📰 In a first, Army receives hand grenades from private sector
Technology from the DRDO was sourced in 2016.
•Marking a first in ammunition supply by the private sector to the Army, Nagpur-based Economic Explosives Limited (EEL) handed over the first batch of Multi-Mode Hand Grenades (MMHG) on Tuesday.
•“The first batch of MMHG manufactured by EEL following Transfer of Technology from Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory of Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), was handed over to the Army in the presence of Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in Nagpur,” a Defence Ministry statement said.
•The EEL had taken the technology from DRDO in 2016, the statement said. “Extensive trials were successfully undertaken by the Army and Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) in 2017-18 in plains, deserts and high altitudes over summer and winter,” it stated.
•The MMHG grenades will replace Grenade No. 36 of World War I vintage design still in service. The EEL had signed a contract with the Ministry of Defence on October 1, 2020 to supply 10 lakh modern hand grenades to the Army and Air Force. The deliveries will be spread over two years from the bulk production clearance, which was accorded to EEL in March 2021, the statement added.
•Talking of the initiative of technology transfer to Industries by DRDO, Mr. Singh said that this was being undertaken free of cost, while providing access to testing facilities and over 450 patents.
Court reviews Haryana government’s notification.
•The Supreme Court on Tuesday held that the government cannot deny reservation to a person belonging to a backward community solely on the ground that he or she is rich.
•Social advancement, higher employment in government services, etc, played an equal rolein deciding whether such a person belonged to the creamy layer and could be denied quota benefits, it said.
•“The basis of exclusion of ‘creamy layer’ cannot be merely economic,” a Bench of Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Aniruddha Bose observed in their judgment, while referring to the court’s Indra Sawhney verdict of 1992, which declared that ‘creamy layer’ in a backward community should be excluded from reservation so that the more deserving were able to come up.
•The court had illustrated that ‘creamy layer’ would include “persons from backward classes who occupied posts in higher services like IAS, IPS and All India Services had reached a higher level of social advancement and economic status,and therefore, were not entitled to be treated as backward”.
•Explaining the 1992 verdict, Justice Rao, said: “Such persons wereto be treated as ‘creamy layer’ without any further inquiry. Likewise, people with sufficient income who were in a position to provide employment to others should also be taken to have reached a higher social status and therefore, should be treated as outside the backward class. Similarly, persons from backward classes who had higher agricultural holdings or were receiving income from properties, beyond a prescribed limit, do not deserve the benefit of reservation. The above mentioned categories were necessarily to be excluded from backward classes”.
Two Haryana notifications
•The court was hearing a petition challenging two notifications issued on August 17, 2016 and August 28, 2018 by the Haryana government sub-classifying backward classes solely on economic basis while fixing the criteria for creamy layer.
•The notifications, issued under the Haryana Backward Classes (Reservation in Services and Admission in Educational Institutions) Act of 2016, said children of persons having “gross annual income” of up to ₹3 lakh annually would get the benefit of reservation in services and admission in educational institutions. The remaining quota would go to those from backward families, which earn between₹3 lakh and ₹6 lakh per annum.
•The sections earning over ₹6 lakh annually were considered as ‘creamy layer’ under Section 5 of the 2016 Act.
•The apex court held that the Haryana’s notifications have violated the law declared in the Indra Sawhney judgment by identifying creamy layer only on the basis of income.
•“In spite of Section 5(2) of the 2016 Act making it mandatory for identification and exclusion of ‘creamy layer’ to be on the basis of social, economic and other relevant factors, the State of Haryana has sought to determine ‘creamy layer’ from backward classes solely on the basis of economic criterion and has committed a grave error in doing so,” the court held, quashing both the notifications.
•The court directed the State to issue fresh notifications in three months. It did not, however, disturb admissions to educational institutions and appointments to State government services made on the basis of the two notifications.
