📰 China says disengagement at most localities along LAC is ‘complete’
Admits issues still remain at Pangong Lake; no change in situation: MoD sources
•China on Tuesday said border troops had “disengaged in most localities” along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), but defence sources said disengagement had only been “partial” at one of the locations that Beijing appeared to be referring to.
•China also acknowledged for the first time that issues were yet to be resolved at Pangong Lake, which is likely to be taken up at the fifth round of Corps Commander-level talks set for later this week.
Incomplete exercise
•Disengagement has been completed from stand-off sites at Patrolling Point (PP) 14 at Galwan Valley and PP 15 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area. It is, however, only partially completed at PP17A, another patrolling point in the Gogra-Hot Springs area, and also incomplete at Pangong Lake, defence sources said, adding that there was no change in the ground situation with the first phase of disengagement remaining incomplete.
•These issues, in addition to further disengagement, would be taken up during the talks.
•“The talks will most likely be in the second half of this week,” a defence source said. “Firm dates are yet to be confirmed.”
•On Tuesday, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was asked by Chinese media to confirm whether “Chinese and Indian troops have completed disengagement at three localities, namely, Galwan Valley, Hot Springs and Kongka Pass” and if “the only area where disengagement is left to be implemented is along the Pangong Lake.” Kongka Pass is east of Gogra-Hot Springs.
•This was the first time that the Chinese media had specifically referred to issues in the Gogra-Hot Springs and Pangong Lake areas along the LAC. Previously, they had only spoken of differences in the Galwan Valley, where a clash on June 15 that claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers, marked the worst violence on the border since 1967.
With reserves crowded, animals are venturing out
•A detailed survey released on Tuesday reveals that nearly a third of India’s tigers are living outside tiger reserves and nearly 17 of the 50 reserves are approaching the peak of their capacity at sustaining their populations. India hosts 70% of the world’s tigers.
•At 2,967, experts say, India may slowly be approaching its peak carrying capacity of tigers. For the first time, said a scientist associated with the survey, there was an attempt to segregate how many tigers were largely present within the reserves and how many flitted in and out and were dependent on the core reserve for sustenance. This was to guide conservation policy.
•The reserves, by definition, are a “source” and suitable for nourishing a growing tiger population because of prey availability and territory. However, when they get too crowded, tigers venture out further from “sources” and form “sinks” and much of wildlife population dynamics is about understanding this source-sink relationship. “Generally, there’s a 60-40 split in tigers from source-sink, but this can vary. However, we are approaching the maximum capacity of several good reserves, and the focus should be on developing under-utilised reserves and not over-nourish those that have a good population,” said Rajesh Gopal, secretary general, Global Tiger Forum.
•When releasing the report, Union Minister Prakash Javadekar said and other wildlife were a kind of “soft power” India had to show on the international front. “The Ministry is working on a programme in which efforts would be made to provide water and fodder to animals in the forest itself to deal with the challenge of human-animal conflict which is causing deaths of animals”.
•In the tiger reserves in Uttar Pradesh, there were several more tigers that depended on the source but lived outside it. In Corbett, there were 231 tigers within the reserves, but 266 were ‘utilising it.’ Kanha in Madhya Pradesh had 88 inside and 108 dependent on it.
•The Pench reserve in Maharashtra had 53 inside but 82 utilising them.
📰 Three billion animals affected by Australia bushfires: WWF
‘It’s one of the worst wildlife disasters’
•Nearly 3 billion koalas, kangaroos and other native Australian animals were killed or displaced by bushfires in 2019 and 2020, a study by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) said on Tuesday, triple the group’s earlier estimates.
•Some 143 million mammals, 2.46 billion reptiles, 180 million birds and 51 million frogs were impacted by the country’s worst bushfires in decades, the WWF said.
•When the fires were still blazing, the WWF estimated the number of affected animals at 1.25 billion. The fires destroyed more than 11 million hectares (37 million acres) across the Australian southeast, equal to about half the area of the United Kingdom.
