📰 Lok Sabha okays National Capital Territory Bill
Govt introduced the Bill and got it cleared in Rajya Sabha in February., in the first part of Budget session
•The Lok Sabha on Wednesday passed the National Capital Territory of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Second (Amendment) Bill, 2021 that seeks to regularise unauthorised colonies that existed in the National Capital Territory of Delhi as on June 1, 2014, and had seen development up to 50% as on January 1, 2015.
•Urban Development Minister Hardeep Singh Puri, speaking on the Bill, said there “was a public perception that the issues with regard to unauthorised colonies were delayed by those who were in office earlier.”
•“In 1947, 17% of the total population of the country lived in urban areas, Delhi’s population at that time was eight lakh. After partition and relocation, it went up to 22 lakhs, and I expect that during the Census of 2021, the population would be close to two crore people,” he said.
•Mr. Puri also quoted a letter received by his Ministry from the Delhi government seeking the extension of a survey of unauthorised colonies. “That is why we brought this Bill,” he said.
•Delhi MP Meenakshi Lekhi, said that a large number of people living in unauthorised colonies in Delhi were not receiving proper amenities and that this Bill provided ownership rights to those living in these colonies. It would facilitate access to institutional credit and also improve the basic amenities.
•The Bill was then passed by voice vote. The government had introduced the Bill and got it cleared in the Rajya Sabha in February, in the first part of the Budget session.
Expanded ‘Troika’ includes U.S., China, Pakistan, with representatives from Kabul and Taliban.
•Close on the heels of U.S. plans for a United Nations regional conference on Afghanistan, Russia has announced it will hold a conference of special envoys from the U.S., China, and Pakistan, along with representatives of the Afghanistan government, Taliban and other senior Afghan leaders next week.
•Unlike the UN-led formulation, however, India has not been invited to the Russian conference, officials confirmed, adding that Moscow has kept New Delhi apprised of the two-year old “Troika” process involving consultations between U.S., Russia and China.
•“A regular meeting of the expanded ‘troika’ is scheduled for March 18 in Moscow at the level of special representatives of Russia, China, the United States and Pakistan, dedicated to the intra-Afghan settlement,” said Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova. Apart from the Afghan representatives of the Ghani government and the High Council for National Reconciliation, leaders including former President Hamid Karzai and Qatar’s envoy have also been invited.
•“The meeting is expected to discuss ways to assist advancing the intra-Afghan talks in Doha, reduce the level of violence and to end the armed conflict in Afghanistan,” Ms. Zakharova said. A joint statement is expected to be released after the three-day conference.
U.S. yet to take a call
•U.S. Special Representative on Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad is yet to confirm his participation in the expanded Troika meet, although he was part of at least two meetings of the “Troika plus Pakistan” in 2020. An Afghanistan Foreign Ministry spokesperson said the composition of the final delegation that would travel from Kabul was under discussion, but that the Ghani government would participate.
•The MEA declined to comment on India’s exclusion from the meeting, which would be the first such meeting with Afghanistan and Taliban representatives present, ever since the Doha talks process ran into trouble earlier this year. Diplomatic sources said the Troika process was an “already established mechanism”, and that there was no attempt to “leave India out” of the proposed talks.
•The sources said Russia is committed to the path of building “regional consensus” for Afghanistan’s peace process, and that it hopes to include India in the talks framework at a later date.
•“India plays a very important role in Afghanistan, and its eventual, deeper involvement in dedicated dialogue formats is natural,” a Russian Embassy release had said on Tuesday, responding to reports that Moscow was trying to “keep India out” of multilateral efforts on Afghanistan.
•The expanded Troika meeting plan had been promoted by Russian Special Envoy on Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov, during a visit to Islamabad in February.
•“My leadership has set the task of finding ways that will facilitate the start of inter-Afghan negotiations through consultations within the framework of the enlarged troika. We agreed on such a meeting with the American special envoy [Zalmay] Khalilzad. It can happen in Moscow,” Mr. Kabulov had told Russian news agency Sputnik at the time.
