh, respectively.
Student-teacher ratio
•The AICTE prescribes a minimum specific student-teacher ratio (STR), ranging from 7.5 to 20, depending on the type and level of programmes and disciplines under its domain. As an overwhelming majority of the institutions are unable to admit students to capacity, their STR, at least on paper, has gone down from 5.5 in 2012-13 to 3.0 in 2020-21.
•A lower STR could mean better quality but in their case, this only means higher cost adversely impinging on their economic sustainability. Their revenue models adversely impacted, they are unable to create quality infrastructure and human resources and become trapped in a vicious cycle of mediocrity. In market terms, they are the price takers and should be willing to offer their products and services at the lowest possible prices.
•In a typical market framework, such businesses would either improve their quality or slash their prices to survive. Apparently, it does not happen in the higher education market, except during the past two years when market corrections led to a drop of 18.3% and 6.01% in the number of institutions and intake capacity, respectively.
Appealing to the regulator
•Instead, they prefer regulators coming to their rescue. In the past they urged doing away with the requirements of a certain percentage of marks in the school board. Recently, they could convince the regulator to abolish the condition of studying science and mathematics at the senior secondary/intermediate level in schools, though the AICTE retracted from the decision quickly. Such suasions have obviously been intended to widen the catchment for admission. Institutions have also been helped by raising the STR — from 15 to 20 in the undergraduate programme in engineering, for example.
The Veblen Effect
•These apart, technical higher educational institutions are differentiated and highly hierarchical. The Indian Institutes of Technology, the National Institutes of Technology, the Indian Institutes of Information Technology, the Schools of Planning and Architecture, the National Institutes of Design, the National Institute of Pharmaceutical Education and Research and a few select universities are the most sought after. Taken together, they can admit a maximum of 40,000 students. An equal number of seats may be available in high quality private institutions.
•Being highly selective, they are the price makers. Left to market forces, they may resort to an exploitative pricing policy. They generally resist capacity expansion ostensibly out of fear of dilution in quality. Artificial scarcity suits them fine and at times enables them to use higher fees as a strategy for brand building. After all, the Veblen Effect (what is expensive is perceived to be excellent), is as applicable to higher education as it is to luxuries.
•Such institutions hate pricing regulations that limit their ability to charge as much as they wish. They are naturally disappointed with the news that the AICTE is contemplating prescribing a ceiling limit on fees that these institutions can charge from their students. A bulk of poor quality institutions are happy about the prospect of a certain minimum level of fees being made mandatory.
Steps for the AICTE
•Technically, the AICTE is empowered to take ‘all such steps as it may think fit for the coordinated and integrated development and maintenance of standards’. Specifically, it can “fix norms and guidelines for charging tuition and other fees” as well. But would it be justified to prescribe a specific amount that must compulsorily be charged from students? Will this move not be construed as helping the institutes bettering their balance sheets, rather than safeguarding the interest of students. After all, the AICTE Act mandates it “to take necessary steps to prevent commercialisation of (in) technical education”.
•Finally, would it be advisable for the AICTE to prescribe fees for all technical higher educational institutions spread across the length and breadth of the country? Cannot it just provide a broad framework and guidelines for determining the permissible level of fees? The rest could be left to the State-level fee fixation committees. This would be in the true spirit of federalism which expects States to be a responsible partner in the process.
📰 Focusing on public health engineering
Expanding the cadre of sanitation engineers will help us confront water-related public health challenges
•Globally, around 80% of wastewater flows back into the ecosystem without being treated or reused, according to the United Nations. This can pose a significant environmental and health threat. In the absence of cost-effective, sustainable, disruptive water management solutions, about 70% of sewage is discharged untreated into India’s water bodies. A staggering 21% of diseases are caused by contaminated water in India, according to the World Bank, and one in five children die before their fifth birthday because of poor sanitation and hygiene conditions, according to Startup India. As we confront these public health challenges emerging out of environmental concerns, expanding the scope of public health/environmental engineering science becomes pivotal.
