📰 Fertility rates of Hindus and Muslims converging: study
India’s religious mix has been stable since 1951, says Pew Center study
•The religious composition of India’s population since Partition has remained largely stable, with both Hindus and Muslims, the two largest religious groups, showing not only a marked decline but also a convergence in fertility rates, according to a new study published by the Pew Research Center, a non-profit based in Washington DC.
•The study, based on data sourced from India’s decennial census and the National Family Health Survey (NFHS), looked at the three main factors that are known to cause changes in religious composition of populations — fertility rate, migration, and conversions.
•With regard to fertility rates, the study found that Muslims, who had the highest fertility rate, also had the sharpest decline in fertility rates. From 1992 to 2015, the total fertility rates of Muslims declined from 4.4 to 2.6, while that of Hindus declined from 3.3 to 2.1, indicating that “the gaps in childbearing between India’s religious groups are much smaller than they used to be.”
•The average fertility rate in India today is 2.2, which is higher than the rates in economically advanced countries such as the U.S. (1.6), but much lower than what it was in 1992 (3.4) or 1951 (5.9).
•The study notes that due to the “declining and converging fertility patterns”, there have been only marginal changes in the overall religious composition of the population since 1951, the year India conducted its first census as an independent nation.
Marked slowdown
•Although growth rates have declined for all of India’s major religious groups, the slowdown has been more pronounced among religious minorities, who outpaced Hindus in earlier decades.
•Between 1951 and 1961, the Muslim population expanded by 32.7%, 11 percentage points more than India’s overall rate of 21.6%. But this gap has narrowed. From 2001 to 2011, the difference in growth between Muslims (24.7%) and Indians overall (17.7%) was 7 percentage points. India’s Christian population grew at the slowest pace of the three largest groups in the most recent census decade — gaining 15.7% between 2001 and 2011, a far lower growth rate than the one recorded in the decade following Partition (29.0%).
•In terms of absolute numbers, every major religion in India saw its numbers rise.
•In percentage terms, between 1951 and 2011, Muslims grew by 4.4 percentage points to 14.2% of the population, while Hindus declined by 4.3 points to 79.8%. But all the six major religious groups — Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains — have grown in absolute numbers. The sole exception to this trend are Parsis, whose number halved between 1951 and 2011, from 110,000 to 60,000.
•Interestingly, out of India’s total population of 1,200 million, about 8 million did not belong to any of the six major religious groups. Within this category, mostly comprising adivasi people, the largest grouping was of Sarnas (nearly 5 million adherents), followed by Gond (1 million) and Sari Dharma (5,10,000).
•Observing that a preference for sons over daughters could play a role in overall fertility, the study noted that sex selective abortions have caused an estimated deficit of 20 million girls compared with what would naturally be expected between 1970 and 2017, and that “this practice is more common among Indian Hindus than among Muslims and Christians.”
•Cautioning that religion is by no means the only or even the primary factor affecting fertility rates, the study noted that women in central India tended to have more children, with Bihar and Uttar Pradesh showing a total fertility rate (TFR) of 3.4 and 2.7 respectively, in contrast to a TFR of 1.7 and 1.6 in Tamil Nadu and Kerala respectively.
•With regard to migration as a driver of change in religious makeup, the study says that since the 1950s, migration has had only a modest impact on India’s religious composition. More than 99% of people who live in India were also born in India, and migrants leaving India outnumber immigrants three-to-one, with “Muslims more likely than Hindus to leave India”, while “immigrants into India from Muslim-majority counties are disproportionately Hindu.”
Influx not apparent
•The study also cast doubt over the speculated numbers of undocumented immigrants in India, noting, “if tens of millions of Muslims from nearby countries had indeed migrated to India, demographers would expect to see evidence of such mass migration in data from their countries of origin, and this magnitude of outmigration is not apparent.”
•Religious conversion has also had a negligible impact on India’s overall composition, with 98% of Indian adults still identifying with the religion in which they were raised.
•These findings, which come as a complement to the Pew Center’s June 2021 report on religious tolerance and segregation in India, are significant in the context of two major issues that have occupied centre stage in recent times — the controversy over the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and National Register of Citizens (NRC), which have been criticised by international human rights bodies as an attempt to manufacture ‘foreigners’ in India, and the spate of anti-conversion laws passed in several States, which, the study notes, “restrict proselytizing and conversion to Islam and Christianity”.
