📰 Reject this inequitable climate proposal
The UN Secretary General’s recent advice to India amounts to asking for its virtual de-industrialisation and stagnation
•The UN Secretary General António Guterres’s call for India to give up coal immediately and reduce emissions by 45% by 2030 is a call to de-industrialise the country and abandon the population to a permanent low-development trap.
Piling on the pressure
•In an extraordinary move in climate diplomacy, Mr. Guterres, delivering the Darbari Seth Memorial Lecture on August 28, at the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), in New Delhi, called on India to make no new investment in coal after 2020. Superficially framed as an even-handed appeal to all G20 nations, it was in reality a deliberate setting aside of the foundational principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that distinguish sharply between the responsibilities and commitments of developed countries vis-à-vis those of developing countries.
•Delivered on Indian soil, at a premier climate institution in the country, and in the presence of India’s External Affairs Minister, the speech was an unmistakable ratcheting up of pressure on India in the climate arena. Subsequently, at a press conference at the UN Headquarters on September 9 while releasing the latest climate report of the World Meteorological Organization, he has upped the ante even further by asking China and India too to reduce their emissions by 45% by 2030, on a par with the developed countries. To add insult to injury, the advice was delivered after it was evident that India, with the lowest per capita income among the G-20, is undergoing the worst economic contraction among them currently, whose long-term impact is still very unclear.
•What is the state of India’s climate action today? The UN Secretary General is quite aware that India, by any yardstick of reckoning, is punching at least on a par, if not above, its weight in responsibility and economic capacity in climate action.
India’s track record
•Its renewable energy programme is ambitious while its energy efficiency programme is delivering, especially in the domestic consumption sector. India is one of the few countries with at least 2° Celsius warming compliant climate action, and one of a much smaller list of those currently on track to fulfilling their Paris Agreement commitments.
•Despite the accelerated economic growth of recent decades India’s annual emissions, at 0.5 tonnes per capita, are well below the global average of 1.3 tonnes, and also those of China, the United States and the European Union (EU), the three leading emitters in absolute terms, whose per capita emissions are higher than this average. In terms of cumulative emissions (which is what really counts in determining the extent of temperature increase), India’s contribution by 2017 was only 4% for a population of 1.3 billion, whereas the European Union, with a population of only 448 million, was responsible for 20%.
•What then lies behind the UN chief’s call to India to set aside coal right away? The UNFCCC itself has reported that between 1990 and 2017, the developed nations (excluding Russia and east Europe) have reduced their annual emissions by only 1.3%. This amounts to practically nil, given the inevitable errors in such accounting. While talking about their phasing out of coal, which is often a decade or more into the future, the global North has obscured the reality of its continued dependence on oil and natural gas, both equally fossil fuels, with no timeline for their phaseout. While it is amply clear that their commitments into the future set the world on a path for almost 3°C warming, they have diverted attention by fuzzy talk of “carbon neutrality” by 2050, and the passage of resolutions declaring a climate emergency that amount to little more than moral posturing.
A First World strategy
•Alongside, large sections of First World environmentalist opinion, while unable to summon up the domestic political support required for climate action, have turned to pressure the developing countries to bear the brunt of climate mitigation. Their strategies include the demonising of coal mining and coal-based power generation, promoting claims that immediate climate mitigation would miraculously lower domestic inequalities and ensure climate adaptation, promoting Third World natural resources as active sites of mitigation and not adaptation, and promoting theories of “de-growth” or the neglect of industrial and agricultural productivity for the pursuit of climate change mitigation.
•All of these are accompanied by increasing appeals to multilateral or First World financial and development institutions to force this agenda on to developing countries. A section of concerned youth in the developing countries, fearful of their futures, but unsensitised to global and international inequalities, have also helped promote the undifferentiated rhetoric of a climate emergency for which all are held equally responsible.
•The current incumbent of the post of UN Secretary General has embraced this strategy almost fully. Tellingly, he has rarely, if indeed ever, called out the U.S. for its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, or called out the EU nations for their long-term reliance on gas and oil while hiding behind their overwhelming rhetorical focus on coal. He has been promoting the agenda of carbon neutrality by 2050 as national level goals applicable to all, without any reference to global and international equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in climate action. With this wilful neglect of the core principles of the climate convention, and extreme demands that the developing world cannot satisfy, the UN Secretary General risks unravelling even the Paris Accord, unsatisfactory as it is.