📰 Climate change, a catalyst for Arctic cooperation
Environmental challenges should be a priority for all players in the region, outweighing military and economic issues
•It is tempting to view the current geopolitics of the Arctic through the lenses of the ‘great power competition’ and inevitable conflict of interests. Interestingly, the current geopolitical scenario is, to a certain extent, mirrored in the Arctic region as well. This is mainly about the growing tensions between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and Russia.
•There are eight countries that have direct access to the Arctic resources, i.e., Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States. In 2013, six Observers joined the Council, including China, Japan, India, Italy, South Korea, and Singapore, bringing their total number to 13.
Security concerns
•By the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical tensions and security concerns in the Arctic were almost forgotten. In October 1987, during a visit to the Kola Peninsula, Mikhail Gorbachev, then Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party, acknowledged the end of the Cold War era and promoted a ‘zone of peace’ in the Arctic.
•The perceived ‘harmony’ was broken in 2007, when the Russian explorers planted their flag on the seabed 4,200m (13,779ft) below the North Pole to articulate Moscow’s claims in the Arctic. This move was certainly viewed as provocative by other Arctic States, and the Canadian Foreign Minister, Peter MacKay, said “this is not the 15th century”, and “countries cannot just go around, plant their flags, and claim the territories”.
•The regional tension increased after the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014. Consequently, relations between the U.S. and Russia reached their lowest point again. The rhetoric of the bilateral mistrust was transferred ‘up to the North’ and created anxiety among other stakeholders in the Arctic.
•After the events in Ukraine in 2014, Russia has been increasingly viewed as a ‘rule-breaker’, ‘revisionist power’ and an ‘untrustworthy player’. Besides, Russia’s intention to re-establish the military might of its Northern Fleet also creates the security concerns and features prominently in the Norwegian foreign policy. On the other hand, some Russian military experts believe that the Barents Sea can serve as the launching area for a western seaborne attack; therefore, the Russian Navy should ensure the readiness of its anti-submarine forces in the Arctic Ocean.
The eco-dimension
•In the last decades, we have been confronted with the multiple ‘wake-up calls’ that are related to climate change; and these calls are getting louder. The summer of 2021 would be recorded in history as one of the most devastating seasons of our times, when ferocious floods and wildfires were destroying communities in many parts of the world. Due to the environmental transformations, natural catastrophes occur unexpectedly — on an unprecedented scale, and in unusual geographic locations. For example, the extreme heat in North America or wildfires in Russian Siberia (Yakutia), where the winter temperature can be below minus 40°. The Arctic region also bears the brunt of climate change. At the same time, it provides a platform for scientific research that can help to get to the bottom of natural calamities around the world.
•Keeping in mind the existential threats, the environmental challenges should be an absolute priority for all players in the Arctic region. These considerations should outweigh military and economic issues and unite countries for the sake of eliminating the potential (and real) dangers attributed to climate change.
•According to The World Climate and Security Report 2020 (the first report of the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security, or the IMCCS), ‘the Arctic is warming nearly twice as fast as the rest of the planet with consecutive record-breaking warm years since 2014... The Arctic is likely to begin experiencing ice-free summers within the next decade, with summers likely to be completely free of sea ice by mid-century’.
•There should be concerted efforts to minimise the adverse effects on the fragile Arctic ecosystem. A good example to be highlighted is the recent case of a Norwegian drilling project; it was taken to the European court by the group of environmentalists. Their main argument is that the negative impact of mining activities can spread beyond the continental shelf of Norway.
The geopolitical vs strategic
•The environmental transformation and rapid ice melting have also opened up new opportunities in the region, which includes trans-Arctic shipping routes. These opportunities have inevitably attracted all stakeholders in the region, both the Arctic and non-Arctic states. China, for example, with its self-proclaimed status of a ‘near Arctic state’, has been actively engaged in various projects across the region.
•The importance of the Arctic region for China mostly stems from its energy security issues and the need to diversify shipping lanes. Transport routes from China to Europe through the Arctic are not only much shorter but also free from the challenges associated with the Malacca Strait and South China Sea. In the latter case, China will continue facing a backlash from many Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, supported by U.S. forces.