Expanding the cadre
•For India to achieve its sustainable development goals of clean water and sanitation and to address the growing demands for water consumption and preservation of both surface water bodies and groundwater resources, it is essential to find and implement innovative ways of treating wastewater. It is in this context why the specialised cadre of public health engineers, also known as sanitation engineers or environmental engineers, is best suited to provide the growing urban and rural water supply and to manage solid waste and wastewater.
•The availability of systemic information and programmes focusing on teaching, training, and capacity building for this specialty cadre is currently limited. Both as professions and as practice, engineering and public health have been traditionally understood as different fields. However, together, these fields can offer a wide range of opportunities for the development of advanced wastewater treatment systems, for understanding complex quality and monitoring processes, designing and managing septic tank systems, supplying good quality water in adequate quantities, maintaining hygiene and access to water, and ensuring that water supply is sustainable, including the study of relevant industry standards and codes of practices.
•Currently in India, civil engineering incorporates a course or two on environmental engineering for students to learn about wastewater management as a part of their pre-service and in-service training. However, the nexus between wastewater and solid waste management and public health issues is not brought out clearly. Most often, civil engineers do not have adequate skills to address public health problems. And public health professionals do not have adequate engineering skills. India aims to supply 55 litres of water per person per day by 2024 under its Jal Jeevan Mission to install functional household tap connections. In this regard, expansion of the pipeline network, identification of sustainable sources of water which have water available year-round, installation of online systems for monitoring the quantity and quality of supply, and collection and treatment of wastewater become increasingly important. The goal of reaching every rural household with functional tap water can be achieved in a sustainable and resilient manner only if the cadre of public health engineers is expanded and strengthened.
Following international trends
•In India, public health engineering is executed by the Public Works Department or by health officials. This differs from international trends. To manage a wastewater treatment plant in Europe, for example, a candidate must specialise in wastewater engineering. With the Government of India starting to think along these lines, introducing public health engineering as a two-year structured master’s degree programme or through diploma programmes for professionals working in this field must be considered to meet the need of increased human resource in this field. For this, the role of medical colleges and public health institutes deserves a discussion. In the current scenario, optimisation and efficiency forms key words in all services. Refresher courses for health and engineering institutes with an updated knowledge in areas of environment science should be made available. Public health professionals can be groomed through in-service training.
•Furthermore, public health engineering should be developed as an interdisciplinary field. Engineers can significantly contribute to public health in defining what is possible, identifying limitations, and shaping workable solutions with a problem-solving approach. Similarly, public health professionals can contribute to engineering through well-researched understanding of health issues, measured risks and how course correction can be initiated. Once both meet, a public health engineer can identify a health risk, work on developing concrete solutions such as new health and safety practices or specialised equipment, in order to correct the safety concern.
•Public health engineering’s combination of engineering and public health skills can also enable contextualised decision-making regarding water management in India. For example, wastewater management systems, especially decentralised and onsite systems, have to be designed based on hydro-geological data and observations of climate patterns. From promoting a robust understanding of processes, trends, and the latest technology in water and wastewater quality monitoring, treatment, and management, public health engineering can help decision/policy makers explore the available options. Given the population growth, diminishing resources and risky exploitation of natural resources, various State governments and not-for-profit organisations are looking to hire environmental engineers through whom public health problems can be addressed.
•There is no doubt that the majority of diseases are water-related, transmitted through consumption of contaminated water, vectors breeding in stagnated water, or lack of adequate quantity of good quality water for proper personal hygiene. Diseases cannot be contained unless we provide good quality and adequate quantity of water. Most of the world’s diseases can be prevented by considering this. Training our young minds towards creating sustainable water management systems would be the first step. Currently, institutions like the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras (IIT-M) are considering initiating public health engineering as a separate discipline. To leverage this opportunity even further, India needs to scale up in the same direction.