📰 Mechanism to induct women cadets into NDA will be ready in May 2022, Defence Ministry tells Supreme Court
UPSC will include women in its exam notification, govt. tells Supreme Court
•The government has informed the Supreme Court that it proposes to have the ‘mechanism’ to induct women cadets into the National Defence Academy (NDA) for entry into the Armed Forces to be ready in May 2022.
•The Ministry of Defence told the court in an affidavit that the Union Public Services Commission (UPSC) would include women in its NDA exam notification expected to be published in May, 2022.
Clear and categorical stand
•“The government, in line with its commitment, hereby place on record the clear and categorical stand that the women candidates shall be considered for entry in the three defence services, in the existing streams, through the National Defence Academy... Entrance examination for entry into NDA are held twice in a year. The government proposes to have the necessary mechanism in place by May, 2022, ie, the time by which UPSC is required to publish the first notification of 2022, for entrance exam for entry to NDA,” a short affidavit by the Ministry said.
•With this, the path is clear for women to train along with men at the NDA, considered a male bastion. After the Supreme Court judgment last year which led to permanent commission for women officers, this is the second time that the court has nudged the Armed Forces towards gender equality.
•On September 8, the government had assured the court that the induction of women into the NDA was already under consideration by the Armed Forces.
•A Bench led by Justice S.K. Kaul had urged the Armed Forces and the government to “take a proactive approach in gender equality issues rather than leave it unattended and calling for the court to interfere”.
•The Ministry said arrangements have to be made regarding infrastructure and curriculum-wise for physical training, etc, before the induction of women.
•“While the education curriculum is well-set, all the rest of the aspects of training are required to be formulated separately for women candidates,” the affidavit said.
Importance of physical training
•Other issues regarding the capability of the NDA to absorb the intake, the desired cadre structure, downstream effect, envisaged requirement and employment by the respective defence services have to be considered.
•The affidavit underscored the importance of physical training.
•“Any dilution of physical training and service subjects like parameters of firing, endurance training, field craft and living off the land for women cadets would invariably impact the battle worthiness of the Armed Forces,” it said.
•On August 18, the court had issued an interim order allowing women candidates to take the NDA exam, which was then scheduled on September 5.
•The court had also questioned why “co-education is a problem” in the Armed Forces.
•The court had orally observed that it was ‘absurd’ that women were not allowed to appear for the NDA exam even after the Supreme Court, in a judgment, had directed permanent commission in the Army.
•On February 17 last year, the Supreme Court had upheld permanent commission for women officers.
A ‘sex stereotype’
•The court had dismissed the government’s submissions that women are physiologically weaker than men as a “sex stereotype” and declared that Short Service Commission (SSC) women officers were eligible for permanent commission and command posts in the Army irrespective of their years of service.
•“Women officers of the Indian Army have brought laurels to the force… Their track record of service to the nation is beyond reproach. To cast aspersion on their abilities on the ground of gender is an affront not only to their dignity as women but to the dignity of the members of the Indian Army,” the apex court had said in its judgment last year.
📰 K. Kasturirangan to head panel to develop new curriculum framework
12-member steering committee given a tenure of three years to complete its task: Education Ministry
•The Centre has started the process to revise school textbooks by appointing former Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Chairman K. Kasturirangan as the head of a 12-member steering committee responsible for developing a new National Curriculum Framework (NCF).
•Dr. Kasturirangan also chaired the drafting committee for the National Education Policy, 2020 which recommended the development of a new NCF. The steering committee has been given a tenure of three years to complete its task, said an Education Ministry statement on Tuesday.
•The last such framework was developed in 2005. It is meant to be a guiding document for the development of textbooks, syllabi and teaching practices in schools across the country. The subsequent revision of textbooks by the National Council of Educational Research and Training will draw from the new NCF.
•In fact, the steering committee will develop four such frameworks, one each to guide the curriculum of school education, teacher education, early childhood education and adult education. “All the National Curriculum Frameworks would also reflect upon the implications of situations such as COVID-19 Pandemic on respective areas for future,” added the statement.
