📰 India-U.S. 2+2 dialogue | U.S. to support India’s defence of territory
U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo raises security threat from China after 2+2 talks.
•The United States will support India to defend its territorial sovereignty and liberty, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said on Tuesday. Addressing the media at the end of the 3rd India-US 2+2 dialogue in New Delhi, Mr. Pompeo also said that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is “no friend to democracy”.
•The observations about the threats to Indian sovereignty came as New Delhi announced the signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on geospatial cooperation (BECA) with the U.S.
•“The United States will stand with the people of India as they face threats to their sovereignty and their liberty,” said Mr. Pompeo hinting at the ongoing tense scenario in eastern Ladakh where Indian and Chinese forces in a standoff since May. Mr. Pompeo also referred to the greater threats posed by China in the Asia-Pacific region and the COVID-19 pandemic.
•“Our leaders and our citizens see with increasing clarity that the CCP is no friend to democracy, the rule of law, transparency, nor to freedom of navigation, the foundation of a free and open and prosperous Indo-Pacific. I am glad to say that the U.S. and India are taking steps to strengthen cooperation against all manner of threats and not just those posed by the Chinese Communist Party,” said Mr Pompeo addressing the media at the Hyderabad House here.
•In his opening remarks, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh laid out the challenges before India. Speaking in Hindi, Mr Singh said, “We are meeting today at an extraordinary time. This pandemic is something that we have never experienced in our lifetime.. ..our partnership is becoming stronger because of the challenges that we are facing at present.” The Minister’s comments were taken forward by Mr Pompeo, promising American support.
•U.S. Secretary of Defence Mark Esper said, “BECA will enable greater sharing of geospatial information between our armed forces”.
•Apart from BECA, India and the U.S. also sealed an MoU on Technical Cooperation in Earth Observations and Earth Sciences, and an agreement to extend duration of the MoU regarding the Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership. The two sides also signed an agreement on electronic exchange of customs data and a letter of intent regarding cooperation in traditional Indian medicines.
•A Joint Statement issued following the conclusion of the visit of the American dignitaries highlighted shared Indo-U.S. goals in the Asia-Pacific region and “emphasised that the Code of Conduct in the South China sea should not prejudice the legitimate rights and interests of any nation in accordance with international law”. The two sides also decided to expand joint capacity building activities with partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
•Mr. Pompeo also referred to the loss of lives of Indian soldiers in the clash with the Chinese PLA troops in June and said India and the U.S. are committed to upholding common values against threats.
•“Today morning we have been to the National War Memorial to pay homage to the brave men and women of the Indian armed forces who have sacrificed for the world's largest democracy including 20 that were killed by the PLA forces in Galwan valley in June,” Mr Pompeo said.
•Chinese rejection
•Responding to the comments of the U.S. Secretary of State, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said Mr. Pompeo's comments are groundless.
•“These are groundless accusations which reflect he is clinging to Cold War mentality and ideological biases. We urge him to abandon the Cold War and zero sum game mentality, stop sowing discord between China and regional countries as well as undermining regional peace and stability,” said Mr. Wang.
‘Security convergence’
•Explaining the “2+2” dialogue, External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar said the discussions had a political military content. “Our national security convergences have obviously grown in a more multipolar world. We meet today to not only advance our own interests but to ensure that our bilateral cooperation makes a positive contribution in the world arena,” he said.
•Speaking about the conclusion of BECA ahead of the U.S. presidential election, a highly placed government source said that the presence of the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defence in India despite the election season in the U.S. is a sign of the importance that the U.S. attaches to India.
•“It is a demonstration to the world at large,” said the official about the discussions between the two sides. Apart from Indo-Pacific region, the two sides also discussed the status of Afghanistan and supported an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process.
Information exchange
•BECA enables exchange of geospatial data and information between the two countries and will improve the accuracy of India’s missiles in future during precision strikes.
•BECA will help share geospatial maps and charts between U.S. and India, which may have been acquired from multiple sources like satellites, UAVs, reconnaissance aircraft, aerostats among others, said Captain (IN) Vikram Mahajan (Retd), Director, Aerospace and Defence at U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Forum.