Iran declines offer
•Sources said Iran had been invited to join the talks, but declined, given its tensions with the United States on nuclear issues and sanctions.
•Officials also said the Moscow “Troika Plus” meeting next week would run “in addition to” and not “counter to” the U.S. proposals for the future roadmap for Afghanistan, that were revealed over the weekend in a letter sent by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani.
•The proposals include discussions on a ceasefire and power sharing in a “more inclusive” government in Kabul, and indicated that the U.S. is still considering whether to pull out its final 2,500 troops from Afghanistan by May 1 this year. Mr. Blinken suggested a two-track dialogue process — with one track of regional talks led by the United Nations, which would include the U.S., Russia, China, India, Iran and Pakistan, while another track of Intra-Afghan dialogue would be facilitated by Turkey.
📰 Joe Biden’s Afghanistan peace plan
The Biden administration is seeking to bring violence to a halt and help form an interim government in the country. What is the Afghan government’s stand?
•The story so far: The Joe Biden administration has proposed a new peace plan to the Afghan government and the Taliban, seeking to bring violence to a halt and form an interim government. Secretary of State Antony Blinken wrote a letter to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, which Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S.’s special envoy for Afghanistan, delivered to the Afghan leader in Kabul last week, detailing the proposal.
What is the American proposal?
•In the letter, which was first published by Afghanistan’s TOLOnews, Mr. Blinken has asked the Afghan President to show “urgent leadership.. in the coming weeks”. The proposal included many elements. First, Mr. Blinken has proposed a UN-led conference of representatives of Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, India and the U.S. “to discuss a unified approach to support peace in Afghanistan”.
•Second, Mr. Khalilzad will share written proposals with the Afghan leadership and the Taliban to accelerate talks. It urges both sides to reach a consensus on Afghanistan’s future constitutional and governing arrangements; find a road map to a new “inclusive government”; and agree on the terms of a “permanent and comprehensive ceasefire”. Mr. Blinken has also proposed a senior level meeting of the Afghan government and the Taliban in Turkey to discuss power sharing, reduction of violence and other specific goals.
Why the U.S. is making this peace push?
•The Biden administration is currently reviewing its Afghan strategy. While the review is not completed, there is a consensus within the administration, as Mr. Blinken has pointed out, that “accelerating the peace process” is the best way to advance the shared interests of the U.S. and the Afghan government. According to the agreement the U.S. signed with the Taliban in February 2020, American troops - currently some 2,500 troops are in Afghanistan - are set to leave the country by May 1. The Taliban have warned that if the U.S. troops are not out by the deadline, they will step up fighting. The Taliban and the Afghan government started peace talks in Doha in September last year but reached no breakthrough. The Biden administration is concerned about the slow pace of the talks.
•The U.S. assessment is that if American troops are pulled out of Afghanistan, the Taliban would make quick gains. When Austin Miller, the commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan, was recently asked by The New Yorker’s Dexter Filkins if he thought that the Afghan Army could secure the country alone, he didn’t give a direct answer. They have to,” he said.
•In his letter to Mr. Ghani, Mr. Blinken was blunter about the Taliban’s advances. “We are considering the full withdrawal of our forces by May 1, as we consider other options. Even with the continuation of financial assistance from the U.S. to your forces after an American military withdrawal, I am concerned that the security situation will worsen and that the Taliban could make rapid territorial gains,” he writes.
•So, the Biden administration’s assessment is that the Taliban are on the ascent. It hopes that the best way to prevent a complete Taliban takeover is a regional peace process and an interim unity government. The Taliban are yet to respond to America’s proposal.
What is the Afghan government’s stand?
•The Ghani administration has consistently been critical of the U.S.’s direct outreach to the Taliban. The Trump administration held direct talks with the Taliban, excluding the government. Later, Washington put pressure on Kabul to release Taliban prisoners as part of an agreement it reached with the insurgents. Even when the Doha talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government were under way, Mr. Ghani made it clear that he, as elected President, is the only legitimate representative of the Afghan people and he resisted making concessions to the Taliban. “My power rests on my legitimacy,” he said recently. “The moment that legitimacy is gone, the whole thing implodes.”