•Apart from Dr. Kasturirangan, others on the panel who had also helped draft the NEP include former Karnataka Knowledge Commission Member Secretary M.K. Sridhar and the Central Tribal University of Andhra Pradesh Vice Chancellor T.V. Kattimani. Other academics on the steering committee include Jamia Millia Islamia Vice Chancellor Najma Akhtar, Central University of Punjab Chancellor Jagbir Singh, and Manjul Bhargava, an American mathematician of Indian origin who won the prestigious Fields Medal in 2014.
•Padma Shri awardee Michel Danino, an Indian of French origin who authored a book identifying the legendary Sarasvati river with a current water body, is also on the steering committee along with National Book Trust Chairman Govind Prasad Sharma and National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration Chancellor Mahesh Chandra Pant. Indian Institute of Management-Jammu Chairman Milind Kamble, an entrepreneur who founded the Dalit Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, is also on the panel. From the non-profit sector, members include former bureaucrat Dhir Jhingran, who heads the Language and Learning Foundation; and former Aadhaar marketing head Shankar Maruwada, who is the founder of the EkStep Foundation.
•The committee is expected to discuss position papers finalised by national focus groups and draw inputs from State curriculum frameworks apart from other experts and stakeholders, said the Ministry statement.
📰 COVID-19 | R-value dropped below one in mid-September
However, the values in Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Bengaluru remained over one
•The R-value, which reflects how rapidly the COVID-19 pandemic is spreading, dropped to 0.92 by mid-September after spiralling over one in August-end, according to experts.
•However, the R-values in certain major cities — Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Bengaluru — remained over one. The R-value in Delhi and Pune were below one.
•The R-values in Maharashtra and Kerala were below one, giving much-needed relief to these two States with the highest number of active cases.
•The R-value was 1.17 at the end of August. It had declined to 1.11 between September 4 and 7. Since then, it has remained under one.
•“The good news is that India’s R has continued to be less than one, as is that of Kerala and Maharashtra, the two States having the highest number of active cases,” said Sitabhra Sinha of the Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai. Mr. Sinha leads a team of researchers who calculate the R-value.
•According to the data, the R-value of Mumbai stood at 1.09, Chennai 1.11, Kolkata 1.04, and Bengaluru 1.06.
•The reproduction number or R refers to how many persons an infected person infects on an average. In other words, it shows how ‘efficiently’ a virus is spreading.
•After the devastating second wave, the R-value started to decline. During the March-May period, thousands died due to the infection, while lakhs were infected.
•The R-value value between September 4 and 7 was 0.94, 0.86 between September 11 and 15, and 0.92 between September 14 and 19.
•According to the Health Ministry, the recovery rate currently stood at 97.75%. The weekly positivity rate (2.08%) had been less than 3% for the last 88 days.
📰 What counts is seldom counted
Census data in India are losing their relevance in the development agenda
•India is busy debating the caste census when the regular Census itself has not been conducted owing to the pandemic. It is quite ironic that various elections have been held, and people gathered together at large rallies flouting COVID-19 norms, while the Census has still not been conducted. This is the first time that India has not conducted its decadal Census since the exercise began.
Losing significance
•The design of the Census (whenever the exercise is held) can be improved. A digital Census would ensure better quality, coverage and quick results in this digital age. Given this promise on the one hand and the uncertainty in conducting the Census on the other, the demand for including caste enumeration within the Census only adds to the confusion.
•First, we must recognise what the Census does. It has lot of potential in policymaking and the exercise is not merely about counting the population. Unfortunately, though, the limited information collected, and the under-utilisation or non-utilisation of Census data, have limited the role of the Census in policymaking.
•Its importance is further diminished when numerous large-scale surveys are funded by the various ministries of the Government of India. These surveys are conducted periodically. They allow for a detailed analysis of the socio-economic issues of significance since the raw data are made available in the public domain. Hence, the Census, at best, serves as a framework for designing these surveys.
