📰 Arms and the women: On gender parity in the Army
Gender parity in the Army is happening at a slow pace, and is mostly led by the courts
•Women have been fighting a tough and uphill battle for equal opportunities in the Indian Army. In a landmark judgment in February 2020, the Supreme Court asked the government to abide by its own policy and grant permanent commission to women in the Short Service Commission and give them command postings in all services other than combat. In The Secretary, Ministry of Defence vs Babita Puniya & Others, the top court pointed out that women had played a “significant role” in the Army since their induction in 1992 and extending permanent commission to women SSC officers “is a step forward in recognising and realising the right of women to equality of opportunity in the Army”. Despite the stringent verdict, systemic issues remain in the Army, and women have gone back to court to sort out the issues. Another step towards ensuring that women get an equal opportunity, as laid down by the Constitution, has been taken on Wednesday, when the Court passed an interim order allowing women to appear for the National Defence Academy entrance exam on September 5. Till now, women could join the Army through the Indian Military Academy and the Officers Training Academy. The directive allows girls who clear the exam to study at the NDA and then at the IMA or the naval and air force academies and become commissioned officers.
•The directive is subject to further orders from the Court, and the case has been posted for hearing again on September 8. When Additional Solicitor-General Aishwarya Bhati, appearing for the Government and the Indian Army, told the Court that it was a policy decision not to allow women to take the NDA exam, the Bench, of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hrishikesh Roy, said it was based on “gender discrimination”, directing the Centre and the Army to take a constructive view. The Bench pointed out that closing a route of entry for women to join the Army was discriminatory. The ruling came on a writ petition filed by Kush Kalra seeking permission for women to sit for the NDA entrance exam. Mr. Kalra argued that Articles 14, 15, 16 and 19 of the Constitution, which uphold the values of equality and allow equal, non-discriminatory opportunities at work, were being violated by denying eligible women the opportunity. Though the legal route has helped overcome some of the hurdles, it will be a long haul before gender parity is fully achieved in the Army. In that context, the Prime Minister’s Independence Day announcement that girls will be granted admission in the Sainik Schools is a welcome move towards preparing them for an equal role and life in the military.
The signing of the Accords has helped remove strategic obstacles for New Delhi and aided defence cooperation
•The recent visit by the Indian Air Force chief, Air Chief Marshal R.K. Bhadauria, to Israel offers a window to study how New Delhi is taking advantage of the Abraham Accords deal signed between Israel and a consortium of Arab States led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2020 According to reports, an Indian contingent of the Indian Air Force (IAF) will now visit Israel in October to take part in multilateral military exercises.
Deepening cooperation
•In the same week as ACM Bhadauria’s visit, India also conducted the ‘Zayed Talwar’ naval exercises with the UAE off the coast of Abu Dhabi, further deepening the fast-developing strategic cooperation between the two countries. In December 2020, Indian Army chief, General M.M. Naravane, visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia, becoming the first chief of the Indian Army to do so. The foundation for these visits was set by the (now former) chief of the Indian Navy, Admiral Sunil Lanba, in 2017, who visited the UAE and Oman, the latter being home to Duqm Port where New Delhi signed a deal with Muscat for access to the facility, including dry dock use by the Indian Navy. The above examples show the pacey developments on the defence front between India and the West Asian region. The signing of the Accords has removed a significant strategic obstacle for New Delhi — that of a trapeze wire delicate balancing act India has had to play out between the Arab Gulf and Israel over the decades. This status quo is now witnessing a change, with Israel inaugurating its first diplomatic mission in Abu Dhabi and direct flights, business and tourism picking up between the two countries over the past few months. New Delhi had welcomed the Accords, highlighting its support for mechanisms that offer peace and stability in the region.
The thread
•India’s trajectory towards an increased strategic footprint in West Asia has been in development for some time now. Starting from the relatively low-key staging visit to Saudi Arabia conducted by the IAF in 2015, to hosting visiting Iranian naval warships in 2018, defence of the critical waterways in and around the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the extended Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has taken a driving seat in Indian strategic thinking.
