📰 Interpreting the India-China conversations
There is a divergence in views on both sides; India needs a plan to check Beijing’s strategic objectives and ambitions
•The ground situation in Eastern Ladakh shows little change; other than that, towards the end of August, India effectively thwarted an attempt by China to alter the status quo and take control of areas on the South Bank of the Pangong Tso. China’s reaction was sharp, accusing the Indian Army of having “undermined the consensus reached” at the diplomatic and military talks. Several thousand troops of the People’s Liberation Army, in the meantime, remain mobilised across the entire region.
Blunt exchanges
•In the first statement made in Parliament (on September 15) on the situation on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh lambasted China, stating that China was attempting to unilaterally alter the status quo , and that while India wanted to peacefully resolve the ongoing military confrontation, it was fully prepared to deal with any situation. China immediately rebutted the charge, blaming India for “violating” existing border agreements, and alleging that India bore responsibility for the recent situation. China observed that the most important task for India is to disengage on the ground as soon as possible, and take concrete action to ease the situation.
•Earlier, on the sidelines of the Russia, India, China Trilateral meeting (RIC) in Moscow in early September, the Indian and Chinese Defence and Foreign Ministers had met to try and sort out matters. Mr. Rajnath Singh met his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Wei Fenghe on September 4, while the Indian and Chinese Foreign Ministers (S. Jaishankar-Wang Yi) held a meeting on September 10. Given the precarious military situation in Eastern Ladakh, both meetings had been invested with considerable significance.
•According to reports, Mr. Rajnath Singh, in his meeting, did not mince matters, putting the blame entirely on the PLA for its “aggressive actions and behaviour” in seeking to “unilaterally alter the status quo” in violation of all bilateral agreements. According to Xinhua, Gen. Wei is believed to have said “China’s territory cannot be lost and the Chinese military is fully determined, capable and confident to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity”. The blunt exchanges between the Defence Ministers did little to assuage ongoing concerns.
•There was considerably great anticipation about a possible breakthrough during the September 10 meeting. On the eve of the talks, India’s External Affairs Minister had even been quoted as saying that the situation called for “deep conversation between the two sides at the political level”, and India and China “needed to find an accommodation”.
More illusion
•What emerged from the talks, however, fell well short of expectations. Some preferred to see in the outcome an illusion of forward movement where none existed. The ‘Five Point Consensus’ limited itself to urging the two sides to take guidance from “the consensus of their leaders on developing India-China relations, including not allowing differences to become disputes”. The remaining points were confined to urging both sides to abide by all existing agreements and protocols on China-India boundary affairs and maintain peace and tranquillity; avoid any action that could escalate matters; reiterated the importance of the Special Representative Mechanism to maintain communications; and calling for the continuance of meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC). Work to conclude new Confidence-Building Measures to maintain and enhance border peace and tranquillity were shelved, to be considered after the situation eases. Neither the Joint Statement, (nor the respective notes issued subsequently) specifically or obliquely mentioned a return to “the status quo” or to positions prior to the stand-off.
•Confirmation of the wide divergence in views existing between the two sides were to be found in the contents of the separate notes circulated by the two sides following the meeting. China, for instance, claimed that the Indian side “does not consider relations to be dependent on the settlement of the boundary question”. This, according to the Indian side, was very different from what the Indian External Affairs Minister had said at the meeting. The Chinese side was again dismissive of the tensions prevailing in India, claiming that the “Indian side believes that China’s policy towards India has not changed”. It, thereafter, goes on to pontificate that what China and India need now is cooperation not confrontation, mutual trust and not suspicion. It is evident that for China, despite all that had happened, and the ongoing tensions, it was “business as usual”, ignoring the huge trust deficit that existed between the two countries.
