📰 Towards robust data regulation
The non-personal data committee’s data governance framework raises many questions
•For a country that does not have a personal data protection bill, the setting up of a committee to regulate non-personal data seems premature. However, there is global realisation that data should be unlocked in public interest beyond the sole service of commercial interests of a few large companies. There is also recognition that data, in many cases, are not just a subject of individual decision-making but that of communities, such as in the case of ecological information. Therefore, it is critical that communities are empowered to exercise some control over how the data are used. On July 12 the NPD committee released a governance framework which raises many concerns.
Key stakeholders
•To enable a robust regulation of NPD, the report defines key stakeholders for the ecosystem. First are data principals, who/ which can be individuals, companies or communities. The roles and rights of individuals and companies in the context of data governance are well understood. However, the idea of communities as data principals is introduced ambiguously by the report. While it provides examples of what might constitute a community, e.g. citizen groups in neighbourhoods, there is little clarity on the rights and functions of the community. The report does not problematise the ways in which communities translate offline inequalities and power structures to data rights. There are examples in indigenous data governance, which imagine collective rights and community-personhood on data-related issues, which may have found useful mention here.
•Next are data custodians, who undertake collection, storage, processing, and use of data in a manner that is in the best interest of the data principal. The details in this section are fuzzy – it is not specified if the data custodian can be the government or just private companies, or what best interest is, especially when several already vague and possibly conflicting principal communities are involved. It is also not clear how communities engage with the custodian. Further suggestion that data custodians can potentially monetise the data they hold is especially problematic as this presents a conflict of interest with those of the data principal communities. Based on current literature, data custodians can be interpreted as data stewards, imagined in many cases as independent entities that intermediate with technology companies on behalf of communities, which they represent.
Unclear relationship
•Next, the report talks about data trustees as a way for communities to exercise data rights. Trustees can be governments, citizen groups, or universities. However, the relationship between the data principal communities and the trustees is not clear. The articulation of trustees does not explain how “trust” is extended and fructified with the community, and how trustees are empowered to act on behalf of the community. The idea of trusteeship for data is being discussed globally — the principles of a legal trust and the fiduciary responsibility that come with it are critical. Trustees, by definition, are bound by a duty of care and loyalty towards the principal and thus work in their best interests, negotiating on behalf of their data rights with technology companies and regulators. This thinking is not reflected in the report.
•Finally, the report explains data trusts comprising specific rules and protocols for containing and sharing a given set of data. Trusts can hold data from multiple custodians and will be managed by public authority. The power, composition and functions of the trust are not established. One possible way to simplify the ecosystem would be to consider data trusts as a type of custodian, such that fiduciary responsibilities can be extended, and trustees can represent the community and act on behalf of the data principals.
•The committee should organise broader consultations to ensure that the objective of unlocking data in public interest and through collective consent does not end up creating structures that exacerbate the problems of the data economy and are susceptible to regulatory capture.
The relief measures do not seem to be commensurate with the economic disruption caused by the lockdown
•How does India compare in the quantity and quality of its COVID-19 response to other developing countries? Here we extend our earlier analysis of India’s fiscal response ( The Hindu online, “India must enhance fiscal support for COVID-19 relief and rebuilding”, April 18, 2020) drawing on the International Monetary Fund Policy Tracker, the COVID-19 Economic Stimulus Index (CESI) of Ceyhun Elgin at Columbia University, and the World Bank.
•Before the announcement of the Atmanirbhar Bharat package, India lagged significantly behind comparable developing countries that are similar in GDP per capita, state capacity, and structure of the labour force. As of early July, the gap seems to have narrowed.
•However, given the blurring of the distinction between fiscal and monetary components, ensuring comparable and accurate figures for fiscal responses is a challenge. For example, the total Atmanirbhar package is billed at 10% of GDP. The headline number for India’s fiscal response in international databases is around 4% of GDP. But we and others have estimated that the new fiscal outlay, including the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana, of March, the direct fiscal aspects of Atmanirbhar Bharat, and the latest extension of free rations under the Public Distribution System, is around 1.7% of GDP. The one significant demand-side intervention in the Atmanirbhar Bharat package was Rs. 40,000 crore of additional outlay for the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). Most other demand-side measures involve the frontloading, consolidation, or rerouting of existing funds — for example, the recently announced Rs. 50,000 crore Garib Kalyan Rojgar Abhiyan, which consolidates projects of 12 ministries/departments.
•On the other hand, India has surpassed almost all others in the stringency of its containment measures. As a result, the extent of relief measures does not seem to be commensurate with the economic disruption and dislocation caused by the severity of the lockdown. Vietnam, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Egypt, all while averaging less stringent measures than those in India, have announced stimulus measures that are as large or more substantial, as a share of GDP.