•“This ranks as one of the worst wildlife disasters in modern history,” said WWF-Australia Chief Executive Officer Dermot O’Gorman in a statement.
•The project leader Lily Van Eeden, from the University of Sydney, said the research was the first continent-wide analysis of animals impacted by the bushfires, and “other nations can build upon this research to improve understanding of bushfire impacts everywhere”.
•The total number included animals which were displaced because of destroyed habitats and now faced lack of food and shelter.
📰 RIC, a triangle that is still important
Calls for a westward shift in India’s foreign policy appear misplaced as engagement with Russia and China does matter
•Last month, on June 23, a few eyebrows were raised when India decided to attend a (virtual) meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, India and China (RIC). Amid the tensions on the Line of Actual Control, the dominant calls were for a more decisive westward shift in India’s foreign policy. A RIC meeting seemed incongruous in this setting.
•The leaders’ statements at the meeting reflected their divergent preoccupations. The Chinese Minister did not see the irony in his call for opposing bullying practices, rejecting power politics and supporting the rule of law in international relations. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov criticised unilateral coercive measures to settle scores with geopolitical rivals and topple regimes. India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar pointedly emphasised that for a durable world order, major powers should respect international law and recognise the legitimate interest of partners.
The initial years
•When the RIC dialogue commenced in the early 2000s, the three countries were positioning themselves for a transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order. It was not an anti-U.S. construct; all three countries considered their relationship with the United States an essential prop to their global ambitions. The RIC shared some non-West (as distinct from anti-West) perspectives on the global order, such as an emphasis on sovereignty and territorial integrity, impatience with homilies on social policies and opposition to regime change from abroad. Their support for democratisation of the global economic and financial architecture moved to the agenda of BRIC (with the addition of Brazil).
•The initial years of the RIC dialogue coincided with an upswing in India’s relations with Russia and China. The advent of President Vladimir Putin reinforced the political, defence and energy pillars of the India-Russia strategic partnership. With China, the 2003 decision to bring a political approach to the boundary dispute and to develop other cooperation, encouraged a multi-sectoral surge in relations. An agreement in 2005, identifying political parameters applicable in an eventual border settlement, implicitly recognised India’s interests in Arunachal Pradesh.
Subtext to India-U.S. ties
•Simultaneously, India’s relations with the U.S. surged, encompassing trade and investment, a landmark civil nuclear deal and a burgeoning defence relationship that met India’s objective of diversifying military acquisitions away from a near-total dependence on Russia. There was a strategic sub-text: as China was rapidly emerging as a challenger to its global pre-eminence, the U.S. saw value in partnering with a democratic India in Asia. Former U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice writes about this in her memoirs.
•Transformations in the external environment impacted on these political equations. Among other irritants, China went back on the 2005 agreement, launched the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, worked to undermine India’s influence in its neighbourhood and expanded its military and economic presence in the Indian Ocean.
•The texture of the relationship with Russia also changed, as India-U.S. collaboration widened — in defence and the Indo-Pacific. As U.S.-Russia relations imploded in 2014 (after the annexation/accession of Crimea), Russia’s pushback against the U.S. included cultivating the Taliban in Afghanistan and enlisting Pakistan’s support for it. The western campaign to isolate Russia drove it into a much closer embrace of China — particularly in defence cooperation — than their history of strategic rivalry should have permitted. Thus, the RIC claim of overlapping or similar approaches to key international issues, sounds hollow today.
Links in the grouping
•Having noted this, the Russia-India-China engagement still has significance. India is in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is driven by Russia and China and includes four Central Asian countries. Central Asia is strategically located, bordering our turbulent neighbourhood. A sliver of land separates Tajikistan from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan’s membership of SCO and the potential admission of Iran and Afghanistan (as member states) heighten the significance of the SCO for India. Growing Chinese influence is testing the informal Russia-China understanding that Russia handles the politico-security issues in the region and China extends economic support. It is important for India to shape the Russia-China dynamics in this region, to the extent possible. The Central Asian countries have signalled they would welcome such a dilution of the Russia-China duopoly. The ongoing India-Iran-Russia project for a sea/road/rail link from western India through Iran to Afghanistan and Central Asia, is an important initiative for achieving an effective Indian presence in Central Asia, alongside Russia and China.