•Recently, as tensions between Iran, Israel and the United States flared up in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Navy orchestrated Operation Sankalp, which saw Indian warships escort on an average 16 Indian-flagged vessels a day. This comes as covert attacks on merchant vessels in the region expand, with tensions between Iran and Israel spilling across the region. Till a certain extent, the Accords, from the UAE’s perspective, were to make sure the emirate along with its international centres of trade such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi do not become targets between Jerusalem and Tehran. However, not all Arab States have been on board with the geopolitical shifts the Accords have pushed through. Despite a lot of effort from Israel, under the (now former) Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Saudi Arabia has maintained a distance from this arrangement. More recently, Riyadh has praised the Accords, but said that the resolution of the Palestinian State remains at the forefront of its requirements.
•It is imperative to remember here that despite India’s rare but arguable successes in a ‘non-alignment’ approach in West Asia, it has taken one-sided decisions in the past, such as training Iraqi Air Force cadets on MiG aircraft in Tikrit between 1958 and 1989, while also maintaining good relations with former President Saddam Hussein, seen as a critical part of India’s energy security thinking. The rationale behind such thinking back then has not changed even in 2021, as India still imports more than 80% of its annual oil requirements, much of which still comes from suppliers such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
The Iran link
•Iran, as part of India’s ‘West Asia’ construct, will also play a significant part in India’s outreach in the months to come as the crisis in Afghanistan deepens. The fact that New Delhi used Iranian airspace and facilities when evacuating its diplomatic staff from Kandahar in July showcases a level of strategic commonality, interest and play on certain issues in the region. Keeping this in mind, connectivity projects such as Chabahar Port and Chabahar-Zahedan rail project (project discussions are still on) amongst others remain critical. Recent multiple visits by India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh followed by Iranian Defence Minister Brigadier General Amir Hatami’s visit to India highlight a revitalised strategic cooperation between the two countries despite multiple obstacles in the bilateral relations, led by U.S. sanctions against Tehran and the general tensions between Israel, the Gulf and Iran via proxy battles in theatres such as Yemen, Syria and beyond.
•India’s strategic play in West Asia will be reflective of its economic growth, and by association, an increasingly important place in the global order. From the UN Security Council to the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi will be expected to be more assertive, diplomatically and militarily, in its posturing and shed the cloaks of its foreign and strategic policies being conducted from a stage balanced on a fence.
📰 Back to basics
It is important for India to work on ways to strengthen foundational education for children
•A preliminary report of a nationwide survey conducted by Lego Foundation in Denmark stated that students give importance to peer interactions, good teachers, fun learning content and knowledge gained from experimental approaches. The UNICEF says that children want to go back to school. We can reasonably assume that these aspirations hold true for Indian children but how prepared are we to send them back to school?
•According to various estimates, the pandemic and lockdowns have led to an alarming drop-out rate from schools, migration of children from private to government schools due to inability to pay fees, increased abuse at home, inadequate nutrition, etc.
•Industry experts will agree with the claim that for adults to unlearn and relearn is a very expensive and time-consuming process. Thus, if the foundation of education is weak, any effort at a later stage to strengthen it will only yield sub-optimal results.
Issues to be addressed
•So, what are the major factors that need to be addressed at the foundational level? UNICEF has raised the issue of nutrition. Children, depending on their age group and gender, need to consume 1,000-3,200 calories per day. How close do India’s mid-day meal schemes address their nutritional needs?
•The UNDP Human Development Report 2019 states that students who fall behind may struggle “if the level of classroom instruction (based on textbooks that follow ambitious curricular standards) is considerably above their learning level. These problems are exacerbated at higher grades, if students are automatically promoted to the next grade without having acquired foundational skills.” While the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 proposes pedagogical freedom to the teacher, content-heavy curriculum forces instructionist rather than constructivist engagements by default, as teachers are always short of time. As a result, students simply consume what they are taught; they don’t become creators. Supporting slower foundational development while focusing on the essentials will allow for deeper and more meaningful learning.