On cash transfers
•Demand-side interventions announced by other developing countries could provide lessons for additional measures in India. Unsurprisingly, cash transfers constitute the largest category of support. The World Bank reports that, on average, such transfers amount to 30% of monthly GDP per capita, reaching 46% for lower-middle-income countries, for an average of three months. Countries have also significantly expanded coverage of their cash transfer programmes from pre-COVID-19 levels; Bangladesh and Indonesia have increased the number of beneficiaries by 163% and 111%, respectively. Indonesia’s cash schemes now cover more than 158 million people (or 60% of the population). It has even created two new unconditional cash schemes to reach 20 million individuals in urban and rural settings excluded from the current social protection measures. India could take these actions into account in decisions about expanding existing transfer programmes or even creating new ones.
Enhance NREGA
•Of the World Bank’s list of 621 measures across 173 countries, half were cash-based. Most of the rest related to food assistance (23%) or waiver/postponement of financial obligations (25%). Only 2% related to public works, a clear indication of the popularity of cash transfers over public works for income support, perhaps in part due to concerns over physical distancing. One example of the latter is Mexico, which announced an enlargement of its rural permanent employment scheme to 200,000 farmers and beneficiaries. Indonesia has allocated more than $1 billion (more than Rs. 7,000 crore) to fund public works schemes that will benefit at least 600,000 workers.
•Additionally, the Indonesia central government has directed village authorities to focus their budgets on a cash-for-work programme for day labourers and the unemployed. India has been a leader in employment guarantee policies with its flagship MGNREGA programme. This is the right time to expand entitlements in this programme as well as introduce an urban version of the programme, as many have called for.
Steps in the developing world
•Developing countries are resorting to drastic means to finance COVID-19 responses. Actions so far include the amendment of legal budget limits and the enhanced issuance of bonds — including a ‘pandemic bond’ by Indonesia. One set of measures has been particularly notable: central banks in many emerging economies are experimenting with purchases of public and private bonds in the secondary market (quantitative easing) or directly purchasing government bonds on the primary market (monetising the deficit). Although the Reserve Bank of India has been buying sovereign bonds on the secondary market in India, the debate continues over whether the Indian government should invoke the “escape cause” in the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, to enable the central bank to directly finance the deficit. Indonesia and Brazil have both amended laws to allow their central banks to buy government bonds, which the Indonesian central bank is doing in the primary and secondary markets. At the same time, the
Philippine central bank has also bought $6bn (Rs. 42,250 crore) worth of government bonds under a three-month repurchase agreement that is extendable after three months.
•In India, one reason for the subdued fiscal response and the resort to monetary measures is likely a concern with the debt-to-GDP ratio, which is higher than for most countries in our set. However, aggregate demand and confidence in the economy have slumped and may not recover for many months. Additional fiscal outlay — in the form of cash and in-kind transfers and expanded public works schemes — would save lives and jobs today and might prevent a protracted slowdown. Not spending more now, therefore, might only worsen the debt-to-GDP ratio if growth remains depressed.
📰 The main planks in a counter-China policy
Trying to make sense of Beijing’s actions is critical, and India must use the ‘subtler tools’ of power available to it
•The situation along the China-India border in Ladakh region is still tense. The disengagement process is proving difficult, and the latest meeting of the Corps Commanders on July 14 has not resulted in any demonstrable progress regarding troop disengagement/de-escalation. India is standing firm on both sides ensuring complete disengagement of troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while China is laying emphasis on strengthening Confidence Building Measures in the border areas, and proper handling of border issues in a timely manner to “avoid differences becoming disputes”.
China’s objective
•Details regarding the actual ground situation, meanwhile, remain sketchy, lending itself to differing interpretations. However, it would appear that this time around, China is intent on managing the ground situation to its advantage, and bring about a realignment of the LAC. With the idea of ‘buffer zones’ having been accepted — which apparently are to be located on Indian territory — it would appear that China is well on its way to achieving its objective. If China does succeed, it could be for the first time that China has a foothold on the west side of the Kongka Pass.
•The events of May and June were hardly a ‘one-off manoeuvre’. A great deal of planning would have preceded the incursions across the LAC at multiple points, several hundred kilometres apart. However, what prompted China’s aggressive behaviour is unclear, but it had the effect of shredding the painstakingly devised Border Agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013. Whether China is behaving like an ‘irredentist power’ seeking to expand its frontiers to the limits that existed in the Qing Dynasty, or as an ‘expansionist power’ (as the Prime Minister obliquely hinted which produced an instant reaction from Beijing, warning India against making “a strategic miscalculation with regard to China”), is less critical than what China’s current objectives are. Undoubtedly, humbling India in the eyes of Asia and the world was all important. India needs to ponder deeply on this, to avoid making a strategic miscalculation during a difficult period.
•The 21st Century was once heralded as the Asian Century, with China and India in the vanguard. Rumour has it that as far back as 1988, Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, had mentioned to then Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, that he doubted this. If so, Deng has been prescient, for in the 21st Century the two Asian giants have been more at loggerheads than anything else.