•The bilateral arms of the India-Russia-China triangle will also remain important. The defence and energy pillars of India’s partnership with Russia remain strong. Access to Russia’s abundant natural resources can enhance our materials security — the importance of which has been highlighted by COVID-19. With China too, while the recent developments should accelerate our efforts to bridge the bilateral asymmetries, disengagement is not an option. We have to work bilaterally and multilaterally on a range of issues, even while firmly protecting our interests on the border, in technology and the economy.
The Indo-Pacific issue
•The elephant in the RIC room is the Indo-Pacific. For India, it is a geographic space of economic and security importance, in which a cooperative order should prevent the dominance of any external power. China sees our Indo-Pacific initiatives as part of a U.S.-led policy of containing China. Russia’s Foreign Ministry sees the Indo-Pacific as an American ploy to draw India and Japan into a military alliance against China and Russia. India’s focus on economic links with the Russian Far East and activation of a Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor may help persuade Russia that its interests in the Pacific are compatible with our interest in diluting Chinese dominance in the Indo-Pacific; this also accords with President Putin’s concept of a Greater Eurasia.
Autonomy of action
•The current India-China stand-off has intensified calls for India to fast-track partnership with the U.S. This is an unexceptionable objective, but is not a silver bullet. National security cannot be fully outsourced. India’s quest for autonomy of action is based on its geographical realities, historical legacies and global ambitions — not a residual Cold War mindset.
•As noted, RIC dynamics are sensitive to the configuration of the U.S.-Russia-China triangle. This configuration changed in 2008 (the global economic crisis) and again in 2014 (Crimea’s accession to Russia). COVID-19 could trigger another change, which could be modulated by the outcome of the U.S. Presidential elections. The nature and impact of this change is, for now, an unknown unknown.
📰 The South Asian migrant crisis
The South Asian labour force forms the backbone of the Gulf economies, but has no social security protection or labour rights
•In early July, the Kerala High Court issued notice to the Central and State governments on a petition seeking to set up a mechanism to assist NRIs who had lost their jobs abroad and had returned to India, to seek due compensation. The petition exposes the precarious conditions of migrant workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Employers, particularly construction companies, have used the crisis as an opportunity to retrench masses of migrant labourers without paying them wages or allowances.
Living in misery
•The South Asia-Gulf migration corridor is among the largest in the world. South Asians account for nearly 15 million in the Gulf. The South Asian labour force forms the backbone of the Gulf economies, but has had to go knocking on doors for food and other basic necessities. The pandemic, the shutdown of companies, the tightening of borders, and the exploitative nature of the Kafala sponsorship system have all aggravated the miseries of South Asian migrant workers. They have no safety net, social security protection, welfare mechanisms, or labour rights. The events are reminiscent of the plight of migrant labourers who had been evacuated during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, as we found during our field research in Kuwait a while ago. In the initial days of the lockdown, the Kerala government was requested to send regular medicines for lifestyle diseases. Since medicines are expensive in the GCC countries, migrants often procure them from India. However, the suspension of flights caused an acute shortage of medicines, and exposed the frail medical insurance system in the GCC for these workers. Now, thousands have returned home empty-handed from the host countries.
•Indians constitute the largest segment of the South Asian workforce. Gulf migration is predominantly a male-driven phenomenon. A majority of the migrants are single men living in congested labour camps. They share rooms and toilets, to save earnings to send back home. The COVID-19 spike in these labour camps has mainly been due to overcrowded and unsanitary living conditions. However, as the COVID-19 crisis and response unfolded in the Gulf countries, the most neglected segment turned out to be the migrant women domestic workers, whose untold miseries have increased in the present volatile situation. The Indian missions, with their inadequate administrative personnel, could not adequately cater to the needs of the migrants. The situation forced the Indian government to repatriate the NRIs through the Vande Bharat Mission. The Indian government has repatriated over 7.88 lakh NRIs from various destinations. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, etc. have also been repatriating their citizens.