Need for skilled teachers
•The National Curriculum Framework for Teacher Education 2009 quoted the NEP 1986 which said, “The status of the teacher reflects the socio-cultural ethos of the society; it is said that no people can rise above the level of its teachers”. NEP 2020 has entrusted the intellectual development of kindergarten children from underprivileged sections to matriculation-pass Anganwadi teachers and helpers whose monthly salary is about ₹10,000 and ₹5,000, respectively. Anganwadi teachers will not be able to fulfil the task of developing underprivileged kindergarten students into creators simply because they lack the expertise to do so. The proposal to upgrade their skills using online methods is grossly inadequate.
Working in rural areas
•If the sight is on the 2030 Sustainable Development Goal for Education, India needs to work on a war footing. It will have to acknowledge that EdTech is a resource of the privileged and learning higher-order cognitive skills requires time and personal support. One way is to mobilise students in higher education to contribute three to six months in government-sponsored programmes by working in the most remote and underdeveloped areas to educate children and teachers. Private companies could also sponsor mentorship programmes where employees spend about a month on the field. This will have a transformative effect on all the participants involved. Current solutions appear to be designed in the cloud without adequate exposure of the ground.
•The ability to successfully satisfy Sustainable Development Goal 4 will depend on the priority afforded to school education. And with budgetary allocations based on priority, the question that begs to be asked is, what is the priority of school education?
📰 Lessons from India’s all-cause mortality data
Data suggest there were 3.5 million to 3.7 million ‘excess deaths’ nationwide, from April 2020 to June 2021
•The scale of devastation caused by India’s COVID-19 epidemic is gradually becoming clearer. This is thanks to the efforts of journalists, The Hindu included, who have been gathering all-cause mortality data from around the country.
•The mortality data, from State and city civil registration systems, paint a grim picture of a major increase in deaths across the country during the novel coronavirus pandemic. Very few of these additional deaths have been recorded as COVID-19 deaths.
Cautious estimate
•We can try to understand the scale of the tragedy via a simple question. How many extra deaths have occurred, over and above those expected in normal times? The data suggest an approximate answer: during 15 months from April 2020 to June 2021, there were 3.5 million-3.7 million “excess deaths” nationwide. This amounts to 35% more deaths than expected.
•This estimate is cautious, and likely to increase as more data come in. Data for June and beyond are very limited, and so the story is incomplete.
•Before we examine the numbers it is important to understand the context. There are several reasons why estimating a surge in mortality is difficult. We need to know how many deaths have occurred during the pandemic, and how many to “expect” in normal times. The idea is to carefully reconstruct these numbers from death registrations and survey-based estimates of pre-pandemic mortality.
Data in the pandemic period
•But death registration data for the pandemic period are limited. It is unavailable for some States, and incomplete in others, for example coming from online systems which do not log all death registrations. Some data are organised according to date of death, and some by date of registration. Moreover, there are uncertainties about death registration prior to the pandemic. In some States, official estimates of levels of registration, which we use, appear to be overestimated.
•Compounding the difficulties, registered deaths show complex trends in some States — for example, gradually increasing prior to the pandemic, but dropping sharply around the time of the national lockdown before the pandemic deaths start to show.
•To arrive at the estimates here, we examined data from 12 States where partial or complete civil registration data are available for at least January 2018 to May 2021: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. These States comprise roughly 60% of the national population.
•During April 2020-May 2021 we found six million death registrations in the data; that is 1.3 million more than expected from 2019 data. If we assume — perhaps optimistically — that the deaths which were not captured in these registration systems, including unregistered deaths, rose proportionately, we arrive at an estimate of around 1.7 million excess deaths in these States up to May.
•If these 12 States reflect the national picture, then India saw around 2.8 million excess deaths nationwide during April 2020-May 2021. This is 8.5 times the official COVID-19 death toll of 3,32,000 over the same period.
