📰 Courts cannot interfere with day-to-day temple rituals: SC
PIL plea questioned puja-darshan procedures at Tirumala
•The Supreme Court on Tuesday said constitutional courts could not interfere with the day-to-day rituals and ‘sevas’ performed in temples on the basis of “public interest” petitions.
•Religious scholars and priests were best equipped to go into the question whether rituals in temples were being conducted in accordance with customs and traditions.
•The writ jurisdiction of a constitutional court under Articles 226 and 32 was limited. Whether a particular ritual was being performed in the right way or not was a “disputed question of fact”, the court explained. At most, it could be a subject for filing a civil suit in a subordinate court.
•“How a coconut should be broken or a puja should be done in a temple is not for a constitutional court to look into,” Chief Justice of India N.V. Ramana said.
Not as per traditions: PIL
•The Bench, also comprising Justices A.S. Bopanna and Hima Kohli, was hearing a writ petition filed by Srivari Daadaa alleging that rituals were not being performed as per traditions at the famous Lord Venkateshwara Swamy temple at Tirumala. He also complained about the procedure for darshan .
•Justices Bopanna and Kohli agreed the Supreme Court could not interfere with the daily conduct of rituals in a temple on the basis of a writ petition.
•The court said, at the most, it could ask the temple administration to clarify in case devotees complain about discrimination or of not allowing darshan, while taking into consideration the current public health crisis.
•Disposing of the case, the court directed the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams (TTD) to respond to Mr. Daadaa’s grievances regarding darshan procedures and other administrative issues within eight weeks.
•The court said Mr. Daadaa could file a civil suit in a lower court to dispute factual issues regarding the performance of rituals.
Some changes in timelines are being finalised, says Vice Admiral S.N. Ghormade
•The Navy’s plan for a 170 ship force are underway, with some changes in timelines which are being finalised, Vice Chief of Naval Staff S.N. Ghormade said on Tuesday. Vice Admiral Ghormade also said the maritime environment is a complex one and it only increases when more number of players are involved. He stated that the Navy has budgeted for a second indigenous aircraft carrier in its Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCPP).
•The Navy will commission the first Project-15B class stealth guided missile destroyer ‘Visakhapatnam’ on November 21, and the fourth Scorpene class submarine ‘Vela’ on November 25, Vice Admiral Ghormade said, briefing the media.
•“We live in a time when global and regional balances of power are shifting rapidly and the region of most rapid change is undoubtedly the Indian Ocean Region,” he said. “Continuous efforts are therefore on to ensure that our force levels grow progressively to enhance the capability of the Indian Navy in meeting the emerging challenges.”
•Terming the commissioning of ‘Visakhapatnam’ and ‘Vela’ as major milestones in showcasing indigenous capacity to build complex combat platforms, he said as many as 39 ships and submarines are presently under construction at various shipyards across the country.
•The Navy currently has 130 ships and had earlier planned to achieve securing 200 ships, which was revised to 170 ships planned by 2027. The timeline is now being revised as the Navy is revising its MCPP for the next 15 years, which is expected to be ready by next year and will be in line with the 10-year Integrated Capability Development Plan (ICDP) being formulated by the Department of Military Affairs to bring in service integration, Vice Admiral Ghormade said.
•China has been rapidly expanding its Navy, rolling our more ships than any other country amid its expanding global footprint, especially in the Indian Ocean Region.
•On the need for a second Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC-II) and the debate over carriers versus submarines, Vice Admiral Ghormade said all platforms like carrier, submarine and maritime patrol aircraft have a definite role.
•“To make a balanced force, all these are required for the capability,” he said, adding the MCPP had factored for all of them while taking into account budgetary allocations and constraints.
•The contract for the construction of four ships under Project-15B was signed in January 2011 at a project cost of about ₹29,643.74 crore. The final cost of the project is ₹35,000 crore. The four ships are christened after major cities from all four corners of the country — ‘Visakhapatnam’, ‘Mormugao’, ‘Imphal’ and ‘Surat’. The remaining ships would be commissioned at one per year from 2022 to 2024.