•Given the significance of the region, the Arctic will continue to draw increased attention. Apart from pursuing national interests, participating nations should also be concerned about the future developments in the region and their larger implications for humanity.
•Hence, they should refrain from mutual provocations, excessive militarisation, and quid pro quo tactics. All the Arctic actors should have a long-term vision and strategic goals as compared to immediate short-term gains. Instead of creating a potential battleground that is reminiscent of the Cold War, the parties concerned should utilise their expertise and create the required synergy to achieve shared goals. Climate change and its dramatic consequences must be a catalyst for Arctic cooperation.
📰 The legal challenges in recognising the Taliban
India can deal with the Taliban government because it is a de facto one, not because it is a legitimate one
•The Taliban’s horrific takeover of Afghanistan has triggered a new debate in international law on the issue of recognising an entity that claims to be the new government of a state. This debate assumes significance because China and Russia, two of the five permanent United Nations Security Council members, have seemingly shown readiness to recognise a Taliban-led government whereas countries like Canada have opposed it. Questions of recognition do not arise when change of government within a state occurs when political power is transferred through legal means. However, things are different when the change of government happens through extra-legal methods like ousting the sitting government using unconstitutional means. The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan squarely falls in this category.
•Recognition of governments under international law is vital for several reasons. It is important to know who the governing authority of the state is, who has the responsibility for effectually carrying out domestic and international legal obligations ranging from pursuing diplomatic relations to the protection of human rights, and so on.
Government versus state
•A salient point to remember is that recognition of the government should not be confused with recognition of the state under international law. As Malcolm Shaw, the celebrated international lawyer, writes, “a change in government, however accomplished, does not affect the identity of the State itself.” Thus, in the current debate, the issue is not about the recognition of Afghanistan, whose legal personality remains intact. Whether countries recognise the Taliban regime or not will depend on their political considerations and geo-strategic interests, as evident from the Chinese and Russian overtures. However, certain criteria have evolved in international law on deciding the issue of recognition of governments and these need to be prudently looked at.
Tests in international law
•Traditionally, the test used in international law to make a decision about the recognition of a new government is that of ‘effectiveness’. According to this principle, to recognise a government means to determine whether it effectively controls the state it claims to govern. In other words, it means to determine whether the government has effective control over the state’s territory (or a part of it), a majority of the population, national institutions, the banking and monetary system, etc. with a reasonable possibility of permanence. The inherent assumption is that effective control means the people of the country accept, or at least acquiesce to, the new regime; if they did not, they would overthrow it. Under this doctrine, it is immaterial how the new government occupied office (whether through civil war, revolution, or a military coup). Since there is hardly any doubt that the Taliban now effectively controls Afghanistan, as per this test, it would be recognised as Afghanistan’s government for international law and thus, international relations.
•A doctrine competing with the effective control theory is that of democratic legitimacy. According to this doctrine, recognition of a government also depends on whether it is the legitimate representative of the people it claims to govern. So, governments that capture power through non-democratic means — notwithstanding their exercising de facto control over the country — should not be recognised by states. The end of the Cold War, the subsequent spread of democracy in the world, and the growing demand for universal respect for human rights gave an impetus to this doctrine in the last three decades.
•This doctrine has led many countries to bestow de jure recognition (legal recognition) on governments in exile in place of governments exercising effective control. Two recent examples can be offered. First, many countries recognised Yemen’s Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi government in exile since 2015 on the ground that the rebellious separatists acquired power in Yemen through illegal means. Second, the Nicolás Maduro government in Venezuela is not recognised by several countries due to the alleged lack of democratic legitimacy.
•The Taliban regime, despite exercising effective control over Afghanistan, lacks democratic legitimacy. Thus, it would fail to be recognised as the legitimate representative of Afghanistan if the doctrine of democratic legitimacy is applied. Things would become even more complicated if the Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, who fled the country when the Taliban entered Kabul, were to announce a government in exile.