•The relationship between Mr. Ghani and Mr. Khalilzad reportedly broke down in recent months. When Mr. Blinken’s letter was leaked, Mr. Ghani was quick to respond. He reiterated his opposition to any transfer of power except through elections. His Vice President Amrullah Saleh, a hardline critic of the Taliban, said the U.S. “can make a decision on their troops, not on the people of Afghanistan”.
What’s next?
•While the Afghan government’s opposition to sharing power with the Taliban is well known, it is not clear whether Mr. Ghani could continue to resist American pressure, especially if the U.S. brings regional powers, including India, on board. And if the Biden administration decides to stick to the Taliban deal and withdraw troops by May, Mr. Ghani would be in a tougher spot. He doesn’t have any good options. If he rejects the American offer, the war will continue forever. The Taliban have already taken over much of the country’s hinterlands and are breathing down the neck of its cities. If he accepts the proposal, he will have to share power with the Taliban and discuss amendments to the Constitution and the future governance framework. Either way, the Taliban are set to make gains.
📰 Regulation redux: On Supreme Court query on an environment watchdog
An environmental regulator can work only if governments see the value of nature
•The Supreme Court’s notice to the Centre on a public interest plea to set up a national environmental regulator under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 revives an issue that successive governments have preferred to ignore, in spite of specific orders passed by the same court more than nine years ago. There is no consensus on what a new regulator can achieve, since official policy privileges ease of doing business. The draft Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification 2020, which seeks to advance that goal, makes no effort to disguise the desire to virtually eliminate civil society’s role. It does not encourage the public to voice its views and report violations, while independent scrutiny of proposals is weakened. In fact, the EIA process, especially after the notification in 2006, has been heavily critiqued for conflicts of interest - the proponent of a project is responsible for producing the EIA report — while clearances under forest, wildlife, air and water quality laws are heavily weighted in favour of promoters. Rather than reform the system, in 2011 and 2014, the Centre rebuffed the apex court on the question of forming an independent regulator, contending that its orders in the Lafarge mining case were only in the nature of a suggestion, and later sought time but decided not to act. The current PIL is forcing the government to come up with a fresh explanation on why it has been sitting on its hands all along. Yet, for a national regulator to work, the government must recognise the limits to extractive growth, respect a neutral body and preserve the integrity of the environment.
•A key issue raised by the PIL is the lack of credibility of the EIA process, leading to reports that are often produced with the help of dubious expertise and manipulated data. In most cases, the proponents also ignore the views of communities that would be displaced, and are ill-equipped to assess the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services such as clean air, water and farm productivity. The Centre and States must acknowledge the conflict arising from pressure on scarce land and ecosystems from polluting projects, which has already created clusters of industrial locations that are doing badly on the CPCB’s Comprehensive Environmental Pollution Index. It is striking that this did not stop approvals for further polluting activity in some of these places, such as large coal-based power plants cleared in recent years in Kanpur, Cuddalore, and Angul in Odisha. What should concern the Centre is the laggardly pace at which multiple departments process project proposals, raising transaction costs and resulting in the clamour to dispense with regulation. The remedies lie in administrative reform. It is eminently feasible, for instance, to produce a whitelist of lands for industry, reclaiming polluted areas. What India cannot afford to do is further degrade its forests, rivers, wetlands and air, whose health is vital for its large population.
📰 Diagnosing gestational diabetes
There is low awareness among the public and low capacity for testing and providing care
•Diabetes is a major public health problem in India with an estimated 7 crore adults with diabetes and half as many with prediabetes. Unfortunately, over half remain undiagnosed till late complications set in. The consequences of this for the health system, economic productivity and the individual’s life and family are well documented and well known. Type 2 diabetes, the most common form of diabetes, is primarily preventable among those at risk through proper lifestyle changes.