•Similarly, the fifth Scorpene undergoing trials is scheduled to be commissioned by October 2022, and the sixth and last submarine by the end of 2023.
Some changes in timelines are being finalised, says Vice Admiral S.N. Ghormade
•The Navy’s plan for a 170 ship force are underway, with some changes in timelines which are being finalised, Vice Chief of Naval Staff S.N. Ghormade said on Tuesday. Vice Admiral Ghormade also said the maritime environment is a complex one and it only increases when more number of players are involved. He stated that the Navy has budgeted for a second indigenous aircraft carrier in its Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCPP).
•The Navy will commission the first Project-15B class stealth guided missile destroyer ‘Visakhapatnam’ on November 21, and the fourth Scorpene class submarine ‘Vela’ on November 25, Vice Admiral Ghormade said, briefing the media.
•“We live in a time when global and regional balances of power are shifting rapidly and the region of most rapid change is undoubtedly the Indian Ocean Region,” he said. “Continuous efforts are therefore on to ensure that our force levels grow progressively to enhance the capability of the Indian Navy in meeting the emerging challenges.”
•Terming the commissioning of ‘Visakhapatnam’ and ‘Vela’ as major milestones in showcasing indigenous capacity to build complex combat platforms, he said as many as 39 ships and submarines are presently under construction at various shipyards across the country.
•The Navy currently has 130 ships and had earlier planned to achieve securing 200 ships, which was revised to 170 ships planned by 2027. The timeline is now being revised as the Navy is revising its MCPP for the next 15 years, which is expected to be ready by next year and will be in line with the 10-year Integrated Capability Development Plan (ICDP) being formulated by the Department of Military Affairs to bring in service integration, Vice Admiral Ghormade said.
•China has been rapidly expanding its Navy, rolling our more ships than any other country amid its expanding global footprint, especially in the Indian Ocean Region.
•On the need for a second Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC-II) and the debate over carriers versus submarines, Vice Admiral Ghormade said all platforms like carrier, submarine and maritime patrol aircraft have a definite role.
•“To make a balanced force, all these are required for the capability,” he said, adding the MCPP had factored for all of them while taking into account budgetary allocations and constraints.
•The contract for the construction of four ships under Project-15B was signed in January 2011 at a project cost of about ₹29,643.74 crore. The final cost of the project is ₹35,000 crore. The four ships are christened after major cities from all four corners of the country — ‘Visakhapatnam’, ‘Mormugao’, ‘Imphal’ and ‘Surat’. The remaining ships would be commissioned at one per year from 2022 to 2024.
•Similarly, the fifth Scorpene undergoing trials is scheduled to be commissioned by October 2022, and the sixth and last submarine by the end of 2023.
📰 For more than a waiver: On India-US global strategic partnership
Threat of sanctions undermines foundation of India-U.S. global strategic partnership
•The announcement by Russia that supplies of the S-400 Triumf system to India have already begun has set the stage for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit in early December. It has also thrown down the gauntlet to the U.S. that threatened sanctions against India. The deal for the air defence system was signed in 2018 during Mr. Putin’s visit then. In 2017, the U.S. had passed its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) that provided for economic and travel sanctions against countries and officials that transacted significant military and intelligence contracts with Russia, North Korea and Iran. The Modi government has, justifiably, paid little heed to U.S. warnings that the sanctions — slapped on China and NATO partner, Turkey, for buying the S-400 — could also be used against India. In contrast to its cave-in on similar U.S. threats over the purchase of Iranian oil in 2019, Government officials have asserted that the deal is an essential part of India’s defences at a time of challenges on its eastern and western frontiers. In order to protect advance payments for the S-400 from U.S. strictures, India and Russia conducted their transfers through a rupee-rouble system. With the first parts of the system now delivered, and the first squadron delivery likely to completed by December-end, the die is cast.