•But the fundamental reason why the Census has lost significance is because the data collected are not disseminated on time, despite the use of technology. The primary reason for this is that the government regulates the release of the numbers based on its calculations of whether or not the Census data have the potential to harm the political agenda. For instance, the data on internal migration collected in the 2011 Census were made available to the public only when the Chief Economic Advisor decided to write a chapter for the Economic Survey 2016-17 in 2017.
•This more-than-century-old decadal exercise is a matter of pride and distinction for this country. Unfortunately, its potential is hardly tapped by policymakers. Concerns now are only about counting castes and minorities, which will help political masters serve their own interests. Census data are mainly used by demographers, who have now redefined themselves as data analysts.
•That this exercise has been reduced to just a count of the population is a great pity. Census-based information was important at a time when there was no alternative way of gauging the dynamics of population change alongside its varied features like employment, education, etc. While there is no denying the fact that alternative sources of information have enriched our understanding of population dynamics and facilitated focused interventions through programmes and policies, the Census has lost its potential relevance. Information is released late owing to bureaucratic regulations. There is also a lack of interest by the scientific community in a nuanced exploration of the data.
•Despite the decadal nature of the data, the inter-Censal and post-Censal information could very well be generated with interpolation and extrapolation. Further, the fundamental demographic attributes around which the Census data are structured offer a lot of scope for interpretation and exploration for understanding future trends as well. The pseudo cohort inspection of the Census data can go a long way in informing us of the changing dynamics of population attributes over time. The fascination and engagement with the Census have been quite limited to two concerns: sex ratio and work participation (female work participation in particular). But the Census data, if explored intelligently and systematically without the limitation of survey-based data sets like biases, errors and representational issues, have much more potential.
Characteristic information
•The primary axes of disaggregation of Census-based information are residence, age, gender, administrative units, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and religion. Apart from such disaggregation, the Census offers two units of analysis: at the individual level and at the household level. These may appear quite limited, but a lot can be inferred from these attributes of disaggregation. Attributes of disaggregation are simply meant for identification and they are more neutral for intervention purposes. Disaggregated attributes should serve a purpose, i.e., help policymakers make interventions, if any. If the reason behind such a purpose is to gauge selective adversity or failure in entitlements, then ascribed attributes like caste and religion are perhaps less important than objective criteria like adversity or failure itself. In fact, associating caste/religion for identification and intervention generates an environment of patronage. In political terms, this can create clientelism. While there is no disagreement that systematic adversities are generated by one’s caste position, it is not necessary to have the count of the attribute as it is to know the magnitude of adversity and its locational attributes. With a widespread information base through administrative records as well as periodic surveys, it is not difficult to focus on these adversities and alleviate them.
•Counting ascribed identities like caste and religion is perhaps less progressive than counting achieved identities or capability attributes like education and profession and other tangible endowments like the ownership of land, house and other consumer durables. Further, associating any adversity with an ascribed identity may at best help focus the intervention but the effort should be on addressing the adversity irrespective of the identity. Injustice or wrongdoings need not necessarily be associated with ascribed attributes. In fact, many make the fallacy of association leading to causation and that leads them to conclude that adversity/discrimination associated with ascribed attributes are largely due to the attributes themselves. Going beyond this association and examining the failure in entitlements and circumstantial differences will perhaps be more effective in thinking of interventions and in addressing concerns. A better example to this effect is blaming certain minority communities for high fertility rates rather than identifying the real reason for the same in terms of socio-economic exclusion.
•On the whole, count and characteristics are equally important, but the characteristics that are modifiable hold the key towards change. It is rightly said that what can be counted may not count and what counts is seldom counted.
📰 The big deal behind the ruckus over AUKUS
China’s economic and military capacities as well as its belligerence have led to a shift in regional security paradigms
•The announcement of the new Australia-U.K.-U.S. (AUKUS) trilateral security pact has naturally generated animated debate in strategic circles, coming as it does just days before the first in-person Quad Leaders Summit to be hosted by United States President Joe Biden on September 24 in Washington. Last week, HMS Queen Elizabeth, the flagship of the United Kingdom’s Carrier Strike Group, arrived in Japan after exercising with India, Malaysia and Singapore and traversing the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Exercise Malabar 2021, held in the Western Pacific from August 26-29, 2021, brought together, for the second year running, the U.S. Navy, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), the Royal Australian Navy and the Indian Navy.