Rehabilitate, reintegrate, and resettle
•The countries of origin are now faced with the challenge of rehabilitating, reintegrating, and resettling these migrant workers. To facilitate this, the Indian government has announced ‘SWADES’ for skill mapping of citizens returning from abroad, but implementation seems uncertain. Kerala, the largest beneficiary of international migration, has announced ‘Dream Kerala’ to utilise the multifaceted resources of the migrants. Bangladesh has announced a special package for the resettlement of return migrants which includes money on arrival, money to launch self-employment projects, and compensation for the families of those who died abroad from COVID-19. The Overseas Employment Corporation in Pakistan has come out with special programmes to upgrade the skills of returnees.
•Meanwhile, in the GCC countries, the movement for nationalisation of labour and the anti-migrant sentiment have peaked. Countries like Oman and Saudi Arabia have provided subsidies to private companies to prevent native lay-offs. However, the nationalisation process is not going to be smooth given the stigma attached to certain jobs and the influence of ‘royal sheikh culture’.
•Paradoxically, countries that are sending migrant workers abroad are caught between the promotion of migration, on the one hand, and the protection of migrant rights in increasingly hostile countries receiving migrants, on the other. The need of the hour is a comprehensive migration management system for countries that send workers as well as those that receive them. No South Asian country except Sri Lanka has an adequate migration policy. The pandemic has given us an opportunity to voice the rights of South Asian migrants and to bring the South Asia-Gulf migration corridor within the ambit of SAARC, the ILO, and UN conventions.
📰 Digging deeper
With GST collections set to shrink, the Centre must find new ways to compensate States
•Four months into FY2020-21, the Centre has finally managed to pay States the compensation due to them for the previous year under the GST regime. This may come as a breather for States seeking to finance efforts to ramp up public health-care capacity and contain COVID-19’s detrimental effects on vulnerable sections. The last instalment of Rs. 13,806 crore for March 2020 was paid out recently, taking the total payments for the year to Rs. 1,65,302 crore. To refresh, States were guaranteed compensation from the Centre for the first five years of the new indirect tax regime introduced in July 2017, for the revenues they lost after the shift from the earlier system where States had the power to levy some indirect taxes on economic activity. This compensation assumed a 14% annual growth rate in a State’s revenue, with 2015-16 as the base year, and was to be paid out from a compensation cess levied on top of the specified GST rate on luxury and sin goods. With growth down over the previous fiscal year even before the pandemic waylaid the economy, the assumptions of the not-too-distant past are beginning to hurt. Compensation cess under GST last year was almost Rs. 70,000 crore less than the payments due to States.
•This gap is likely to enlarge further this year with expected economic contraction denting GST collections as well. Compensation cess inflows could shrink even more with people curbing discretionary spending on luxury goods in order to conserve capital or stay afloat in the pandemic-hit economy. A little over half of the shortfall in last year’s cess kitty has been plugged by tapping cess balances from the first two years of GST implementation. The rest has been conjured up from the Consolidated Fund of India by debiting Integrated GST (IGST) funds that were lying with the Centre. IGST is levied on inter-State supply of goods and services and some of this levy collected in 2017-18 — the first year of GST when systems were still a tad ad-hoc — had not yet been allocated to States. Having thus drawn on these unintended contingent reserves, paying compensation to States this year is going to be even more daunting for the Centre. At the last GST Council meeting in June, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman had said the Council would convene again in July just to discuss the possible alternatives to deal with this particular conundrum. The chief solution officials have been fleshing out is for the Centre to raise special loans against future GST cess accruals in order to help meet its compensation promise to States. There is no sign of that meeting being scheduled yet. That the pandemic’s economic havoc has thrown up multiple challenges for North Block mandarins is understandable. But with a third of the fiscal year almost over, it would help the Centre and the States to battle the virus more effectively if they had more certainty and clarity on the cash at their disposal.