•“Data shared from BECA will help in identifying, updating and tracking of various types of target and their position, both on land and sea,” he told The Hindu.
•Terming the signing of BECA a “significant achievement,” Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said the U.S. accepted an Indian request for “cooperation in the advanced field of maritime domain awareness.” As part of measures to enhance military to military cooperation Mr. Singh said now Liaison Officers at each other's establishments could be leveraged to enhance “information sharing architecture” while in the joint statement both sides “reiterated their intent to assign additional Liaison Officers.”
The scheme is to protect farmers from price fluctuations, says Pinarayi Vijayan
•The government expects to produce an additional one lakh tonnes of vegetables and tubers alike in a year, Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan said on Tuesday. A project would be prepared to ensure the best market for the produce.
•Mr. Vijayan was speaking after announcing the base price for 16 agricultural items, including vegetables, fruits, and tubers, in what the government termed a first-of-its-kind initiative in the country, here. The scheme, designed to protect farmers from adverse price fluctuations, would come into effect from November 1.
•Mr. Vijayan said the base price would provide relief and support to both traditional farmers and those newly farming the land. While farmers around the country were discontent and had taken up protests, the Kerala government supported them and rolled out several initiatives aimed at development of agriculture in the past four-and-a-half years. The base price was one such measure.
•Sixteen agricultural produce would be covered in the first phase. Crops such as tapioca, ‘nendran’ plantain, pineapple, bitter gourd, cucumber, snake gourd, tomato, cabbage, and beans that were produced in the State had been included in the base price, which would be 20% above the production cost of the vegetable.
•If the market price dipped below the base price of a vegetable, the produce would be procured at the base price and the money transferred to farmers’ accounts. The produce would be graded on quality, and the base price fixed on that basis. There was also a provision to revise the base price regularly, the Chief Minister said.
•Local self-government institutions would have an important role to play in the scheme as they would coordinate the procurement and distribution of vegetables, he said.
•The scheme would benefit a farmer with cultivation on a maximum of 15 acres in a season. They would have to register on the Agriculture Department’s registration portal after insuring the crop to get the benefit of the base price. The registration would begin on November 1.
•Initially though, the registration would not be mandatory for farmers intending the procurement to happen through primary agricultural credit cooperative societies. The procured produce would be sold through the department’s markets or the societies’ marketing network. Any excess produce would be converted into value-added products. The scheme also envisaged setting up of supply chain process such as cold-storage facilities and refrigerated vehicles.
•He pointed out that vegetable production in the State had more than doubled from 7 lakh tonnes to 14.72 lakh tonnes in the past four-and-a-half years. Area under paddy cultivation had increased from 1.96 lakh hectares to 2.15 lakh hectares. This was the result of schemes such as Subhiksha Keralam and Jeevani that had attracted non-residents Keralites who had returned home, women, and the youth.
📰 Now, outsiders can buy land in Jammu and Kashmir
Centre notifies Jammu and Kashmir land laws, omits ‘permanent resident’ as criteria
•People as well as investors outside Jammu and Kashmir can now purchase land in the Union Territory (UT) as the Centre on Tuesday notified new land laws for the region, ending the exclusive rights of locals over the land granted under now abrogated Article 370.
•Under the newly introduced J&K Development Act, the term “being permanent resident of the State” as a criteria has been “omitted”, paving the way for investors outside J&K to invest in the UT.
•The Centre has been arguing that Article 370 hampered development in the U.T. as investors were unable to purchase land prior to August 5, 2019.
Laws for Ladakh soon
•The Centre is likely to notify separate land laws for the UT of Ladakh soon.
•“We want that like other parts of India, industries should be set up in J&K. My government is committed to peace, progress and prosperity”, Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha said.
•Under the ‘transfer of land for the purpose of promotion of healthcare or education’, the government may now allow transfer of land “in favour of a person or an institution for the purpose of promotion of healthcare or senior secondary or higher or specialized education in J&K”.
•According to amendments made to “The Jammu & Kashmir Land Revenue Act, Samvat, 1996”, only agriculturists of J&K can purchase agricultural land. “No sale, gift, exchange, or mortgage of the land shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist,” it reads.