•However, some international lawyers like Erika de Wet doubt whether the doctrine of democratic legitimacy, notwithstanding its worth and instinctive appeal to the champions of liberal democracy, has become a binding part of customary international law when it comes to the recognition of governments. In other words, governments may rely on the doctrine of democratic legitimacy to refuse de jure recognition of the Taliban. Nevertheless, there is no binding legal obligation on countries to withhold recognition of the Taliban on the ground that it does not enjoy democratic legitimacy. Thus, if Russia and China were to formally recognise the Taliban regime due to its effective control of Afghanistan, it would be consistent with international law.
Options for India
•Given the Taliban’s brutal past, its extremist ideology, and profound absence of democratic legitimacy, India is within its right to withhold de jure recognition of the Taliban regime. Nonetheless, it will have to find a way to engage with the Taliban given India’s huge investments in Afghanistan and stakes in the South Asian region. India should adopt a clear policy that it will deal with the Taliban simply because it is the de facto government, not because it is a legitimate one. This principle should be followed for bilateral relations and also for multilateral dealings such as within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
📰 The ugly face of a crime-fighting move
The implementation of the National Automated Facial Recognition System in India lacks adequate safeguards
•In the monsoon session of Parliament, no meaningful debate could take place due to the controversy over Pegasus, the spyware. Some Indian journalists, civil society activists and political leaders, and a top election strategist were possibly under surveillance. There has been no categorical denial by the Government and that the Israeli software was not purchased. But above this, there is a much bigger issue of the privacy of the entire citizenry which has not received much public attention. On June 23, 2021, the Joint Committee examining the Personal Data Protection Bill (2019) was granted a fifth extension by Parliament. While informational privacy is not the Government’s priority, it has been simultaneously exploring the potential of facial recognition technology.
A prying technology
•To empower the Indian police with information technology, India approved implementation of the National Automated Facial Recognition System (NAFRS) to “facilitate investigation of crime and detection of criminals” in a quick and timely manner. On its implementation, it will function as a national-level search platform that will use facial recognition technology: to facilitate investigation of crime or for identifying a person of interest (e.g., a criminal) regardless of face mask, makeup, plastic surgery, beard or hair extension.
•The technology is absolutely intrusive: computer algorithms map unique facial-landmarks (biometric data) such as shape of the cheekbones, contours of the lips, distance from forehead to chin, and convert these into a numerical code — termed a faceprint. Thus, for the purposes of ‘verification’ or ‘identification’, the system compares the faceprint generated with a large existing database of faceprints (typically available to law enforcement agencies) through a database on driver’s licence or police mugshots). But the real problem is that facial recognition does not return a definitive result — it ‘identifies’ or ‘verifies’ only in probabilities (e.g., a 70% likelihood that the person shown on an image is the same person on a watch list). Though the accuracy of facial recognition has improved over the years due to modern machine-learning algorithms, the risk of error and bias still exists. For instance, there is a possibility of producing ‘false positives’ — a situation where the algorithm finds an incorrect
match, even when there is none — resulting in wrongful arrest. Moreover, much research suggests facial recognition software is based on pre-trained models. Therefore, if certain types of faces (such as female, children, ethnic minorities) are under-represented in training datasets, then this bias will negatively impact its performance.
•As NAFRS will collect, process, and store sensitive private information: facial biometrics for long periods; if not permanently — it will impact the right to privacy. Accordingly, it is crucial to examine whether its implementation is arbitrary and thus unconstitutional, i.e., is it ‘legitimate’, ‘proportionate to its need’ and ‘least restrictive’? What is its potential for abuse and misuse with the pending-status of the Personal Data Protection Bill (PDPB), and the absence of clear guidelines for its deployment? How does it impact other fundamental rights such as the right to dissent? Should NAFRS be banned or simply regulated?
•The Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States uses facial recognition technology for potential investigative leads; police forces in England use facial recognition to tackle serious violence. In other cases, countries such as China use facial recognition for racial profiling and mass surveillance — to track Uighur Muslims. Policing and law and order being State subjects, some Indian States have started the use of new technologies without fully appreciating the dangers involved.