Global comparison
•Using limited data for June (currently available only for Andhra Pradesh and Punjab), or assuming that the ratio of excess deaths to official COVID-19 deaths does not change rapidly, we estimate 3.5 million-3.7 million excess deaths nationwide by the end of June. Over a 15 month period, for every three expected deaths, there was a further “pandemic death”.
•This places India among the harder hit countries in the world. It would mean that relative to baseline, India’s surge in mortality is lower than that of Mexico, similar to that of Brazil and South Africa, and considerably higher than in the United States, the United Kingdom and most of western Europe.
•Moreover, the estimates here are conservative. More up-to-date data will push up the numbers. There are also hints that disruption may have prevented — and not merely delayed — many death registrations. For instance, we see significant drops in birth registrations during 2020 in some States where this data are available, most noticeably in Kerala and Andhra Pradesh. Moreover, there are good reasons to believe the mortality surge may have been greatest in marginalised communities where death registration is weaker.
•We cannot be sure how many of India’s excess deaths were from COVID-19. According to the latest national serosurvey, around 60%-70% of people in India may have been infected with the virus by June. If so, international data on fatality rates suggest we should expect two million to four million COVID-19 deaths. So, it is quite plausible that the majority of India’s excess deaths have been from COVID-19. But we cannot rule out a significant surge in non-COVID deaths too.
Individual States
•In individual States, all-cause mortality data paint diverse pictures. Kerala, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh stand out for having somewhat lower excess mortality than expected, even after we adjust for possible disruptions to registration. Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, on the other hand, saw considerably more deaths than expected.
•Overall, around two-thirds of the excess deaths took place during a shocking mortality spike around May 2021. But the time-course varies in different States. Madhya Pradesh’s explosive second wave accounted for 80-90% of its excess deaths. By contrast, Maharashtra saw more even surges, with over 40% of its excess deaths during its first wave.
•There are striking variations in the ratio of excess deaths to recorded COVID-19 deaths. In Maharashtra excess deaths up to May 2021 are roughly four times recorded COVID-19 deaths, or less if we factor in reconciliations of COVID-19 deaths during June and July. By contrast, in Madhya Pradesh, excess deaths are an astonishing 25-30 times recorded COVID-19 deaths.
•Exploring the stories behind these variations is important for understanding the pandemic and disease surveillance in India.
•Considerable gaps remain. Some civil registration data are available for Uttar Pradesh up to April 2021, and these appear to show a major surge in mortality; but there are huge fluctuations in registrations, and unexplained discrepancies with historical data which make it hard to use this data with any confidence. Where civil registration data are of poor quality or unavailable, large-scale mortality surveying could help to fill the gaps.
A perspective
•Could the sharp rise in death registrations reflect not a surge in mortality but improvements in death registration? This claim has been made, but is not credible for several reasons. If we accept the estimate that 92% of deaths were registered in 2019, higher registration coverage could not cause a 35% surge in death registrations.
•In fact there is little evidence for improving death registration during the pandemic. During the relatively quiet period between the two COVID-19 waves (January-March 2021), we see death registrations return close to 2019 baseline levels. And throughout the pandemic period, we see a very strong association between monthly excess deaths and official COVID-19 deaths, strongly suggesting these are pandemic-related excess deaths, and not a reflection of underlying trends in registration.
•There are no easy ways to explain away or deny the scale of the catastrophe. Yes, there are uncertainties, and details will change as more data become available. Most likely, the numbers will increase. One thing is clear: during the COVID-19 pandemic, India has witnessed a surge in mortality on a scale not seen since Independence.
📰 Is a caste census desirable?
It is required to document both the disadvantages and privileges of various communities in India
•At the recently concluded Parliament session, there was a demand to lift the 50% cap on reservation imposed by the Supreme Court through the legislative route. With the 2021 Census coming up, several political parties have demanded a nation-wide caste census. They argue that a Socio-Economic Caste Census is the only way to make a case to breach the 50% cap on reservation and rationalise the reservation matrix in the country. Is a caste census desirable? Satish Deshpande and Valerian Rodrigues discuss the question in a conversation moderated by K.V. Aditya Bharadwaj. Edited excerpts:
There is a vocal demand to breach the 50% cap on reservation. Some States like Tamil Nadu have already done this. Do you think it is desirable to breach this cap?