Strategic thought
•It is tempting to view the Jaishankar-Wang Yi interaction, as reflecting implicitly the contrasting strategic thought processes that are to be found in Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. The two Foreign Ministers seem — separately and in their own way — to reflect the influence exerted on their thinking by these two texts; on how to deal with paradoxes and on the prosecution of seemingly contradictory approaches to ensure success. While restraint and moderation, as well as a balanced attitude to the use of force, are recurring themes in both texts, there are clear divergences when it comes to methodologies to be employed. For Sun Tzu, strategic positioning is critical to obtain a strategic advantage. All warfare, according to Sun Tzu is based on deception, and deceiving the opponent. While Kautilya emphasises the significance of both power and morality, Sun Tzu seeks to subdue the enemy without fighting and resorting to attacking the enemy’s strategy as the best option. For generations, China’s leaders have imbibed and adhered to Sun Tzu’s maxims, and Wang Yi seemed to have employed this tactic.
•In the extant circumstances, the dilemma that India’s External Affairs Minister probably faced was how best to achieve a modus vivendi , without compromising India’s position and foreclosing all options with China, short of war. Unlike his opposite number, Mr. Jaishankar was possibly a prisoner of a separate set of beliefs, for in his own words, the challenge India faced is to “manage a more powerful neighbour while ensuring its own rise”. To him, the bottom line for the relationship seemed clear: peace and tranquillity must prevail on the border, if progress made in the last three decades was not to be jeopardised. One could well ponder over the fact whether this dictated his approach during the two-hour-long discussion with his Chinese counterpart, in which the most conspicuous omission was the lack of any mention of restoration of the status quo as of April, as the starting point for any new round of diplomatic negotiations.
Dealing with China
•Understanding Chinese motives are difficult at any time. At present under Chinese President Xi Jinping, it has become still more convoluted. Driven by his notion of the “Community with a shared future for Mankind” Mr. Xi’s, and Chinese intent today, is to achieve great power status, and still more to ensure acknowledgement of its status by other countries. Unstated, but obvious, is that countries such as India should accommodate China’s rise, and not cavil at this or pose a challenge to it.
•Increasing resort to confrontational politics, in substance as well as in style, aggravates this situation further. Combined with constant references to superior capabilities, it creates a psychological impact on China’s thinking, viz. , an exaggerated respect for their own strengths — including military — and a willingness to go to any extent to ensure its self-respect. Defusing tensions demands patient diplomacy, but it is not a character trait that Mr. Xi demonstrates. Even less, he shows a willingness to moderate ambition or take a step backward.
New Delhi must reach out
•India needs a carefully drawn-up plan as also an effective strategy to deny Beijing its immediate objectives, including its determination to establish regional dominance. In this context, India must reach out to its neighbours, and even countries beyond, warning them about falling into the trap of allowing alluring prospects of both economic cooperation and military support for the maintenance of peace, to cloud their thinking. It might well be the case that the current regime in China may be manufacturing crises to play to a domestic audience, in part due to economic compulsions, but India must be on its guard. For this purpose, India must be prepared militarily and otherwise to keep a check on China’s burgeoning ambitions. It also needs to take care to see that China does not exploit the present pandemic to deepen its influence in India’s neighbourhood, as is patently evident from reports of China’s plans to provide access to China’s coronavirus vaccine to several countries of Asia and Africa.
The evolving global order makes it difficult for them to pursue fully convergent policies; a long-term view is essential
•As India-China tensions along the Line of Actual Control continue to escalate, India decided to pull out of Russia’s Kavkaz 2020 (or the Caucasus-2020) military exercises (September 15-26), where it was scheduled to participate alongside other Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) member states. While COVID-19 was cited as the official reason, it was the situation on the border with China that most likely prompted this decision.
LAC issue and Moscow’s role
•New Delhi’s decision has led to questions about the possible impact of deteriorating India-China relations on the India-Russia partnership. Earlier in June, the Russia-India-China Foreign Ministers meeting, convened at Moscow’s initiative and coming days after violent border clashes that led to the death of 20 Indian soldiers, ended without an official communiqué. It is hardly surprising that ongoing conflict between two prominent members, and both close partners of Russia, has given rise to concerns about its impact on India-Russia ties.
•But this is only one side of a complicated story. Moscow has been playing a quiet diplomatic role during the recent border clashes without actively taking sides. India’s Russia engagement has remained steady and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh visited Russia in June for the 75th Victory Day parade. He was in Moscow again on September 4 to attend the SCO Defence Ministers’ Meeting, which also formed the setting for the bilateral meeting with his Chinese counterpart. These visits saw detailed discussions around furthering the India-Russia defence relationship alongside the promise to accelerate certain supplies based on New Delhi’s requirements.