Transitory form of diabetes
•What is less well known is that pregnancy is a diabetogenic stress and as a consequence, some women develop a transitory form of diabetes during pregnancy called gestational diabetes. Women of Indian (South Asian) origin are considered to be at highest risk of gestational diabetes. The International Diabetes Federation (IDF) estimates that up to 25% of pregnancies in South Asia may be affected by hyperglycemia in pregnancy. In India it varies from about 10% in rural areas to about 30% in urban areas. Given that there are approximately 2.7 crore to 3 crore pregnancies each year in India and assuming a modest gestational diabetes rate of 10%, this means that about 27 lakh to 30 lakh women develop it each year.
•Gestational diabetes is associated with significantly increased risk of complications during pregnancy such as preeclampsia (fits during pregnancy), prolonged and obstructed labour, need for assisted delivery, postpartum haemorrhage and sepsis, stillbirths, premature delivery, increased risk of neonatal deaths due to respiratory distress, neonatal hypoglycaemia and birth injuries. All these conditions contribute to high maternal and new born morbidity and mortality.
•If a woman gets gestational diabetes, it is easier to identify her as being at risk of diabetes and cardiovascular diseases. Almost half the women with gestational diabetes go on to develop Type 2 diabetes within 10 years without preventive care. Children born to women with gestational diabetes are also at very high risk of obesity, Type 2 diabetes, and cardiovascular diseases.
•Thus, addressing gestational diabetes has an impact at three levels: it will help lower maternal and new born morbidity and mortality; reduce the risk of future diabetes and cardiovascular diseases in women with gestational diabetes; and possibly break the chain of ‘diabetes begetting diabetes’ by addressing the issue of trans-generational transmission.
Test procedure
•However, there is lack of public awareness about gestational diabetes as well as low awareness and capacity within the health systems for testing and providing care. This is despite the availability of national guidelines and diagnosis and management of gestational diabetes by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India. Professor Dr. V. Seshiah, a pioneer in the field of diabetes and pregnancy, along with the Diabetes in Pregnancy Study Group of India, suggested a single test procedure which is economical and doable. The World Health Organization, the IDF and the International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics have also approved this test procedure.
A recommendation
•Being conceived by healthy parents and born to a mother in good health is the best gift a child can receive as this provides a health advantage. To build a healthy future for the nation, this becomes very important. Several academic associations such as the Diabetes Study Group of India, the Federation of Obstetric and Gynaecological Societies of India and the South Asia Initiative for Diabetes In Pregnancy have recommended that we observe a National Gestational Diabetes Awareness Day on March 10, which is Dr. V. Seshiah’s birthday, in recognition of his service and contribution to the field of diabetes and pregnancy for more than 40 years.
📰 Towards peace on the border
India’s new policy of proactive diplomacy together with strong ground posturing is working
•Things seem to be looking up for India in the neighbourhood. China has withdrawn its troops in eastern Ladakh across the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Pakistan has voluntarily come forward for a ceasefire across the Line of Control (LoC). The new U.S. administration has been issuing positive statements.
Shift in strategy
•This is the second time in the last few years that China has been forced to make a reassessment of its ground strategy. Earlier in 2017, at Doklam where there was a 72-day stand-off, mobilisation of Indian forces led to the withdrawal of Chinese equipment and troops from the disputed area. It took almost 10 months for this to happen in Ladakh. It began at Pangong Tso; Depsang Plains and Hot Springs are yet to see the withdrawal.
•This can be attributed to a conspicuous shift in India’s strategy. Prior to 2014, India used to engage in diplomacy and close matters through a quiet give and take in such conflicts along the LAC. In 2013, India was allegedly forced to dismantle some military structures as a part of the resolution process when China encroached into Depsang Valley. Indian troops used to generally avoid a face-off. That was the kind of peace we managed to maintain along the LAC.