•The Restriction on Conversion of Agricultural Land and Process for Permission of Non-Agriculture clause, however, puts conditions on the use of agricultural land. “No land used for agriculture purposes shall be used for any non-agricultural purposes except with the permission of the district collector”, it reads.
•Under a new provision, an Army officer not below the rank of Corps Commander can declare an area as “Strategic Area” within a local area, only for direct operational and training requirements of the armed forces.
•The introduction of the UT of J&K Reorganisation (Adaptation of Central Laws) Third Order, 2020 by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has resulted in the repeal of at least 11 land laws in vogue in J&K earlier, including the J&K Big Landed Estates Abolition Act that had resulted in famous ‘Land to tiller’ rights.
NC, PDP oppose move
•Political parties, including the National Conference (NC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) opposed the move.
•“The amendments have put J&K up for sale. With these new laws in place, tokenism of the domicile certificate has been done away with, as purchasing non-agricultural land has been made easier. These new laws are unacceptable to people of J&K”, NC vice president Omar Abdullah said.
•PDP president Mehbooba Mufti said, “Yet another step that’s part of nefarious designs to disempower and disenfranchise people of J&K. From the unconstitutional scrapping of Article 370 to facilitating loot of our natural resources and finally putting land in J&K up for sale. Such brazen measures reinforce the need of people of all three provinces of J&K to fight unitedly”.
📰 India’s outreach to Myanmar
The recent announcement of initiatives establishes India’s presence in sectors where it ought to be more pronounced
•The recent visit of Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla and Chief of the Army Staff Gen. Manoj Naravane to Myanmar reflected India’s multidimensional interests in the country and the deepening of ties between Delhi and Naypyidaw. Coming a few weeks before Myanmar’s general election, the visit underscored two lines of thinking that drive India’s Myanmar policy: engagement with key political actors and balancing neighbours. For Myanmar, the visit would be viewed as India’s support for its efforts in strengthening democratisation amidst criticisms by rights groups over the credibility of its upcoming election. The Indian delegation met State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and Myanmar’s military Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
Non-interference in internal politics
•The political logic that has shaped India’s Myanmar policy since the 1990s has been to support democratisation driven from within the country. This has allowed Delhi to engage with the military that played a key role in Myanmar’s political transition and is still an important political actor. It has also enabled Delhi to work with the party in power, whether the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party that won the 2010 polls or the pro-democracy National League for Democracy, which is in power now.
•India is cognisant of the geopolitical dimension of Myanmar’s democratisation. Myanmar’s political transition created challenges for Naypyidaw and limited its ties with the West. India and a few Asian countries have engaged Myanmar keeping in mind the need to reintegrate it with the region and world. This has been a strategic imperative for Naypyidaw as part of its policy of diversifying its foreign engagements.
•A key factor behind the military regime’s decision to open the country when it initiated reforms was, in part, to reduce dependence on China. By engaging Myanmar, Delhi provides alternative options to Naypyidaw. This driver in India’s Myanmar policy has perhaps gained greater salience in the rapidly changing regional geopolitics.
Recent initiatives
•Like in other neighbouring countries, India suffers from an image of being unable get its act together in making its presence felt on the ground. Some initiatives announced during the joint visit suggest Delhi is taking steps to leverage its political, diplomatic, and security ties with Myanmar to address some of these issues. The inauguration of the liaison office of the Embassy of India in Naypyidaw may seem a routine diplomatic activity. However, establishing a permanent presence in the capital where only a few countries have set up such offices does matter. Interestingly, China was the first country to establish a liaison office in Naypyidaw in 2017.
•India has also proposed to build a petroleum refinery in Myanmar that would involve an investment of $6 billion. This is another indication of Myanmar’s growing significance in India’s strategic calculus, particularly in energy security. It also shows India’s evolving competitive dynamic with China in the sector at a time when tensions between the two have intensified.
•Another area of cooperation that has expanded involves the border areas. The joint visit reiterated the “mutual commitment not to allow respective territories to be used for activities inimical to each other.” Both Delhi and Naypyidaw have been collaborating in the development of border areas with the understanding that it is the best guarantee to secure their borders. And this is an area where the fruits of bilateral cooperation are already evident on the ground. Furthermore, the recent announcement that India was transferring a Kilo-class submarine to Myanmar demonstrates the depth of their cooperation in the maritime domain.