Test of ‘proportionality’
•Facial recognition being an intrusive technology has an impact on the right to privacy. The Constitution of India does not explicitly mention the right to privacy. However, a nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs Union of India (2017) recognised it as a precious fundamental right. Since no fundamental right can be absolute and thus even in respect of privacy, the state may impose reasonable restrictions on the grounds of national integrity, security of the state, public order, etc.
•The Supreme Court, in the K.S. Puttaswamy judgment provided a three-fold requirement (which was reiterated in Anuradha Bhasin while examining denial of the ‘right to Internet’ to the people of Kashmir) to safeguard against any arbitrary state action. Accordingly, any encroachment on the right to privacy requires the existence of ‘law’ (to satisfy legality of action); there must exist a ‘need’, in terms of a ‘legitimate state interest’; and, the measure adopted must be ‘proportionate’ (there should be a rational nexus between the means adopted and the objective pursued) and it should be ‘least intrusive.’ Unfortunately, NAFRS fails each one of these tests.
•First, NAFRS lacks ‘legitimacy’. It does not stem from any statutory enactment (such as the DNA Technology (Use and Application) Regulation Bill 2018 proposed to identify offenders or an executive order of the Central Government. Rather, it was merely approved by the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs in 2009 during United Progressive Alliance rule. Second, and more importantly, even if we assume that there exists a need for NAFRS to tackle modern day crimes, this measure is grossly disproportionate. This is because to satisfy the test of ‘proportionality’, benefits for the deployment of this technology have to be sufficiently great, and must outweigh the harm. For NAFRS to achieve the objective of ‘crime prevention’ or ‘identification’ will require the system to track people on a mass scale — avoiding a CCTV in a public place is fiendishly difficult — resulting in everyone becoming a subject of surveillance: a disproportionate measure. In the absence of a strong data protection law or clear guidelines on where this technology can be used or who can be put on a watch list? And, how long the system will retain sensitive personal data of those the surveilled people, NAFRS will indeed do more harm than good.
Impact on rights
•From a technical angle, facial recognition technology can be tasked to ‘identify’, among other uses, cases. In doing so, one faceprint is compared to many other faceprints stored in a database (known as 1:N matching). In some cases, it is known that the person to be identified exists in the database, whereas, in other scenarios, it is not (for e.g., when persons are checked against watch lists). This is where its deployment becomes hugely worrisome. With the element of error and bias, facial recognition can result in profiling of some overrepresented groups (such as Dalits and minorities) in the criminal justice system.
•Further, as anonymity is key to functioning of a liberal democracy, unregulated use of facial recognition technology will dis-incentivise independent journalism or the right to assemble peaceably without arms, or any other form of civic society activism. Due to its adverse impact on civil liberties, some countries have been cautious with the use of facial recognition technology. The Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom ruled the use of facial recognition technology by South Wales as unlawful in the absence of clear guidelines. In the United States, the Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act of 2020 was introduced in the Senate to prohibit biometric surveillance without statutory authorisation. Similarly, privacy watchdogs in the European Union have called for a ban on facial recognition.
Unchecked pathway
•At present, the Information Technology Act 2000, and the Rules framed thereunder offer broad powers to the Central government to infringe privacy in the name of the sovereignty, integrity or the security of the state. The Personal Data Protection Bill 2019 is not much different. It gives the central government unchecked power for the purposes of surveillance — it can exempt any agency of the Government from the application of the proposed law in the name of legitimate state interest.
•Without adequate safeguards such as penalties that are dissuasive and sufficiently deterrent, police personnel may routinely use facial recognition technology. In sum, even if facial recognition technology is needed to tackle modern-day criminality in India, without accountability and oversight, facial recognition technology has strong potential for misuse and abuse. In the interest of civil liberties and to save democracy from turning authoritarian, it is important to impose a moratorium on the use of facial recognition technology till we enact a strong and meaningful data protection law, in addition to statutory authorisation of NAFRS and guidelines for deployment. If the Government has the will, it can get any law passed with god speed just like the recently passed 20 Bills including the OBC Bill or three Farm Bills.