Indo-Pacific is the core issue
•Earlier in April, France, which like the United Kingdom has historically been an Indo-Pacific power with territories and bases across the region, participated in a multi-nation naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal with the four Quad nations (the U.S., Japan, Australia and India). All this points to a vigorous strengthening of bilateral, trilateral and multi-lateral security dialogues and structures, seemingly different in scope and activity, but which converge on the core issue of maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
•There is no gainsaying the fact that rapid accretion in China’s economic and military capacities, but more particularly its belligerence, has led to a tectonic shift in regional security paradigms.
•The Quad is not a security arrangement though there is a widespread feeling that without stronger security underpinnings it would play a limited role in dealing with the real challenge of China’s militarisation. The Malabar exercise is not a naval alliance, even though the habit of cooperation is geared to facilitate communication and interoperability in times of need. Several countries have been obliged to review their defence preparedness in response to China’s rising military power and its adverse impact on regional stability.
•In August, Japan’s Defence Ministry proposed a budget of U.S.$50 billion for the fiscal year 2022, which represents a 2.6% nominal increase in its annual defence spending. The traditional ceiling of limiting defence spending to under 1% of GDP is no longer sacrosanct. Its Defence White Paper, for the first time, highlighted the urgent need to take stock of developments around Taiwan, a clear acknowledgement that Japan’s own security is linked to stability in the Taiwan Strait where muscle-flexing by China is the new norm. It is not without reason that Australia’s defence budget has seen enhanced outlays for the ninth straight year. For the financial year 2020-2021, it touched AUD 44.61 billion (USD$34.84 billion) representing a 4.1% hike over the previous year.
•The AUKUS pact will facilitate the transfer of nuclear submarine propulsion and manufacturing technologies to Australia, the first instance of a non-nuclear nation acquiring such capability. Even if the first of the eight nuclear-powered submarines may be available only around 2040, or perhaps a few years earlier, the very fact of Australia operating such advanced platforms adds a new dimension to the evolving maritime security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. It conclusively puts to rest a long-standing domestic debate on whether it was time for Australia to assess China through the strategic lens, overcoming the purely mercantile considerations that tended to dominate its China policy.
A chance for the U.K.
•The AUKUS pact is also an emphatic assertion of the relevance of the U.S.-Australia Security Treaty (ANZUS). New Zealand, the outlier, walked away in 1984 from the treaty that ironically still bears its initials. Its “nuclear free” stance ran counter to the U.S. Navy’s non-disclosure policy in regard to nuclear weapons aboard visiting vessels. Close ties notwithstanding, Australia’s future fleet of nuclear submarines will not be permitted access to New Zealand’s ports or waters, as averred by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern.
•AUKUS provides a fresh opportunity to the United Kingdom to reinsert itself more directly into the Indo-Pacific. It is already a member of the Five Eyes (FVEY), an intelligence-sharing alliance built on Anglo-Saxon solidarity (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S.).
•AUKUS is not a substitute for the Quad. At the same time, it does not erode the Quad’s significance as a platform for consultations and coordination on broader themes of maritime security, free and open trade, health care, critical technologies, supply chains and capacity-building. The AUKUS submarine deal, on the other hand, is an undiluted example of strategic defence collaboration, and a game-changer at that.
•In 2016, Japan’s Mitsubishi-Kawasaki consortium that manufactures the Soryu-class diesel-electric submarine lost out to France’s Naval Group (formerly known as the DCNS) which bagged the contract to build 12 diesel-electric submarines in Australia to replace its six Collins-class vessels. The Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A submarine offered by France was a diesel-electric variant of its own Barracuda-class nuclear attack submarine. It is heightened threat perceptions that have now prompted Australia to switch from conventional to the far more potent nuclear attack submarines.
Beijing’s stance is odd
•China, expectedly, has strongly criticised AUKUS and the submarine deal as promoting instability and stoking an arms race. This is sheer hypocrisy. China has the world’s fastest-growing fleet of sub-surface combatants, including the Type 093 Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and the Type 094 nuclear-powered Jin-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), not to speak of its burgeoning fleet of conventional diesel-electric submarines with AIP (air-independent propulsion) capability. Its nuclear submarines are on the prowl in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, China denies Australia and others the sovereign right to decide on their defence requirements!