•The September visit coincided with the biannual Indo-Russian naval exercises, INDRA, in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, in the strategically crucial waters of the Indian Ocean. India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar attended the online BRICS foreign ministers meeting on September 4 and also travelled to Moscow for the SCO Foreign Ministers meeting (September 9-10). In fact, in November, India will host the SCO Heads of Government Meeting.
Forums are crucial
•The multilateral forums are important as they foster continued India-Russia cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels. While increasingly divergent foreign policies of its members pose challenges of agenda-setting and overall scope, it also underscores that at this moment of flux, countries such as India and Russia are keeping all their options open. India was to have hosted the Quad foreign ministers meeting, but the venue is likely to be now shifted to Tokyo. So alongside this, if this flurry of activity looks contradictory, it should not be surprising given the changes under way in the global order.
•Mr. Jaishankar has noted that we live in a ‘curious world’ where one cannot view engagement with different parties as a ‘zero-sum game’. As a result, worsening India-China ties or a burgeoning China-Russia relationship does not automatically mean a breakdown of the India-Russia strategic partnership. In fact, India and Russia have spent the past few years strengthening their partnership, particularly since the 2018 Sochi informal summit. From substantive defence engagement to regional questions in Central Asia, Afghanistan and West Asia, a conversation with Moscow remains an important element of Indian foreign policy.
•India and Russia are pragmatic players looking at maximising their strategic manoeuvrability, which understandably has led them to align with different powers based on their respective geopolitical positioning. Both recognise the value of having a diversified portfolio of ties. This is not to deny that external events will have no impact on the partnership. But in order to understand this, one cannot see the India-China clashes in isolation.
China-Russia ties
•In fact, a more aggressive China is a result of its rise that has led to a change in the existing balance of power. It is this systemic change that is likely to produce a long-term shift in India’s posture, prompting it to take tougher, decisive positions. It is the combination of a changing regional order, closer Russia-China ties and India’s alignment with the United States and other like-minded countries to manage Beijing’s rise that has the potential to create hurdles for India-Russia cooperation in the Asia.
•While India would like to secure Russian support in this changing Asian regional order, the latter has seen China become its key partner as relations with the West have hit a new post-Cold war low since 2014. This has led to a qualitative improvement in its ties with Beijing as the superpower looks to partner with a strong external player that can balance the West. The U.S. policy towards Russia has further pushed the latter towards China, strengthening the rising power, to the detriment of both Indian and western interests. While Russia has acknowledged that the Indian and Association of Southeast Asian Nations concepts of the Indo-Pacific do not include the aim of containment of another power, it has been critical of the American conception of the region that in its strategy classifies China as a revisionist power.
•India on its part has sought to include Russia in its vision of the Indo-Pacific that does not see the region as ‘a strategy or as a club of limited members’. In fact, Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his 2019 visit to Vladivostok contextualised the cooperation in the Russian Far East as ‘a confluence of the Eurasian Union on one side and the open, free and inclusive Indo-Pacific on the other’ in an effort to bridge the strategic visions of the two countries. As part of the same effort, reports indicate that a proposal for a India-Russia-Japan trilateral is being explored.
•A world split into two blocs would be detrimental to the interests of both New Delhi and Moscow — squeezing the space available for hedging — and that makes it imperative that seeming contradictions in their respective policies are managed pragmatically while taking a long-term view of the strategic partnership. Although the evolving global order makes it difficult for India and Russia to pursue fully convergent policies, it does not preclude the bilateral relationship from retaining its relevance. The strategic space both provide to each other is critical and only underscores the need to insulate their bilateral relationship from the vagaries of the international system.