•Much of the blame should be cast on China. The latter, having shaken off its image as a ‘status quo power’, is intent on dominating the geostrategic space in its neighbourhood and across Asia, before embarking on its ambition to displace the United States as the Global Numero Uno. Instead of reinforcing economic relationships in the region, China has been intent on transforming the Asian region in its own image, and, simultaneously, seeking to become a continental and a maritime power.
Raise the divisions
•Trying to make sense of China’s actions is critical for India’s response. To begin with, and despite the fact that China has been inclined for long to nibble at territories in the western, middle and eastern segments of the border, it would be a mistake to think that China is preparing for a conflict over territory. India should not be taken in by Western propaganda about China’s territorial ambitions, for China is well aware that it cannot be certain whether it will emerge a victor from an all-out conflict with India. With two key dates in mind (2025 and 2035 — Made in China 2025 and China Standards 2035), China cannot afford to jeopardise its future for the present. India’s strategic thinkers and planners must keep this in mind, while drawing up plans to checkmate China’s predatory actions in the mountainous border regions. Instead, they should urgently implement the plans to set up the Mountain Strike Corps divisions, which had been inexplicably shelved. This is bound to deter China here far more than the stockpiling of state-of-the-art weapons.
•Undoubtedly, a strong military is an important component of a nation’s power. It is important to maintain a strong military but it is even more important to know when or how to use it. With a country such as Pakistan, the military option is more often than not the most suitable one; with countries such as China, one has to consider a variety of options. Undue sensitivity to domestic politics in a situation such as the one we currently face in Ladakh, should not dictate our course of action.
Go on a diplomatic offensive
•India must go back to the drawing board and consider what are the ‘subtler tools’ of power available to it, rather than only considering the military option. India may well find non-military tools not only more cost effective but also less risky. One option, readily available, is diplomacy which is an equally indispensable instrument of a nation’s power. Exploiting the current widespread opposition to China, India must embark on a diplomatic offensive to create international opinion in its support regarding border violations. A diplomatic offensive, involving different Ministries of the Central government, business leaders, persons of international standing, etc., can achieve a great deal in convincing international opinion that India is right and China is wrong, as also in conveying a message about India’s peaceful intentions vis-à-vis China’s expansionist ambitions.
•As a corollary to this, India should also revitalise another instrument of power that it had employed in the past, viz., cultivation of foreign leaders with a view to draw their specific attention to China’s aggressive policies and designs. Countering China’s moves to ‘buy’ influence will not be easy, but India’s involvement with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) should prove invaluable in this respect. India’s relationship with NAM needs to be revitalised. India previously also had a programme of helping countries across Asia and Africa through a well-designed technical aid programme which possibly still exists, but may need to be upgraded. Such programmes not only provide an enduring link between India and these countries but also help contrast India’s ‘untied aid’ with that of countries such as China whose aims are political and economic subjugation.
It’s peace versus aggression
•To compete effectively in today’s world (and to counter China’s offensive across the world), India must also overhaul its ‘messaging’ capacity. It should make greater use of technology to send across its message and ideas to people and countries, in its vicinity and across the globe, highlighting its peaceful intentions in stark contrast to China’s aggressive policies and tactics. This was not one of India’s strong points in the past, but in today’s world where social media plays a dominant role, sustained messaging has become critical.
•At this time, India must pay particular attention to relations with countries in its neighbourhood, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, and allies such as Iran and Vietnam, which seem to have frayed at the edges, with India being more intent on strengthening relations with the West, especially the U.S., and bodies such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), or the informal strategic dialogue between the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia. Smaller countries of Asia, which constantly face China’s aggressive interference in their internal affairs, have not received much support from India, and this needs India’s attention.
A united face
•India’s true strength, over and above all this, however, is its unity in diversity. A truly united and resilient India is the best antidote to China’s attempts to humble India. The impact of a united India will be far greater than establishing closer links with the U.S. or the West. China has never been able to properly fathom, or understand, the strength India seems to derive from its spiritual, religious and cultural attributes, which are a part of its civilisational heritage. China has also never been able to comprehend the innate value India attaches to reaching out to leaders of different religions, in particular the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, with no strings attached. In recent years, possibly with a view to appeasing China, India has somewhat distanced itself from the Dalai Lama, which has, without doubt, been a mistake that needs to be rectified. The Dalai Lama is an enduring symbol of hope for many millions of people across the globe, apart from Tibetans. Restoring the Dalai Lama to the same level of eminence in India’s official thinking, should be an important plank in India’s anti-China policy.
•Simultaneously, India would do well to take pole position in propagating ‘Himalayan Buddhism’ which China has been seeking to subvert to achieve its ends. India’s credentials here far outweigh that of China’s and should produce excellent dividends. It needs to become a key plank in India’s ‘forward policy’.