•As for India, it operates one indigenously-built SSBN (INS Arihant) after returning the SSN (INS Chakra) on lease from Russia. It operates a number of conventional submarines, though far fewer than what it truly needs, including the Scorpene-class diesel-electric attack submarine which is manufactured at Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd. (MDL) in collaboration with France’s Naval Group under Project 75.
Australia’s role gets a boost
•Australia’s proposed nuclear submarines, whether the U.K.’s Astute-class attack submarine or the U.S.’s Virginia-class vessel, will potentially be fully equipped with advanced U.S. weapons such as the Mark-48 torpedoes, the Harpoon anti-ship missiles and the Tomahawk cruise missiles. These will give Australia quite a punch in terms of a stand-off capability. Situated as it is, far away from any other country, the diesel-electric attack submarines that it currently operates, or even those that it might have got from France, have limited capacity in terms of range and duration of mission as compared to nuclear-powered submarines. The growing focus on anti-submarine warfare across a more expansive region is clearly altering calculations.
•Australia’s nuclear submarines would help create a new balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, especially in tandem with the U.S. and the U.K. Australia will now have a more meaningful naval deterrence of its own to protect its sovereign interests. Australia is set to play a more robust role in ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
•France’s momentary pique at the cancellation of the contract by Australia should soon subside. As a major Indo-Pacific power, France is an important part of the regional security calculus. The setback ‘down under’ may spur France to focus afresh on partners such as India, which must strike a balance between continuing imports and implementing the all-important Atmanirbhar Bharat in defence manufacturing.
📰 Changing the agri exports basket
India has the potential to become a global leader in the food processing sector
•The Indian government has been encouraging agricultural exports to meet an ambitious target of $60bn by 2022. The Ministry of Food Processing Industries shows that the contribution of agricultural and processed food products in India’s total exports is 11%. Primary processed agricultural commodities form the majority share. India’s export earnings will increase by focusing more on value-added processed food products rather than primary processed agricultural commodities (Siraj Hussain, 2021). From 2015-16 to 2019-20, the value of agricultural and processed food increased significantly from $17.8bn to $20.65bn. The Indian agricultural economy is shifting from primary to secondary agriculture where the focus is more on developing various processed foods. The Indian food processing industry promises high economic growth and makes good profits.
Changing export basket
•India’s agricultural export basket is changing from traditional commodities to non-traditional processed foods. Traditionally, Basmati rice is one of the top export commodities. However, now there is an unusual spike in the export of non-basmati rice. In 2020-21, India exported 13.09 million tonnes of non-basmati rice ($4.8bn), up from an average 6.9 million tonnes ($2.7bn) in the previous five years.
•Similarly, Indian buffalo meat is seeing a strong demand in international markets due to its lean character and near organic nature. The export potential of buffalo meat is tremendous, especially in countries like Vietnam, Hong Kong and Indonesia.
•In 2020-21, the export of poultry, sheep and goat meat, cashew kernels, groundnuts, guar gum, and cocoa products went down in terms of value and total quantity.
•The export of processed food products has not been growing fast enough because India lacks comparative advantage in many items. This may imply that the domestic prices of processed food products are much higher compared to the world reference prices.
•The main objective of the Agriculture Export Policy is to diversify and expand the export basket so that instead of primary products, the export of higher value items, including perishables and processed food, be increased. The exporters of processed food confront difficulties and non-tariff measures imposed by other countries on Indian exports (Siraj Hussain, 2021). Some of these include mandatory pre-shipment examination by the Export Inspection Agency being lengthy and costly; compulsory spice board certification being needed even for ready-to-eat products which contain spices in small quantities; lack of strategic planning of exports by most State governments; lack of a predictable and consistent agricultural policy discouraging investments by the private sector; prohibition of import of meat- and dairy based-products in most of the developed countries; withdrawal of the Generalised System of Preference by the U.S. for import of processed food from India; export shipments to the U.S. requiring an additional health certificate; and the absence of an equivalency agreement with developed countries for organic produce.