Ending coal investment
•What will be the consequences if India indeed ceases all coal investment from this very year? Currently, roughly 2 GW of coal-based generation is being decommissioned per year, which implies that by 2030, India will have only 184 GW of coal-based generation. But meeting the 2030 electricity consumption target of 1,580 to 1,660 units per person per year, based on the continuation or a slight increase of the current decadal growth rate, will require anywhere between 650 GW to 750 GW of renewable energy. Unlike the developed nations, India cannot substitute coal substantially by oil and gas and despite some wind potential, a huge part of this growth needs to come from solar. None of this will really drive industry, particularly manufacturing, since renewables at best can meet residential consumption and some part of the demand from the service sector. Currently, manufacturing growth powered by fossil fuel-based energy is itself a necessity, both technological and economic, for the transition to renewables.
•Whether providing 70% to 80% of all generation capacity is possible through renewables depends critically on technology development, including improvements in the efficiency of conversion of energy from its source into electricity, in the management of the corresponding electricity grids, as well as advance in storage technologies. But since the Copenhagen Accord signalled the end of legally binding commitments to emissions reduction by the developed countries, technology development in climate change mitigation technologies has registered a significant fall. Annual filing of patents shows a marked decline, ranging between 30% to 50% or more from 2009-10 to 2017, across all subsectors and across all developed countries, without exception. The exception is China which has a rising trend in select areas. Regrettably, India’s presence in such patenting hovers between minimal to near-vanishing, a persistent trend over decades that is very difficult to reverse any time soon.
•Lacking production capacity in renewable energy technologies and their large-scale operation, deployment on this scale will expose India to increasing and severe dependence on external sources and supply chains. It is also a truism that renewables alongside coal will generate, directly and indirectly, far more employment than renewables alone. Apart from the impossibility of India implementing a 45% reduction in emissions by 2030, the advice by the UN Secretary General, taken all together, amounts to asking for the virtual de-industrialisation of India, and stagnation in a low-development trap for the vast majority of its population.
•India must unanimously reject the UN Secretary General’s call and reiterate its long-standing commitment to an equitable response to the challenge of global warming.
On free speech, there must be a forum to moderate dialogue between the players — lawyers, journalists and the public
•The fires created and stoked by Justice Arun Mishra using the power of contempt to convict Prashant Bhushan for free speech still rage. While so, here comes another contempt action, by a Madras High Court Judge. The Tamil actor, Suriya, who supports public causes, had issued a statement highlighting what he felt was differential treatment, viz . that when due to fear of the novel coronavirus, the court is delivering justice through video conferencing, it is asking students to go and write the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (for admission to medical courses) without fear. The judge, Justice S.M. Subramaniam, in a letter, has requested the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court to initiate proceedings for contempt.
Possible solutions
•The judge is well-esteemed, and was in the news recently for a generous donation to support young lawyers in these difficult times. So for court watchers, this was a bit of a surprise. One other matter for surprise was that this letter was given by an undisclosed source to the media; this is hardly proper, it is a letter of importance addressed to the head of the judiciary in the State, and if the confidential nature had been maintained, the Chief Justice could have dealt with it in a variety of ways — discussed it quietly with the judge, perhaps bring about a softening of view, involving other senior members of the Court for a considered decision, etc. A simple solution would have been for the court’s Registry to issue a statement explaining how the factual position is obviously different, and that while online court hearings are a viable alternative, none such exists for NEET. Now, the harsh glare of publicity, with strong voices weighing in advocating actions of extreme ends (throw the letter out/throw the actor in) only makes things more difficult for the Chief Justice.
•Freedom of speech is not just Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution; it is an article of faith for courts and judges, because they, above all, know that it is essential for the functioning and survival of a democracy, and for making government accountable to the people. The courts are constitutionally cast as Defenders and Protectors of the public right to free speech and expression. It is a tragic inversion to see judges being cast as the ones who want to limit and abridge it. This is not for the well-being of the institution and those who man it and depend on it, and that means a great many of us.
Avoiding controversy
•Judges know that much depends on the factual setting of the case. Now, if only some quiet deliberation had taken place, could not the senior judges have considered if it was rational, wise and prudent to pitch their tent opposing a sea of anxious parents who are quite justifiably petrified about the prospect of their child catching this dreaded infection? God forbid, if such were to happen, we know it is human nature to look elsewhere to blame, and the courts closeted in closed rooms hearings are easy objects to blame. To go in for contempt on this issue will invite and exacerbate this. And the actor seems to have a favourable public image, especially among the youth. Why do we want to go looking for trouble, could have been the question very easily asked; not so easy to answer, and that would have ended the matter.