•But under the new policy, the Indian forces practice active engagement on the ground while their leadership engages in negotiations with their counterparts. This revised strategy of ‘proactive diplomacy together with strong ground posturing’ seems to be working well with our northern neighbour. Long ago, Chairman Mao Zedong had conveyed an important message to India through his Premier, Zhou Enlai. In August 1962, Mao had asked his army commanders to prepare for war with India. Zhou, a good friend of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, reminded Mao about the Panchsheel Treaty signed by the two countries, which mandated ‘peaceful coexistence’ as the core principle. Mao told Zhou to convey to Nehru that India and China should practice ‘armed coexistence’. This must always be remembered in dealings across the LAC.
•The LoC too has seen some pleasant manoeuvres. In a sudden development, the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGsMO) of India and Pakistan decided on February 22 to strictly implement the 2003 ceasefire agreement. Coming after one of the worst years of ceasefire violations across the LoC (more than 5,000) and just before summer, this decision must be a greatly reassuring one for peace. On its part, India has always demonstrated its commitment to peace. A similar agreement was reached between the two DGsMO in 2018 too. However, there were violations by Pakistan, including the Pulwama attack. Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan insisted that there would be no engagement with India until the status quo was restored in Jammu and Kashmir. All that seems passe now. There seems to be equal enthusiasm in Pakistan over the ceasefire.
•Just as China’s withdrawal cannot be second-guessed, Pakistan’s climbdown too cannot be explained conclusively. The FATF sword is still hanging over Pakistan’s head, the economy is in precarious condition, COVID-19 has impacted exports, and there is a repayment crisis. China is helping its friend, but it looks unhappy about the uncertainty over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
•Political pundits predict that when besieged from all sides, Pakistan has a propensity to spread terror and violence in India. India has enough experiences to appreciate Pakistan’s potential for mischief. That is why India has reiterated that there will be no let-up in counter-terror operations. But there is discernible change in General Qamar Javed Bajwa’s tone and tenor. Moeed Yusuf, Special Adviser on National Security in Pakistan, cryptically told journalists: “Do you think this could happen without pressure?”
Biden administration’s approach
•Pakistan must be under pressure from India, the new U.S. administration as well as China. There are indications that the Biden administration will adopt a nuanced approach with China. In its own economic and strategic interest, China would prefer to give that a chance. It probably wants Pakistan also to fall in line. Contrary to fears, the Biden administration seems to be largely siding with India in its South Asia policy. “We are concerned by Beijing’s pattern of ongoing attempts to intimidate its neighbours. As always, we will stand with friends, we will stand with partners, we will stand with allies,” a State Department official stated recently on the border stand-off. In another statement, the U.S. State Department said it “welcomes” the steps taken to return Jammu and Kashmir to “full economic and political normalcy consistent with India’s democratic values”. India should seize this opportune moment. Taking a leaf out of Vajpayee’s statesmanship in 2003 may not be a bad idea.
📰 A case for a revamped, need-based PDS
There should be political will to take this step, which would reduce the subsidy bill and the scope for leakages
•The Economic Survey, tabled in Parliament in January, rightly flagged the issue of a growing food subsidy bill, which, in the words of the government, “is becoming unmanageably large”.
•The reason is not far to seek. Food subsidy, coupled with the drawal of food grains by States from the central pool under various schemes, has been on a perpetual growth trajectory. During 2016-17 to 2019-20, the subsidy amount, clubbed with loans taken by the Food Corporation of India (FCI) under the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF) towards food subsidy, was in the range of ₹1.65-lakh crore to ₹2.2-lakh crore. In future, the annual subsidy bill of the Centre is expected to be about ₹2.5-lakh crore.
High drawal rate
•During the three years, the quantity of food grains drawn by States (annually) hovered around 60 million tonnes to 66 million tonnes. Compared to the allocation, the rate of drawal was 91% to 95%. As the National Food Security Act (NFSA), which came into force in July 2013, enhanced entitlements (covering two-thirds of the country’s population), this naturally pushed up the States’ drawal. Based on an improved version of the targeted Public Distribution System (PDS), the law requires the authorities to provide to each beneficiary 5 kg of rice or wheat per month.