•Satish Deshpande: The 50% cap, as introduced by the court, has not really been argued through. Reservation in our country has been caught in ideological misgivings. It is constructed as though it is the only departure or the main departure from fair competition, but that is simply not true. The absence of reservation does not mean that the playing field is level. Reservation is one among many considerations which affect competition among candidates. Therefore, I think there is nothing sacrosanct about the 50% limit − it can be exceeded, if necessary, but a clear argument should be given for why this is being done.
•Valerian Rodrigues: While I agree that there is nothing sacrosanct about the 50% cap, I still feel that it is a prudent rule. The reservation policy is one of the elements of the larger structure of democratic constitutionalism in India that by definition subscribes to the argument of equality of citizens. Reservation, no matter how extensive, is going to cater only to a small proportion of those who are entitled to it. Exceptionally, however, reservation can be accepted, extended, but we do need to know very well that the rule is 50% and if there is an extension, it is an exception.
•I also want to say a couple of more things regarding reservation in India — the way it is practised has invariably led to [the growth of] elites among castes and communities. These elites within the castes have tended to exercise their dominance over their very communities and not let them exercise the kind of freedoms, or search for equality, which any democratic polity deserves. Eventually, the bent in a good society should not be to preserve caste but to strengthen democracy. Therefore, we need to see where the convergence lies. The more you actually begin to dole out reservation, the more the tendency to preserve caste, protect it, precisely because that becomes the bastion for the dole.
Many have argued that a Socio-Economic Caste Census would be the best way to rationalise reservation based on data and make a strong case for breaching this gap. Earlier governments argued that counting caste will perpetuate it. Do you think a caste census is actually desirable at the national level today?
•Valerian Rodrigues: I feel that a caste census is absolutely desirable in India today. And the purpose of a caste census is not merely geared to the reservation issue; a caste census would actually bring to the fore the large number of issues that any democratic country needs to attend to, particularly the number of people who are at the margins, or who are deprived, or the kind of occupations they pursue, or the kind of hold that institutions like caste have on them. This information is absolutely necessary for any democratic policymaking. The courts in India have often emphatically said that it is important to have adequate data with regard to reservation. Very often, States have shied away from gathering this data. Now, data gathering itself is a big problem because it can become very, very invasive. But we need to actually balance it with enabling people and asserting citizen equality.
•Satish Deshpande: We have got locked into a mindset where we think only those communities which want welfare benefits from the state must be enumerated. We should not be associating enumeration of communities only with welfare programmes, that is to say only with communities that are, in some sense, needy. Caste is not only a source of disadvantage; it is also a very important source of privilege and advantage in our society. Caste enumeration is also required to document, as far as possible, this privilege. We have to stop thinking of caste as being applicable to only disadvantaged people, poor people, people who are somehow lacking. The opposite is even more true: caste has produced advantages for certain communities, and these also need to be recorded. In my opinion, when everyone’s caste is counted, we will finally come out of the unhelpful mindset of thinking of caste as an exception meant only for those who are supplicants of the state. The state has helped privileged communities far more, even though this help has not taken the explicit form of programmes like reservation. The naming and counting of caste is a difficult thing that we have to pass through in order to bring about a future when it will not matter as much as it matters today.
It is actually many of the OBC [Other Backward Classes] leaders and parties that have been demanding the enumeration of castes. But the somewhat unsaid opposition to it seems to be coming from the upper castes.