•The U.S. has a choice not to allow the S-400 delivery to turn into a showdown with India. U.S. President Joe Biden has been authorised by the Congress to waive sanctions if the waiver is found to be in American “vital national security interests”, or, that India would reduce its future dependence on Russian weaponry. While it is unlikely India would give assurances on the latter, it is easy to argue, as many U.S. Congress representatives have done in a proposed amendment to CAATSA, that India is a prized U.S. partner — of the Quad, the Indo-Pacific and in countering China. Sanctions will cause a rift in India-U.S. ties, and could spur India towards Russia. Above all, the U.S. must recognise that its unilateral sanctions, which are not U.N. endorsed, undermine the multilateral system. The subjective and whimsical manner in which these sanctions were used, withdrawn and then reimposed against Iran, for example, do not inspire confidence in them. For India, acceding to such sanctions amounts to becoming a party to a bilateral dispute, and challenges the nation’s principles of sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Rather than trying to reason with the U.S. for an exceptional waiver to its domestic law, New Delhi must make it clear to Washington that the law should be abandoned, as it negates the very “rules-based international order” that is the foundation of the India-U.S. global strategic partnership.
📰 Longer term, better impact
The recent ordinance that allows the Centre to extend the tenure of the Director of the CBI is timely and merited
•The Central government’s decision to give a five-year tenure to heads of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED) has drawn a lot of flak. The Opposition smells a rat in the ordinances issued a few days ago. This is unsurprising. Any governmental move to strengthen a powerful law enforcement agency is bound to invite questions and raise suspicion. And the CBI’s track record for objectivity and neutrality is anything but straightforward.
•It is, however, preposterous to probe the intentions of this major move. How can we suspect the bonafides of the government until we have evidence to prove that the decision was motivated by dishonest intentions? No government is a saint, but to question the intentions behind an administrative decision right after it is made seems unfair. If one perceives politics here, let us remember that only 5-10% of the cases registered by the CBI involve politicians.
Capricious decisions
•When I assumed charge of the position 20 years ago, I was the first beneficiary of the apex court’s directive giving a mandatory two-year tenure to the Director of the CBI. This was a fallout of the Hawala scandal. I had an extra four months because my retirement age automatically gave me this benefit.
•Prior to my appointment, the government was arbitrary and capricious in choosing the Director. It was not rare to see temporary appointments given to favour some individuals. Seniority was often ignored in appointments and Directors were removed frequently. In 1987, C.M. Radhakrishnan Nair was appointed as the Director. This decision was rescinded within days to give an extension to the man holding the post, Mohan Katre. Could there be anything more demoralising to the officer concerned and to the elite organisation?
•The recent ordinances are timely and merited. A two-year tenure for a CBI head is too short for any officer to make an impact on the organisation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation chief in the U.S. gets a 10-year term. This provides them the much-needed continuity that a Director needs in an outfit charged with the task of conducting highly sensitive investigations, which sometimes impinge on the longevity and stability of a democratically elected government.
•We will have to wait for a few years to gauge the impact of the change in tenure rules. Any blatantly dishonest interference in the working of the organisation is bound to raise the hackles of those who believe in and carry out straightforward investigations. The government will therefore have to show enormous restraint in its interactions with the head of the CBI.
•Of course, as a measure of accountability, the Director will have to keep the government informed of all major administrative decisions. He or she should inform the executive but not take orders from it.
•The only problem with the latest ordinance is that, at the end of the mandatory two-year tenure, the government will have to issue orders granting one-year extensions at a time. It would have better if there was a straight five-year term for the Director. The rule about three annual extensions can be misused by a tendentious government. It may be construed as a reward for ‘good behaviour’, which is a euphemism for an obliging Director.
Dependence on State governments
•Successive chiefs have suggested the drafting of a CBI Act to ensure that the organisation is not dependent on the State governments, many of which have withdrawn consent for the CBI to function in that State. The Supreme Court has recently made caustic references to this objectionable development. Eight States — West Bengal, Maharashtra, Kerala, Punjab, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Mizoram — have withdrawn the general consent. The Court termed this a “serious issue”. The CBI should be made to derive its authority for launching investigations from its own statute instead of depending on the Criminal Procedure Code, which makes the CBI a police organisation. Apt analogies are the Income Tax Act and the Customs Act, which enable the officers of the two mighty departments to act on their own, without being at the mercy of State governments.