📰 A surfeit of sero surveys
While they are useful in detecting the prevalence of antibodies, frequent sero surveys are expensive and futile
•A sero surveillance survey ascertains the prevalence of a past infectious disease in a population. In the case of COVID-19, it helps to detect whether antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 are present in a population. The antibodies are like evidence in a crime scene and the virus is like a criminal. But to prevent the criminal from repeating the crime, we need to conduct RT-PCR and Rapid Antigen Tests (RAT). With this information, we can isolate the individual and prevent further infection and also manage complications of the infection if they arise.
Benefits of sero surveys
•If anyone has had a severe case of COVID-19, can they walk around freely believing that they won’t get the infection again as they have developed adequate natural antibodies? No. They can still be asymptomatic carriers of the virus. They cannot be exempted from COVID-19-appropriate behaviour. And they must get vaccinated too. In other words, all sero positive individuals have to observe COVID-19-appropriate behaviour and get fully vaccinated. This means that sero surveys don’t personally benefit individuals.
•For public health authorities, sero surveys are of varying use at different phases of the pandemic. Such surveys are widely used by the media and by epidemiologists to show under-reporting of cases and deaths due to COVID-19. Independent sero surveillance data can expose the level of data suppression.
•After releasing the fourth sero survey results, the ICMR recommended acceleration of vaccination of the vulnerable population, especially yet-to-be-vaccinated health staff; tracking COVID-19 infection in SARI cases in hospitals; and identifying clusters of current cases and cases of clinical severity for genome sequencing which would help track mutations of the virus. But these are valid irrespective of the sero conversion levels.
•The second use of sero surveys is to find out whether community transmission has taken place or not. The ICMR was right in refuting some accounts by the media in mid-2020 that community transmission had taken place without the system knowing about it. Many demanded RAT or RT-PCR tests on a large scale. That would have been a wrong public health action. The first sero prevalence survey in May-June 2020 showed that overall infection was 0.73%. The relevant public health actions to be taken then were rapid case detection, isolation and containment measures as vaccines were not ready then. In August 2020, the second survey showed that sero prevalence had increased to 7.1%. Even after the first wave, when evidence of rapid transmission was emerging, we needed an additional weapon to fight the virus apart from observing COVID-19-appropriate behaviour and that was vaccination.
•The third use of sero surveys is to assess how far or close we are to herd immunity. Many virologists said that 60% of the population should be immune to COVID-19 for us to reach herd immunity. We were nowhere near a herd immunity level at that time. Though there were claims that parts of the urban poor population in Mumbai and Pune had 70% developing antibodies, the third survey found that after the first wave, only 21.4% Indians had SARS-CoV-2 antibodies. The degree of change was highest in rural areas at 19.1%. In non-slum urban areas, it was 26.2%, while in urban slums the prevalence had increased to 31.7%. The fourth survey showed that 67.6% of the population had developed antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 meeting the earlier prophesied threshold for herd immunity. Now, we have to change the goalpost to 80-90%. There are breakthrough infections everywhere. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation has reported that over 81% have developed antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 in Ahmedabad, but there continue to be cases.
Cost-benefit analysis
•Under these circumstances, it is not rational for public health experts to advise governments to embark upon city-wise seroprevalence surveys to detect the presence of COVID-19 antibodies. Those surveys are no more useful than our COVID-19-appropriate behaviour and vaccinations to control the pandemic. For an academic documentation of the trend of the pandemic spread and penetration among communities, one national-level ICMR survey is good enough.
•A survey of 5,000 people per city costs around ₹25 lakh. This is not a good investment for a country still grappling with the pandemic. If we do a cost-benefit analysis, frequent sero surveys are a poor use of staff time, technology and funds and divert attention from the core activities of screening, testing and other containment measures. The genome analysis of breakthrough cases in spite of vaccination is more beneficial for evidence-based policy changes.