•Somewhere here one also gets the feeling that the place of criticism and critiquing in a democracy is not being properly understood. As George Orwell said, freedom is the right to tell people what they do not want to hear. And the response of authority to criticism should echo the words popularly attributed to Voltaire — I disagree with everything you say, but I shall defend to the death your right to say it. Judges are holders of high public office and are not immune from being criticised. They must bear it and carry on, safe in the knowledge that their rightful actions and their garnered reputations are their ultimate shield, and that ill-mannered and ill-meant speech will be recognised for what it is and shunned by people. We want our judges to have broad shoulders with the ability to shrug off such comments, and focus on the matters that matter.
A platform and guidelines
•There are multiple voices in the current narrative on this subject; lawyers objecting to their criticism of judges’ acts of commission and omission being proscribed, journalists’ fear of chilling effect on free speech, and public bewilderment at what is going on. But there is another set of voices we need to pay close attention to — and these are of judges who have passed strong judgments in seminal cases in favour of free speech and expression, who now can be heard saying that some things have gone too far. And so there is need for introspection, communication and understanding on all sides.
•We also need a forum for moderating dialogue between leaders of these three communities, where concerns and apprehensions can be discussed between them, all of whom want the best for the country and its institutions and people. What could then emerge is a clear set of guidelines, of what is acceptable and what is not. And one can then be sure that the latter category are acts so undefendable that no supporter of free speech will support them, for rights are indeed subject to restrictions; the latter must be reasonable and minimal, but must be obeyed for the former to have full play.
📰 Is the Quad rising after China’s challenge at the LAC?
The Quadrilateral will be useful, but it will not be the answer to the challenge India is facing
•As India faces China’s challenge over the ground situation at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), is a maritime coalition in the Indo-Pacific, the Quadrilateral, comprising India, the U.S., Japan and Australia, an effective counter? Ashok Kantha and Tanvi Madan discuss this question in a conversation moderated by Suhasini Haidar . Edited excerpts:
In the past week in Parliament, the Defence Minister has said that we have not seen transgressions across the LAC with China, but that Chinese troops have been amassed along it. There is hope that the five-point agreement in Moscow last week will bring some peace along the LAC. How do you see the situation?
•Ashok Kantha:As the Defence Minister pointed out, we are in the middle of an unprecedented situation. We have had stand-offs along the India-China border in the past, but what’s happening this time is really different. For one, as the Defence Minister noted, the level of troops amassed by China is of a very high order. And we have also undertaken some deployment to match that. The onus has been placed on the border commanders to move towards early disengagement, de-escalation of troops. As you know, that process has not made any headway since the middle of July. There is a glimmer of hope from the Foreign Ministers’ agreement in Moscow. I think there is need for very active involvement and engagement at diplomatic levels, apart from meetings with the border commanders of India and China.
•Tanvi Madan:It is clear from what the Defence Minister has said that the Chinese have violated previous agreements on the LAC. So, there’s a lack of trust, and even the Indian Ambassador to China pointed out that there’s been considerable damage to trust between New Delhi and Beijing. So, how do you trust that the new agreement [in Moscow] is going to work? I think there are some parallels with the 1962 war. But there are also limits to those parallels: both China and India are much stronger countries than they were then, and they have dialogue mechanisms, consistent dialogue even today, despite the kind of violations we have seen.
Given the challenge, do you think that the U.S.-India-Japan-Australia Quadrilateral is an effective counter to China’s aggression at the LAC?
•TM:I think it depends on what you’re trying to counter. I think you could call the Quadrilateral a coalition of the willing to try to deter China in the future, to set the rules of the road in the Indo-Pacific, and to ensure that they are maintained, but it’s not an exclusive arrangement. Did India’s presence in the Quad deter China or the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] from transgressing the boundary? The answer is ‘no’. But that is also not what one should expect from something like this, which is frankly not an alliance.
•I think the Quad is useful in terms of what it can do. What can these countries do to enhance Indian capabilities? And what can the Quad do to shape the future balance of power, even the present balance of power, and try to restore deterrence in Asia, in the Indo-Pacific?
•AK:We need to look at the Quad in depth, as part of a much larger jigsaw puzzle that we are faced with today. We have to recognise and acknowledge that our relations with China have entered new territory. The basic paradigm governing this relationship over the last three decades has broken down. Now, as we try and deal with an increasingly aggressive and assertive China, which is rising in a situation where the capability gap between India and China is growing, I think the Quad will be useful, but it will not be the answer to the challenge we are facing. When it comes to our continental challenge vis-a-vis China, the Quad will be of fairly limited use to us. Yes, to some extent, we may get support from partner countries bilaterally in matters like intelligence inputs or credible supplies of military hardware, but we are largely on our own when it comes to dealing with the Chinese challenge along the land border. When it comes to the maritime domain, clearly there can be much greater collaboration with like-minded countries, say, in pushing forward the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific and a whole lot of other areas.