The way forward
•The Centre’s policy should be in the direction of nurturing food processing companies, ensuring low cost of production and global food quality standards, and creating a supportive environment to promote export of processed food. Developed countries have fixed higher standards for import of food items. Reputed Indian brands should be encouraged to export processed foods globally as they can comply with the global standard of codex. Indian companies should focus on cost competitiveness, global food quality standards, technology, and tap the global processed food export market. India has competitive advantages in various agricultural commodities which can be passed onto processed foods. It has the potential to become a global leader in the food processing sector.
📰 Swooping down on algorithms
China’s draft rules on regulating recommendation algorithms address pressing issues but have a flavour of authoritarianism
•China has pursued aggressive measures in its tech sector in the past few months, ranging from strong-arming IPOs to limiting gaming hours for children. A host of legislative instruments are in the process of being adopted, including the Personal Information Protection Law, the Cybersecurity Law, and the draft Internet Information Service Algorithm Recommendation Management Provisions.
Providing user autonomy
•The Management Provisions, released by the Cyberspace Administration of China, are possibly the most interesting and groundbreaking interventions among the new set of legislative instruments. The provisions lay down the processes and mandates for the regulation of recommendation algorithms which are ubiquitous in e-commerce platforms, social media feeds and gig work platforms. They attempt to address the concerns of individuals and society such as user autonomy, economic harms, discrimination, and the prevalence of false information.
•Algorithmically curated feeds dominate most of our interactions on the Internet. For instance, this article could reach you on social media platforms like Twitter thanks to a recommendation algorithm. Such an algorithm helps a user navigate information overload and presents content that it deems more relevant to the user. These algorithms learn from user demographics, behavioural patterns, location of the user, the interests of other users accessing similar content, etc., to deliver content. This limits user autonomy, as the user has little opportunity to choose what content to be presented with. Algorithms tend to have certain inherent biases which are learned from their modelling or the data they encounter. This often leads to discriminatory practices against users.
•China is aiming to mandate recommendation algorithm providers to share the mantle with the users. The draft says users should be allowed to audit and change the user tags employed by the algorithms to filter content to be presented to them. Through this, the draft aims to limit classifications that the user finds objectionable, thereby allowing the user to choose what to be presented with. This also has ripple effects in platformised gig work, where the gig worker can understand the basis of gigs presented to her. Additionally, Article 17 of the draft specifically strikes at labour reform at the algorithmic level, by necessitating compliance with working hours, minimum wage, and labour laws.
•The draft has a clear emphasis on active intervention by recommendation algorithm providers to limit and prevent information disorder. This indicates how China is attempting to crack down on mis-/dis-/malinformation. It has to be read with the clear overtone of the draft requiring recommendation algorithm providers to “uphold mainstream value orientations”, “vigorously disseminate positive energy”, and “advance the use of algorithms in the direction of good.” Evidently, this is China’s attempt at dissuading any disaffection to the Party and remain in tight control of the social narrative.
Lessons for the present
•Regulating algorithms is unavoidable and necessary. The world is lagging in such initiatives and China is hoping to lead the pack. The draft addresses pressing issues and entrenches some normative ideals that should be pursued globally. The regulatory mechanism institutionalises algorithmic audits and supervision, a probable first in the world. However, a distinct Chinese flavour of authoritarianism looms large in the draft rules. China has less than desirable records in liberty and is not the ideal choice to set standards through laws. It would be best for liberal democracies to steer clear of these overtures and stick to technically sound regulation which is free from the ails of censorship and social control.
•It is high time for India to invest better and speed up legislative action on the regulation of data, and initiate a conversation around the regulation of algorithms. India should strive to achieve this without emulating China, where this draft only complements a host of other laws. India must act fast to resolve the legal and social ills of algorithmic decision-making. Policymakers should ensure that freedoms, rights and social security, and not rhetoric, inform policy changes.
•Algorithms are as fundamental to the modern economy as engines to the industrial economy. A one-size-fits-all algorithm regulation fails to take into account the dynamic nature of markets. An ideal regime should have goals-based legislation that can lay down the regulatory norms for algorithms. Such legislation must aim to lay down normative standards that algorithmic decision-making must adhere to. This should be complemented by sectoral regulation that accounts for the complexities of markets.