📰 An outreach to tribals that checks all the boxes
‘Janjatiya Gaurav Divas’ is a part of the steps being taken to secure the culture and welfare of India’s tribal communities
•In the Ayodhya kanda of the Ramayana, when Lord Rama is exiled from the kingdom of Ayodhya, and reaches the northern bank of the Ganga at Sringaverapura, he is received by the king of the neighbouring kingdom of Nishadha, Guha. Rama treats the tribal leader, Guha, as his own conscience. Rama stays at Guha’s place and the Nishadha king helps Rama cross the river the next day. In the Mahabharata, Arjuna’s travels in the Northeast lead to his encounter with Ulupi, the princess of the Naga tribe, who he marries and has a son with, Iravan. The Ramayana and the Mahabharata are replete with harmonious relationships between forest dwellers and the “city dwellers’’.
Recognition now
•Despite a place for tribals in Indian culture and history, the enactment of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1871 by the British government, branded the very ‘descendants’ of Guha as criminals. With its racist overtones and the stereotyping of tribes as uncivilised, this Act aimed to create a sense of fear against tribal communities. Various tribes across India resisted British rule vehemently and the law was aimed at dealing with these tribes with an iron fist. From Birsa Munda and Tantia Bhil in the north and central parts, Komaram Bheem and Thalakkal Chandu in the south to the likes of Rani Gaidinliu in the northeast, tribal movements in different regions of the country waged spirited battles against the British colonial rule. A lot of their contributions today are either not known or not fully appreciated.
•The aim of commemorating November 15, the birthday of Bhagwan Birsa Munda, as Janjatiya Gaurav Divas is to ensure that the freedom fighters from various tribal communities who fought for India’s Independence get their rightful recognition. It will also ensure that the heritage, culture and the values of the 705 tribal communities (Scheduled Tribes) that constitute approximately 10% of our population is protected and is made accessible across the nation.
Meaningful representation
•Since Independence, there have been efforts to improve the social, political and economic conditions of the tribal populations. Ensuring political representation by reserving electoral constituencies with large tribal populations was one such vehicle. However, representation at ministerial levels was still restricted to the odd figurehead Ministry such as Tribal Affairs. The recent expansion of the Union Council of Ministers led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi saw the inclusion of eight Ministers belonging to the Scheduled Tribes representing the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha and West Bengal. They represent the Gond, Santal, Miji, Munda, Tea Tribe, Kokana and Sonowal-Kachari communities. The Union Cabinet now has three Ministers who belong to various tribal communities. Contrast this with the period between 2004- 2014, when tribal community political representatives were considered mere figureheads. Under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, between 2004-2014, the Ministers from the tribal community were fewer and primarily restricted to the Tribal Affairs Ministry.
Economic well-being
•Apart from political representation, it is also important to ensure that tribal communities see economic progress and better human development indicators. This received renewed impetus in 1999, when former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee set up a separate Ministry for Tribal Affairs. Now, under Mr. Modi, imbalances in budgetary provisions are being addressed in mission mode. For the year 2021-2022, the Ministry of Tribal Affairs saw a budgetary allocation of ₹7,524.87 crore. This is nearly double the budgetary allocation made in the last UPA Budget of 2013-2014.
•After close to 90 years, the Indian Forest Act of 1927 was amended in 2017 (The Indian Forest (Amendment) Act, 2017; https://bit.ly/3wR8zSS) so that bamboo is no longer classified as a tree. This has allowed for the economic value of bamboo to be leveraged to its fullest potential and also brought the Act in consonance with the Forest Rights Act of 2006. The biggest beneficiaries of this are the forest dwelling tribal communities who are now able to use such forest produce to make value-added utility products. The role of tribal marketing development corporations in building market linkages is further increasing incomes of tribal communities.
•Sustainable development also needs to ensure that human development indicators (HDIs) in nutrition, health and education are being improved. The National Education Policy (NEP) acknowledges the additional focus required for tribal communities to address issues such as higher dropout rates.