•Last, for Delhi, the balancing act between Bangladesh and Myanmar remains one of the keys to its overall approach to the Rohingya issue. Delhi has reiterated its support for “ensuring safe, sustainable and speedy return of displaced persons” to Myanmar. The choices before Delhi are limited on the issue. By positioning as playing an active role in facilitating the return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, India has made it clear that it supports Myanmar’s efforts and also understands Bangladesh’s burden. For Delhi, engaging rather than criticising is the most practical approach to finding a solution.
•Delhi’s political engagement and diplomatic balancing seems to have worked so far in its ties with Myanmar. Whether it has leveraged these advantages on the ground to the full is open to debate. The aforementioned initiatives could be the beginning of change on the ground by establishing India’s presence in sectors where it ought to be more pronounced. For India, Myanmar is key in linking South Asia to Southeast Asia and the eastern periphery becomes the focal point for New Delhi’s regional outreach.
📰 India’s DisCom stress is more than the sum of its past
There must be an overhaul of the regulation of electricity firms and their deliverables using common sense metrics
•Distribution Companies (DisComs) have been called the lynchpin but also the weakest link in the electricity chain. For all of India’s global leadership for growth of renewable energy, or ambitions of smart energy, the buck stops with the DisComs, the utilities that typically buy power from generators and retail these to consumers. Long gone are the days of scarcity of power; while the physical supply situation has mostly improved, the financial picture has not brightened much — and this was before COVID-19.
More loan than stimulus
•The Indian government responded to COVID-19’s economic shock with a stimulus package of ₹20-lakh crore, out of which ₹90,000 crore was earmarked for DisComs (later upgraded to ₹1,25,000 crore). While it was called a stimulus, it is really a loan, meant to be used by DisComs to pay off generators. Our recent study on DisComs shows a much graver picture than one that can be solved by a fill-up, even though such a liquidity injection is required (but probably insufficient).
•Newspaper reports abound with stories of how DisComs owe one lakh crore rupees to generators, and without such an infusion the chain will collapse. Unfortunately, the dues to generators are several times higher than this number, and, worse, the total short-term dues of DisComs are multiple times higher, which excludes long-term debt.
Data on liabilities
•How did this magic figure of one-lakh crore capture popular imagination? This figure is roughly what the government’s PRAAPTI (or Payment Ratification And Analysis in Power procurement for bringing Transparency in Invoicing of generators) portal shows for DisCom dues to generators. However, what is not widely appreciated is that the portal is a voluntary compilation of dues, and is not comprehensive. The Power Finance Corporation (PFC)’s Report on Utility Workings for 2018-19 showed dues to generators were ₹2,27,000 crore, and this is well before COVID-19. It also showed similar Other Current Liabilities. Our analysis shows that what has happened over the years is that DisComs have delayed their payments upstream (not just to generators but others as well) — in essence, treating payables like an informal loan. But why do DisComs not pay on time? Conventional wisdom blames the utilities for inefficiency, including high losses, called Aggregate Technical and Commercial (AT&C) losses, a term that spans everything from theft to lack of collection from consumers. However, this is only an incomplete explanation.
•To understand what is going on, we have to dig into all the accounts of DisComs. Ideally, they should not incur losses as they enjoy a regulated rate of return. While AT&C losses can explain part of any gap, the first problem starts at the regulatory level where even if DisComs performed as targeted, across India, they would face a non-trivial cash flow gap, which was ₹60,000-plus crore in FY18-19 compared to their then annual cost structure of ₹7.23-lakh crore.
•Then, we have the severe challenge of payables to DisComs. These dues are of three types. First, regulators themselves have failed to fix cost-reflective tariffs thus creating Regulatory Assets, which are effectively IOUs, which are to be recovered through future tariff hikes. Second, about a seventh of DisCom cost structures is meant to be covered through explicit subsidies by State governments. Third, consumers owed DisComs over ₹1.8 lakh crore in FY 2018-19, booked as trade receivables.