•For this financial year (2020-21) which is an extraordinary year on account of the COVID-19 pandemic, the revised estimate of the subsidy has been put at about ₹4.23-lakh crore, excluding the extra budgetary resource allocation of ₹84,636 crore. Till December 2020, the Centre set apart 94.35 million tonnes to the States under different schemes including the NFSA and additional allocation, meant for distribution among the poor free of cost.
•Importantly, the government has decided to abandon the practice of extra budgetary resource allocation and include in the food subsidy amount itself, arrears in loans outstanding of the FCI drawn through the NSSF. Even in the figure of revised estimates for 2020-21, the arrears constitute a portion.
Issue prices and politics
•It is against this backdrop that the Survey has hinted at an increase in the Central Issue Price (CIP), which has remained at ₹2 per kg for wheat and ₹3 per kg for rice for years, though the NFSA, even in 2013, envisaged a price revision after three years.
•What makes the subject more complex is the variation in the retail issue prices of rice and wheat, from nil in States such as Karnataka and West Bengal for Priority Households (PHH) and Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) ration card holders, ₹1 in Odisha for both categories of beneficiaries to ₹3 and ₹2 in Bihar for the two categories, according to an official document. Needless to say, in Tamil Nadu, rice is given free of cost for all categories; this includes non-PHH.
•The Centre, by stating through the Survey that it is difficult to reduce “the economic cost of food management in view of rising commitment” towards food security, does not want the NFSA norms to be disturbed. But, a mere increase in the CIPs of rice and wheat without a corresponding rise in the issue prices by the State governments would only increase the burden of States, which are even otherwise reeling under the problem of a resource crunch. Political compulsions are perceived to be coming in the way of the Centre and the States increasing the prices. The politics of rice has been an integral feature of the political discourse. Promises by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in the 1967 Assembly election in Tamil Nadu — three measures (approximately 4.5 kg) at ₹1 — and the Telugu Desam Party during the 1983 poll in Andhra Pradesh — ₹ 2 per kg — captured the imagination of the voter. One should ponder over the advisability of keeping so low the retail prices of food grains at fair price shops, even after the passage of nearly 50 years and achieving substantial poverty reduction in the country. As per the Rangarajan group’s estimate in 2014, the share of people living below the poverty line (BPL) in the 2011 population was 29.5% (about 36 crore).
Recast the system
•In this context, it is time the Centre had a relook at the overall food subsidy system including the pricing mechanism.
•It should revisit NFSA norms and coverage. An official committee in January 2015 called for decreasing the quantum of coverage under the law, from the present 67% to around 40%. For all ration cardholders drawing food grains, a “give-up” option, as done in the case of cooking gas cylinders, can be made available. Even though States have been allowed to frame criteria for the identification of PHH cardholders, the Centre can nudge them into pruning the number of such beneficiaries.
•As for the prices, the existing arrangement of flat rates should be replaced with a slab system. Barring the needy, other beneficiaries can be made to pay a little more for a higher quantum of food grains. The rates at which these beneficiaries have to be charged can be arrived at by the Centre and the States through consultations. These measures, if properly implemented, can have a salutary effect on retail prices in the open market. There are no two opinions about reforms implemented in the PDS through various steps, including end-to-end computerisation of operations, digitisation of data of ration cardholders, seeding of Aadhaar, and automation of fair price shops.
•Yet, diversion of food grains and other chronic problems do exist. It is nobody’s case that the PDS should be dismantled or in-kind provision of food subsidy be discontinued. After all, the Centre itself did not see any great virtue in the Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) mode at the time of giving additional food grains free of cost to the States during April-November last year (as part of relief measures during the pandemic). A revamped, need-based PDS is required not just for cutting down the subsidy bill but also for reducing the scope for leakages. Political will should not be found wanting.