•Valerian Rodrigues: I don’t think that counting of caste necessarily perpetuates caste or the caste system. However, under certain conditions, enumeration of caste for cultivating elitism can be a backward step to hold on to caste. But that is concerning the elites. Overall, the democratic dividends of enumeration of caste are much higher. There are a lot of myths which actually deprive a large number of people, particularly on the margins. Let’s take the case of Karnataka. For a long time, there were claims that among the castes, the Lingayats are the most numerous. But a lot of other studies have brought out that this may not be true. And these kinds of myths lead to the argument that given that this is a caste which is numerous, it has to be constantly placated. This is true of Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra and several places across India. These myths can be debunked through a caste census. There is a vested interest among Backward Class leaders demanding that caste be enumerated. There is a section of people in India who relish claiming that they are casteless while utilising all the benefits that a democratic dispensation provides to them. This can be debunked by saying, look, you have benefited so much across the years, while there are people in this country who have either not benefited at all or if they have benefited, it is nothing in comparison to what you have and most of these benefits that have accrued to you are precisely because you belong to a certain caste.
We have had two exercises of a caste census — one carried out by the Union government in 2011 and another by the Karnataka government in 2015. Data from both censuses have not been made public and the governments have also disputed the data. Why is a caste census always controversial?
•Satish Deshpande: Yes, this is a demonstration of the principle that those in power control data and information. We have had instances where this data has been collected but has not been made public. I have to also emphasise that a caste census is a necessity, it is not a happy thing, it is not a great achievement, it is just something that we have to do. It will also, I think, increase friction, to some extent harden caste identities in the short term. But not counting caste is much worse. And one of the major things we will have to fight against in this journey is the vested interests of particular governments. You see, we say that democracy is rule by the people, but it is not. It is rule by a particular party or parties which have won an election. And once they have won an election, they have their own vested interests. So, this is a larger issue with democracy that has to be countered.
Governments shying away from releasing the data of a caste census seems to be a bipartisan issue. How do we find the political intent and capital to carry out this exercise?
•Satish Deshpande: I am actually quite pessimistic. I don’t think a caste census will happen unless something extraordinary happens in our polity. As you said, this seems to be a bipartisan issue. And in my opinion, the main need is that of exposing privilege. There are also important questions of demands coming up because of mismatches between the numbers that we come out with and the share in resources that different communities have. This is a kind of nightmare that all governments fear. So, they would much rather leave things vague.
•Valerian Rodrigues: I make a slightly different assessment. I think the ruling dispensation is seriously feeling that it needs to reach out to the Backward Classes. The Backward Classes are more than 50% of the population. And this dispensation knows that it cannot afford to lose the support of the Backward Classes. So, there has recently been a tendency within the dispensation to bring the Backward Class elite to the forefront. Therefore, I am not negative that this dispensation, or the UPA government, would be wholly denying a caste census. However, like the UPA government escaped by saying that a caste census would be different from the general census and called for only certain issues to be enumerated, this dispensation also might actually play the same game and begin to disconnect the caste census from the general census. What is required is to bring the caste census alongside the general census. Only then will we know the situation.
•Satish Deshpande: Yes, this is a very important issue. I agree completely. We cannot separate the caste census from the general census. Only if we don’t will the exercise make sense. But what really worries me about this particular government given its record in the past few years is the integrity of data. A caste census is badly needed, but a caste census without data integrity would be much worse. A suspect caste census would be much worse than no census at all.
The data of caste censuses have always been disputed, probably due to the contest of several vested interests in accepting the data. While Hindutva forces seem to be trying to co-opt subaltern communities that are demanding a caste census, how do they handle the paradox of the caste question?
•Satish Deshpande: I think this is the central issue. The problem is that the core support for the ruling party is upper caste, at least in mentality, if not always strictly in terms of caste identity. But the upper castes are a minority; hence the unavoidable electoral necessity of bringing in the middle castes, and the Dalits who provide large numbers. This is a political balancing act, where you invite the lower castes promising to give them the place denied to them for so long. At the same time, you have to keep your core supporters happy. The core supporters are extremely uncomfortable when the social distance between them and the castes that they believe are lower than them appears to shrink. They get very upset. All over the country, the conflict between Dalits and OBCs is bitter and violent. How do we square this circle? This is the main challenge for Hindutva politics.