States as defaulters
•State governments are the biggest defaulters, responsible for an estimated a third of trade receivables, besides not paying subsidies in full or on time. On an annual cash flow basis, the shortfall in subsidy payments appears very low — only about 1% — but cumulative unpaid subsidies, with modest carrying costs, make DisComs poorer by over ₹70,000 crore just over the last 10 years.
•This earlier equilibrium of increasing the dues as well as relying on continued subsidies (not to mention extensive cross subsidies between consumer categories) all worked as long as there was steady growth. However, such muddling along cannot suffice. To begin with, COVID-19 has completely shattered incoming cash flows to utilities. While there was a multi-month dip in demand, the revenue implications were far worse since the lockdown disproportionately impacted revenues from so-termed paying customers, commercial and industrial segments. On the flip side, reduced demand for electricity did not save as much because a large fraction of DisCom cost structures are locked in through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) that obligate capital cost payments, leaving only fuel savings with lower offtake.
•We will probably need a much larger liquidity infusion than has been announced thus far, but it also must go hand-in-hand with credible plans to pay down growing debt. Stimulus loans are near market term and not soft loans. If there is a haircut to be taken, all the risk and future obligations should not be placed on DisComs alone. Generators, transmission companies, and lending institutions must all chip in. Else, we risk kicking the can down the road until we may require another future support package if not bailout.
•Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of time to put the house in order.
Renewable energy beckons
•The rise of renewable energy means that premium customers will leave the system partly first by reducing their daytime usage. And as battery technologies mature, their dependence on DisComs may wane entirely. Even without batteries, regulations permitting, they may want to find third party suppliers under competitive models.
•So what is the solution other than simply throwing money at the problem? Improving AT&C losses is important, but will not be sufficient. We need a complete overhaul of the regulation of electricity companies and their deliverables. Much of inefficiency is tolerated in the name of the poor but they do not get quality supply. We need to apply common sense metrics of lifeline electricity supply instead of the political doleout of free electricity even for those who may not deserve such support. For the rest, regulators must allow cost-covering tariffs. The financial problems of DisComs have been brewing for many years, and it is unlikely that a silver bullet, even privatisation, can solve the problems overnight. However, if business as usual was not even good enough before COVID-19, it will not be workable for the current national needs of quality, affordable, and sustainable power.
📰 GST and the complexity of political negotiations
With the Centre’s actions in the COVID-19 phase affecting the federal architecture, the danger lies in States following suit
•Over the last couple of months, the Centre and States have not been on the same page over issues connected with the Goods and Services Tax (GST). As a result, Centre-State relations have plumbed the depths. This tussle, between the Centre and the States is, however, not uncommon and all federations witness bargaining in some form or other. A diversity of interests is the badge of federalism, and there will be constant negotiation and renegotiation. It is this tension that keeps a federation ticking.
•Called one of the most significant fiscal reforms since Independence, the GST replaced numerous central and State taxes with a one single destination-based tax. The Constitutional Amendment overhauled Centre-State relations, with States giving up almost all their powers to tax. In exchange for this bargain, the Centre assured them full compensation, for five years, for all losses arising due to the transition to the GST. A GST Council, made up of the Central and State Finance Ministers, was established and empowered to make recommendations about various issues related to the GST.
Under strain
•This grand federal bargain was severely tested this year following the general economic slowdown and the COVID-19 pandemic induced disruption. Tax collections plummeted which in turn have led to a massive revenue shortfall. In turn, this has also reduced the available resources in the compensation fund. With the GST in place, the Centre held the whip hand and with limited abilities to raise revenues. The States in turn were left staring at a bad deal. The crisis and the unequal relationship created an incentive for the Centre to blur the lines. The Centre it appeared was no longer committed to the agreement and wanted to overturn parts of the deal that were “unfavourable” to it, creating an immense strain on the fragile consensus.