We haven’t really seen the Quad emerge from all the questions that were asked about it. For example, right now India is still hesitant to even say that Australia will be a part of the Malabar exercises. Even if that decision has been taken, it has not been announced, presumably because you don’t want to exacerbate the situation with China. What might this Quad coalition actually look like?
•TM:I don’t think the litmus test for the Quad is whether Australia will join Malabar. Japan, Australia, India and the U.S. are four democratic anchors in the region which have spelt out what they would like to do together, including maritime security cooperation, providing alternatives to the Belt and Road initiative, cooperation in 5G, cyberspace and other areas like Artificial Intelligence. You even see things like Quad-plus formats thinking about what a post COVID-19 world would look like, not just in terms of the kind of healthcare, but also in things like supply chain resiliency. I think it’s a question of whether Quad countries can establish more habits of cooperation and interoperability. I don’t just mean that in the military sense, that if and when there are scenarios where they need to act together, that could be like the supposed tsunami in disaster relief, but could be something more kinetic. What India needs to do most, which I think has perhaps not been done enough, is use these partnerships for internal balancing, use these partnerships to build India’s own capabilities. The continental and maritime are connected in that sense.
How does this closeness with the U.S. in the Quad impact China’s behaviour? We’ve often heard many diplomats say that China actually comes closer to India when India and the U.S. have a better relationship. How do you think the dynamics work?
•AK:Frankly, we have been far too cautious when it comes to developing the Quad or when it comes to developing our own strategic linkages with the U.S. by asking how China would react. A relationship with the U.S. helps in our dealings with China, more so in a situation where the capability gap between India and China is increasing day by day. We have to work with like-minded countries, and that includes the U.S., Japan, Australia and many other countries. At the same time, we have to recognise that what we can achieve through the Quad is limited, it’s still work in progress. So, much more effort needs to be put in, to flesh out the idea of Quad and to see how it can become an effective lateral grouping.
•TM:Chinese actions at the boundary have tended to be about bilateral issues between China and India, or how Beijing is looking at the region, or thinking about an assertive posture. The other thing that I think we’ve seen is — and we’ve seen it in the last six months — Beijing has been acting assertively on multiple fronts, regardless of ties with the U.S. So, the Japanese, for example, have been engaging in a major outreach to China over the last few months. But even they are facing this assertiveness from China. The Philippines was hesitating from signing an agreement with the U.S., and they too have been facing this assertiveness from the Chinese. Australians used to be very hesitant about saying anything to the Chinese. And that didn’t prevent the Chinese from pushing against them, which is why you’ve seen the change towards China in Australia in the last few years. So, you cannot let Beijing veto a relationship that is actually helping you strengthen your own ability to balance China, and particularly if it is acting aggressively against you.
How does India’s membership of the eight-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organisation work with being part of the four-nation Quadrilateral? Do you think India is going to have to choose between these continental and maritime coalitions, or can these contradictions be managed?
•AK:I think these contradictions can be managed. It’s possible for us to be part of multilateral groupings which might be seemingly at odds with each other. In fact, the fact that we are part of RIC [Russia-India-China] and BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa] and SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organisation] provides a good rationale for more proactive engagement in the Quad setting. What we need to do is to show the requisite strategy, flexibility. China is a fact of life for us. We need to engage with China, though the nature of this engagement is going to change very significantly in the months and years to come.
•TM:India’s motivations for being part of the SCO in particular, but also RIC and BRICS, are three or four. One is to keep Russia on its side for defence but also strategic reasons. Russia continues to be important to India and these institutions and groupings are important to Russia. Second, you do not want to leave a platform to your rivals, that is China and Pakistan. I think the third thing is these are platforms to resolve or try to manage some of these contradictions with those rivals when you might not have other platforms to engage with them during a crisis.
•The Quad has a very different purpose, and you do not have any inherent disputes between those four Quad countries. In the SCO, however, you have seen that India declined to participate in this SCO military exercise and then walked out of the NSA [National Security Advisers] meeting because of the Pakistanis showing a new map. And if this becomes a venue for India-Pakistan or India-China tensions in the way SAARC has, then you have to question the SCO’s value.
•India may have multiple partnerships, but they are all not equal. This is not a hub and spoke where each of these relationships is equal. And I think the India-Russia relationship could potentially create strains with the U.S. as it has over the S-400 (anti-missile system). All anybody in the West has to do is just sit back and let these contradictions within the SCO play out themselves.