•The NEP, by ensuring that the medium of instruction until at least Class 5, will be the mother tongue or local language of the child has ensured that tribal languages are protected and are treated on a par with languages mentioned in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. The expansion of the Eklavya Model Residential Schools, from 90 new schools sanctioned in the UPA years to 472 new schools sanctioned since 2014, will ensure that tribal children will see better education outcomes. This coupled with health interventions in the form of primary health and wellness centres and nutrition programmes will see improved HDIs among tribal communities in the long run.
•Bhagwan Birsa Munda was only 25 when he died in prison (1900). He fought bravely against the exploitative system of the British Raj and spearheaded a movement against the British colonial oppressive system. It is unfortunate that the contributions of several other tribal freedom fighters including those of tribal women freedom fighters such as Rani Gaidinlu, Jhano Murmu, Helen Lepcha and others have nearly been forgotten.
Tribal museums
•There are records of over 200 tribal freedom fighters across India who participated in about 85 instances of revolts and uprisings against colonial rule. To recognise this, 10 tribal freedom fighter museums are being set up in the States of Andhra Pradesh (Lambasingi), Chhattisgarh (Raipur), Goa (Ponda), Gujarat (Rajpipla), Jharkhand (Ranchi), Kerala (Kozhikode), Madhya Pradesh (Chhindwara), Manipur (Taminglong), Mizoram (Kelsey) and Telangana (Hyderabad) will showcase the contribution of tribal freedom fighters and are at different stages of construction and completion.
•Commemorating November 15 every year will integrate various stakeholders and allow for a discussion on the achievements and contributions of tribal communities, their cultural heritage, and practices and traditions among the younger generation of Indians. As India celebrates its 75th year of Independence with ‘Azadi ka Amrit Mahostav’, this would be a thoughtful gift for our tribal community and a recall to Ram Rajya — where the likes of Guha are given due respect, their cultural diversity is respected, and their contributions celebrated.
📰 Kabul, Kashmir and the return of realpolitik
India could find itself in a catch-22 situation as engagement with the Taliban may lead Pakistan to up the ante in J&K
•While the return of the Taliban to Kabul may have ended the internecine warfare within Afghanistan, the geopolitical contestation to own the spoils of Taliban’s victory has just begun. In a rather unfriendly neighbourhood, New Delhi’s attempts at forming a regional consensus to stabilise Afghanistan, albeit wise and timely, will only achieve limited success thanks to the China-Pakistan coalition and its interests at play in and over Afghanistan. What is worse, India’s advances to court the Taliban and attempts to evolve a regional consensus on Afghanistan might deteriorate India-Pakistan relations and pose challenges for India in Kashmir.
Post-American Afghanistan
•While the recently-held Delhi Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan on November 10, 2021 was an important initiative to help Afghanistan stabilise, the sober reality is that the two countries that are key to stabilising Afghanistan — China and Pakistan — decided to stay away from it. Russia or the Central Asian states have neither the ability nor the desire to pursue a role in Afghanistan autonomous from the larger Chinese or Pakistani designs there. Iran has limited interests in Afghanistan and is unlikely to go against the Chinese plan for the region, especially in the broader context of being under United States sanctions.
•While China seems to be approaching the Taliban-led Afghanistan in a cautiously slow manner, it is clearly poised to be in the driving seat of the regional, if not global, engagement with the region in the months ahead. It is a matter of time before Beijing recognises the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and it is likely to coordinate its recognition along with that of Russia and Pakistan. China’s long-term vision for Afghanistan revolves around the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project of which Afghanistan has been a part since May 2016. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is also viewed as a key component within the larger Chinese BRI project and Afghanistan could eventually become part of CPEC if and when the Taliban regime stabilises itself in the country. For China, there is a lot riding on the Taliban.
•Even as Pakistan recognises the challenge to itself from an unstable Afghanistan, its current Afghan strategy reeks of a triumphalist attitude. While it lobbies the international community to help prevent Afghanistan slide into further turmoil, it is determined to keep India as far away from Kabul as possible even though the Taliban would like India to continue the engagement and offer development assistance. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is the mother of all zero sum games.