The GST Council strategy
•The Centre was averse to providing succour, and when it did, it came with strings attached. For instance, in May 2020, it linked the increase in the fiscal deficit of States from 2% to 3% to reforms in four areas including universalisation of a ‘One Nation-One Ration Card’, electricity distribution, ease of doing business, and urban local body revenues. Similarly, on compensation, the initial noises were that it was not obligated to make good the compensation losses. Most States preferred that the Centre should borrow the entire shortfall and then lend it to States, while the Centre wanted the States to borrow the money directly. The GST Council meetings during this period did not help reduce the trust deficit and break the deadlock but only added fuel to the fire. States had no clue of what the Centre was thinking as there were no statements of intent at the Council meetings. For example, the Finance Minister of Kerala complained that decisions were not being made in the Council but announced subsequently in press meetings.
•The disinclination to use the Council was deliberate and intended to prevent “unionised bargaining” by the States. At the same time, by working outside the Council, the Centre was able to exploit asymmetries and divisions between States. In August 2020, States were offered two options to borrow money to meet the shortfall. When a sufficient number of States accepted one of them, the Centre argued that this was the favoured solution. The States, especially those ruled by the Opposition parties, were reluctant to accept this offer and stuck to their preferred position until the Centre finally relented in October. The friction not only shook the foundations of the GST, with at least one State threatening to go to court over the issue, but also exposed the hollowness of the Centre’s hype around cooperative federalism.
•The puzzle is why the States agreed to move authority in determining Budget spending (Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act earlier) and setting tax rates (value-added tax, or VAT, first and GST now) and in the process shrink their discretionary space to manage their financial affairs. The shift is counter-intuitive, especially since we expect States to protect their autonomy vigorously, and in fact attempt to enlarge their scope. Economic and fiscal federalism scholarship offers us reasonably sound economic and normative reasons for this shift, which include efficiency, equity, stabilisation, economic growth, and balanced development, among others. However, this logic does not make political sense and does not help understand the current new low in the relations between the Centre and States.
Political linkages matter
•I argue that the nature of the party system and party linkages matters in Centre-State relations. In the period of Congress dominance, States had few issues when economic management was centralised in the name of development. Their concerns and grievances, if any, were taken up through intra-party channels. The Congress-ruled States went along with the central government given that the locus of power in the party was not at the State level but the Centre. Dissent against centralisation appeared only when non-Congress parties consolidated their position.
•The period towards the end of the one-party dominance was especially fractious, and government-Opposition relations increasingly coloured Centre-State relations. To check its competitors, the Congress used (and misused) every available means, including, the use of Article 356, the institution of the Governor and discretionary central grants among others to continue its dominance.
•In sharp contrast to the one-party dominant phase, the coalition era inaugurated a seemingly more cordial period of Centre-State relations based on a recognition of mutual interests. In federal coalitions, States and their interests were made to feel that they were being represented. Ironically, it was during this period, when State-based parties called the shots that much of the authority migration began.
•Former Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha in his memoirs underlines how the Centre chose to remain out of the limelight, and an empowered group of State Finance Ministers helped bring about VAT, the precursor to GST. The GST reforms also followed the same pattern.
•This decision-making process gave States both the confidence and ownership of reforms and the new institutions being put in place. State-based parties probably assumed that they would continue to influence national-level decision-making through the new institutions or through coalitions. It follows that authority migration towards the Centre might not make a difference to States/parties if their interests appear to be taken care of by the Centre/party. Party linkages between levels give State-level politicians greater space. In a polity-wide disciplined party, acceding to the central government’s demands may secure the career prospects of State-level leaders. Similarly, for State-based parties, there is access to resources and the possibility of influencing national-level decisions through federal coalitions.
•The greater the degree of party centralisation, the higher the possibility of federal centralisation. This explains why the Congress-ruled States did not make a noise during the one-party dominant phase, and the Bharatiya Janata Party-ruled States do not do so today. Party linkages between different levels of government are crucial to both the making and the maintenance of federal compacts.
Uphold the player rules
•The GST agreement also illustrates the complexity of political negotiations. The bargain quite naturally could not have foreseen 2020. More importantly, the nature of the relationship between the actors involved has changed. From a period in which State-based parties had heft, we now have a one-party formation calling the shots. All institutional arrangements we know have winners and losers; while the winners attempt to maintain status quo, the losers will attempt to overhaul the existing state of affairs. While the States are negotiating within the agreed framework, the Centre’s actions undermine the federal architecture. If this happens consistently over time, there is nothing to stop the States also from doing so.