📰 Dilution without adequate deliberation
It is important that there is wider scrutiny and public discussion on the labour bills
•On September 19, the government withdrew three Bills related to labour laws and replaced them with new ones. These Bills make significant changes to regulation of labour and the employer-employee relationship in several ways. India has a complex regime of labour laws, and several committees have recommended simplifying and rationalising them. Last year, the government introduced four labour codes as Bills to replace 29 existing laws. These Codes dealt with regulation of wages, occupational safety and health, social security, and industrial relations. The Code on Wages was passed by Parliament last year. Over the last few months, the Standing Committee on Labour presented its reports on the other three Bills. It is these three Bills that the government has replaced and introduced in the Lok Sabha.
Major changes
•There are several aspects of these Bills that differ significantly from the earlier Bills. Let us call the new Bills as the 2020 Bills to distinguish them from the 2019 Bills that were examined by the Standing Committee and subsequently withdrawn.
•First, the 2020 Bills raise several thresholds. The Factories Act of 1948 defines any manufacturing unit as a factory if it employs 10 workers (and uses electricity) or 20 workers (without using electric power). These thresholds are being raised to 20 and 40 workers, respectively. The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 requires any establishment employing over 100 workers to seek government permission before any retrenchment; the threshold has been raised to 300, with the government empowered to raise it further through notification. These changes have been debated for over two decades but were not proposed in the 2019 Bill. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946 requires employers to formally define conditions of employment under them if they have at least 100 workers. The 2020 Bill has increased this threshold to 300 workers.
•Second, they provide the government with the power to exempt establishments from any or all of their provisions. The Code on Industrial Relations governs working conditions, trade unions, retrenchment and layoffs, dispute resolution, and establishes industrial tribunals. The government may, in public interest, exempt any new industrial establishment from the provisions of this Code. The Code on Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions specifies leave and maximum work hours, requires health and safety norms including adequate lighting and ventilation and welfare measures. It subsumes 13 Acts including the Factories Act. The 2020 Bill allows the State government to exempt any new factory from its provisions in the interest of increased economic activity and employment generation. Given that every new factory would lead to incremental employment, this gives wide discretion to the State government to exempt new factories from basic safety and welfare norms. Note that the Factories Act permitted such exemption for a limited period of three months only during a “public emergency”.
•Third, there are some changes related to contract labour. The 2019 Bill was applicable to establishments which employed at least 20 contract workers and to contractors supplying at least 20 workers; these thresholds have been raised to 50 workers. The 2020 Code prohibits the employment of contract workers in any core activity, and specifically permits employment in a specified list of non-core activities including canteen, security and sanitation services.
•Fourth, the 2019 Bill on Occupational Safety allowed the government to prohibit employment of women in undertaking operations that could be dangerous to their health and safety. The 2020 Bill removes this power to prohibit employment and instead allows the government to require employers to provide adequate safeguards.
A shift in approach
•All the three Bills (both the 2019 and 2020 versions) also show a major shift in approach from the earlier laws. Many essential features of the law are no longer specified in the Codes but have been delegated to be prescribed by the government through Rules. Examples of delegated items include setting the thresholds for application of various social security schemes, specifying safety standards and working conditions, and the power to increase the threshold for establishments that have to seek permission before retrenchment. An important question is whether such features should be hard-coded in the Acts.
•Another important issue for consideration is whether there should be relaxations for small enterprises to reduce their compliance burden. One may argue that some matters such as safety standards should apply to everyone while others that provide job security could be based on the size of the firm. The Occupational Safety Bill (which prescribes safety standards and maximum work hours) exempts small establishments from its purview while the Industrial Relations Bill applies to all.
•These three new Bills were introduced on Saturday, and the Business Advisory Committee of the Lok Sabha has allocated three hours for them to be discussed and passed this week. Together, these Bills have 411 clauses and 13 schedules, and come to 350 pages. The provisions of the Bill affect every person working in India and every employer, and address complex issues. It is difficult to believe that Members of Parliament, who are attending Parliament every day including weekends, have had the time to read and understand the implications of the various provisions of the Bill. As discussed above, the Bills also have several key changes from the 2019 Bills that were examined by the Standing Committee. Therefore, it is important that there is wider scrutiny and public discussion on these Bills. They should be referred to the Standing Committee. After all, a complete revamp of labour laws should be done only after due deliberation.