To aid or not to aid
•The international community is faced with a dilemma in Afghanistan when it comes to deciding to help the country get back on its feet. Taliban and Pakistan refer to the U.S.-led coalition as ‘colonisers’ who just vacated the Afghan territory; and in the same breath, they seek assistance from those very ‘former colonisers’. Second, if the U.S. and the West indeed send aid to Afghanistan, it may or may not reach the people. And yet, if they do not help, Afghans will suffer untold miseries. But perhaps what might bother the West the most is that if they stabilise the country, they would still be called former colonisers, and Pakistan and China will benefit out of it geopolitically, making it, in that sense, a thankless job for the West. So the question before the western leaders is how to offer structured incentives to the Taliban, and when.
India’s dilemma
•India now faces a new dilemma in Afghanistan — the first one was to decide whether to engage the Taliban or not. The successive governments in Afghanistan, including the current Taliban regime, have sought relations with India which has upset Pakistan. Pakistan has always been deeply suspicious of growing India-Afghanistan relations no matter who was/is in charge in Kabul. India’s current dilemma is also along the same lines. The Taliban want India to engage and help the country stabilise, but Pakistan resents that. Not too long ago, the Pakistani National Security Adviser had lashed out against India for (India) reaching out to the Taliban delegation in Doha. And now, Pakistan refused to attend the regional security meeting on Afghanistan called by India. These instances indicate that Pakistan would not like India to either develop close relations with the Taliban or be a part of any regional set up to stabilise the country. More so, it is likely that the more India gets close to the Taliban, the more the Pakistani side will increase the heat (read ‘attacks’) in Jammu and Kashmir. By maintaining ties with the Taliban and convening the regional security meeting in New Delhi, India has indicated that this is an acceptable risk.
•Let me explain this dilemma a bit more. Very crudely put, if the Taliban regime is stabilised in Kabul without India’s assistance to the country, the more it is likely to do Pakistan’s bidding vis-à-vis India. On the other hand, the more India helps the Taliban-led Afghanistan, the more Pakistan will up the ante in Kashmir. This is a catch-22 situation that India finds itself in. And yet, India has little choice but to engage the Taliban.
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy
•The earlier Pakistani willingness to be conciliatory towards India on Kashmir before and in the run-up to the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021 seems to have disappeared for now. This is at least partly due to the Pakistani triumphalism about the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. The bilateral backchannel conversations in late 2020 and early 2021 had reportedly discussed the reduction of violence in Kashmir in general and a political understanding with regard to Kashmir. The February ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan and the subsequent reduction in violence in Kashmir (i.e., infiltration of terrorists from the Pakistani side to Kashmir, terror attacks in Kashmir and ceasefire violations on the Line of Control) were a direct result of the backchannel understanding between the two sides. This understanding held until August when the Taliban takeover happened. Since then, violence data show that the backchannel understanding is withering away with violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) spiking along all three indicators albeit gradually. More so, sentiments from across the border also indicate that the earlier Pakistani stand that it would accept the Indian decision to withdraw the special status to Kashmir (in lieu of New Delhi restoring Statehood to Kashmir and allowing political activity in the State) has now changed. It now demands that India fully reverts to the pre-August 5, 2019 position on Kashmir. In other words, the Pakistani conciliatory approach on Kashmir lasted only till the Taliban takeover of Kabul. At best, this is a post-facto change in the Pakistani strategy, and at worst, Pakistan was stringing India along.
•The appointment of Sardar Masood Khan, former Pakistan occupied Kashmir President, as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the U.S. is perhaps yet another indication of the centrality of Kashmir in Pakistan’s foreign policy in the wake of the Taliban takeover of Kabul.
•If this analysis is accurate, then we are likely to see more war of words and violence in the context of J&K. This will mean that any possibility of India-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan would be very hard to achieve. Beijing will play along; so will Iran and the Central Asian countries, for the most part. For New Delhi then, the options are to coordinate its Afghan policy with Moscow, Washington and the various western capitals while steadfastly engaging the Taliban.