📰 India and the Abraham Accords
Israeli foray into the Gulf could disrupt thepolitico-economic architecture India has built with the GCC
•The White House ceremony on September 15 marking the formal normalisation of Israel’s ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Bahrain has created a significant inflection point in regional history and geopolitics. Indeed, it helped ring in the Jewish new year (Rosh Hashanah 5781) last weekend with some extra cheers!
Two new friendships
•The two Gulf states have, thus, joined Egypt and Jordan which had their peace treaties with Israel in 1979 and 1994, respectively. Still, several nuances make the September 15 reconciliation different. For one, the UAE and Bahrain do not have any territorial dispute with Israel, nor have they ever been at war with it. Although formally committed to an Arab consensus over a two-state resolution of the Palestine cause, these two countries have steadily, albeit furtively, moved towards having substantive links with Israel in recent years. Hence, the ‘Abraham Accords’ entered with the UAE and Bahrain are ‘peace-for-peace’ deals without any physical quid pro quo by Israel. Multiple drivers are likely to spur the two new friendships to grow faster and deeper than the ‘cold peace’ Israel has had with its two Arab neighbours. Externally, Israel, the UAE and Bahrain share the common threat perception of Iran against the backdrop of the ongoing diminution of Pax Americana in the region. Internally, while all three have their respective hotheads opposing this reconciliation, these seem manageable. They are relatively more modern societies which share the overarching and immediate priority of post-pandemic economic resuscitation. They have lost no time to set up logistics such as Internet connectivity and direct flights to pave the way for more active economic engagement. If these sinews evolve, other moderate Arab countries are likely to join the Israel fan club.
•Israel’s detente with Egypt and Jordan did not have any major impact on India as our ties with them were relatively insignificant. However, now India has stronger, multifaceted and growing socioeconomic engagements with Israel and the Gulf countries. With over eight million Indian diaspora in the Gulf remitting annually nearly $50 billion, annual merchandise trade of over $150 billion, sourcing of nearly two-thirds of India’s hydrocarbon imports, major investments, etc., it is natural to ask how the new regional dynamic would affect India.
Implications for India
•Geopolitically, India has welcomed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel, calling both its strategic partners. In general, the Israel-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) breakthrough widens the moderate constituency for peaceful resolution of the Palestine dispute, easing India’s diplomatic balancing act. However, nothing in West Asia is monochromatic: The Israel-GCC ties may provoke new polarisations between the Jihadi fringe and the mainstream. The possibility of the southern Gulf becoming the new arena of the proxy war between Iran and Israel cannot be ruled out, particularly in Shia pockets. India would have to be on its guard to monitor and even pre-empt any threat to its interests in the Gulf.
•Even more important for India is to manage the economic fallout of the Israel-GCC synergy. With defence and security cooperation as a strong impetus, both sides are ready to realise the full potential of their economic complementarity. The UAE and Bahrain can become the entrepôts to Israeli exports of goods and services to diverse geographies. Israel has niche strengths in defence, security and surveillance equipment, arid farming, solar power, horticultural products, high-tech, gem and jewellery, and pharmaceuticals. Tourism, real estate and financial service sectors on both sides have suffered due to the pandemic and hope for a positive spin-off from the peer-to-peer interactions. Further, Israel has the potential to supply skilled and semi-skilled manpower to the GCC states, particularly from the Sephardim and Mizrahim ethnicities, many of whom speak Arabic. Even the Israeli Arabs may find career opportunities to bridge the cultural divide. Israel is known as the start-up nation and its stakeholders could easily fit in the various duty-free incubators in the UAE.
•Israeli foray into the Gulf has the potential to disrupt the existing politico-economic architecture India has carefully built with the GCC states. India has acquired a large and rewarding regional footprint, particularly as the preferred source of manpower, food products, pharmaceuticals, gem and jewellery, light engineering items, etc. Indians are also the biggest stakeholders in Dubai’s real estate, tourism and Free Economic Zones. In the evolving scenario, there may be scope for a profitable trilateral synergy, but India cannot take its preponderance as a given. It needs to keep its powder as dry as the shifting sands of the Empty Quarter.
