📰 UN draft declaration goes soft on demand for reform
Process of membership expansion likely to slow down
•Despite India’s repeated demands for reform of the UN Security Council, the process of the expansion of the membership is expected to slow down this year with the final draft of the Declaration on the Commemoration of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the U.N. favouring a softer approach to the issue.
•“We reiterate our call for reforms of three of the principal organs of the United Nations. We commit to instil new life in the discussions on the reform of the Security Council and continue the work to revitalise the General Assembly and strengthen the Economic and Social Council. The review of the peace-building architecture has our full support,” the final draft says. The Declaration is a powerful reiteration of the UN’s founding principles that brought a new world order 75 years ago.
•Mention of ‘discussions’ in this key anniversary document is being interpreted as dilution of the progress made on the path of reform of the principal organs of the UN during the 122nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly.
•At the meeting on September 15, 2008, the General Assembly on the basis of previous resolutions had ‘decided’ to proceed with the “modalities in order to prepare and facilitate intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council”.
•The final draft for the upcoming UNGA is also a step down from the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on September 16, 2005 when the call for reform was demanded against the backdrop of widespread unilateral decisions as seen during the Iraq war of 2003 and the “war on terror”.
•The 2005 Resolution had expressed strong global will to stop misuse of military power and said, “We are determined to reinvigorate the intergovernmental organs of the United Nations to adopt them to the needs of the twenty-first century”.
Records of 1960 boundary talks show PLA troops at Pangong Tso and Galwan Valley are now beyond Beijing’s own territorial claims
•Chinese troops are currently present on the north bank of Pangong Lake in Ladakh in an area that is beyond what even China described as its official boundary during talks with India in 1960, official records show.
•China’s tent that it set up on the bend of the Galwan river, which sparked the violent face-off culminating in the death of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese personnel on June 15, was also beyond China’s territorial claims, according to the 1960 records.
•The records contradict China’s current claims of where the Line of Actual Control (LAC) runs. They also raise questions on recent statements from top Indian officials that China is not present anywhere on Indian territory.
•In 1960, India certainly viewed China’s presence in areas where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) transgressed in May as being beyond Beijing’s own territorial claims.
•At the north bank of Pangong Tso, the PLA moved up to Finger 4 and prevented India from crossing Finger 4. The Fingers refer to mountain spurs on the bank, and run from 1 to 8, west to east.
•China now claims up to Finger 4, while India says the LAC is at Finger 8. China previously built a road to Finger 4 in 1999 and has dominated up to Finger 4, but since May has, for the first time, completely cut off India’s access to its LAC at Finger 8, effectively shifting the line 8 km west.
•Following the four rounds of Corps Commander-level talks, the PLA has moved back from Finger 4 to 5, while Indian troops also moved back further west to Finger 2, the base post in the area where the troops initiated their patrols, The Hindu reported earlier.
MEA report
•During boundary negotiations in 1960, China spelled out its territorial claims in the area. The record is available in the “Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People’s Republic of China on the Boundary Question”, published by the Ministry of External Affairs.
•Following border talks in April 1960 in Delhi between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that failed to break the impasse, it was decided that officials of the two governments would meet “to examine factual materials in the possession of the two governments to support their stands.”
•Three rounds of talks were held. The first session took place from June 15 to July 25, 1960, in Beijing, with 18 meetings. The second session was held in Delhi from August 19 to October 5, when 19 meetings were held. Following the final session in Rangoon, when 10 meetings were held, the official report was signed on December 12, 1960. In the report, the Indian side asked: “What was the exact point where the alignment cuts the western half of Pangong Lake? And what was the exact point where it left the Pangong Lake?”
•The Chinese side responded: “The coordinates of the point where it reached the Pangong Lake were Longitude 78 degrees 49 minutes East, Latitude 33 degrees 44 minutes North.” This roughly corresponds to an area near Finger 8, around 8 km east of where China now says the LAC is and where it transgressed in May.
•Regarding the Galwan Valley, when India asked in 1960 for “heights of peaks and locations of passes” in the area, the Chinese side replied that the alignment “crossed the Galwan river at Longitude 78 degrees 13 minutes East, Latitude 34 degrees 46 minutes North.”
•Even accounting for approximations because the coordinates were round numbers noted in “degrees” and “minutes” while the “seconds” were not specified, China has gone beyond its 1960 claims both in Pangong Tso and in the Galwan Valley.
•In the Galwan Valley, the 1960 line ran east of the bend of the Galwan river, called the Y-nallah, which was the site of the June 15 clash. The clash took place following a dispute during the de-escalation process, triggered when the PLA put up a tent near the bend, and marked the worst violence on the border since 1967.
📰 A chance to restore the rule of law
The extra-judicial killing of Vikas Dubey is the last wake-up call for our democracy and the judiciary
•The killing of gangster Vikas Dubey was clearly a case of premeditated murder and not a spontaneous act of self-defence as the Uttar Pradesh police would have us believe. No person can be expected to believe the police version of the incident which is riddled with multiple absurdities. First, Dubey surrendered publicly in Madhya Pradesh. Why then would he try and run away in an open field from more than two dozen policemen? Second, he was seen travelling in a different car, just a few minutes before he was killed, from the one that overturned. Third, the media vans trailing the convoy from Ujjain were stopped by the police minutes before the “accident”. Fourth, why had Dubey, a dreaded criminal, not been handcuffed? And if he was, how could he have snatched a pistol after the car overturned? Last, he was shot in the chest, while supposedly running away. And despite the scuffle that allegedly ensued, his clothes were spotless and his COVID-19 mask was on! Before Dubey, five of his aides had been killed in similar fashion.
Spate of extra-judicial killings
•No disciplinary action has been taken against the police officers who participated in this extra-judicial killing. The killings of Dubey and his aides highlight the disturbing trend of extra-judicial killings in the State. U.P. Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s disregard for judicial due process is captured in his 2017 statement: “ Agar apradh karenge toh thok diye jayenge (If they commit crimes, they will be knocked down)”. This has prompted many to colloquially refer to his regime as ‘Thoki Raj’.
•Dubey’s killing suggests that there were people in this government who were at risk of being exposed if he testified in court. It is ironic that Dubey thrived even during ‘Thoki Raj’, which could have been possible only if he enjoyed political patronage from those in the current State government as well. Over the past three years, his name did not figure in the ‘Most Wanted List’ of the U.P. government despite the fact that he had more than 60 serious cases against him.
•Dubey’s killing has been applauded by a large number of people who have been made to believe that this is the only way of ensuring justice in a State where the courts are increasingly seen as weak and effete institutions incapable of dispensing justice. Dubey was acquitted in case after case by various local courts. We have reached a stage where lynch mobs and extra-judicial killings are celebrated. There is a progressive weakening of people’s faith in the rule of law. Nothing can be more alarming and shameful for a country that takes pride in the claim that unlike many banana republics of the world, it is still a democracy governed by the rule of law with an independent judiciary capable of enforcing it.
•Alarmed by the spate of extra-judicial killings happening in the country, the Supreme Court, in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra (2014), said that “the ‘encounter’ philosophy is a criminal philosophy” because it affects the credibility of the rule of law. The Court laid down a number of guidelines for the prevention and investigation of such killings, including immediate registration of FIR in respect of such killings; independent investigation by the State Criminal Investigation Department (CID) or the police force of a police station other than that involved in the extra-judicial killing, and headed by an officer ranked higher than the policemen involved in the incident; and simultaneous magisterial inquiry under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
Utter disregard for guidelines
•However, according to a fact-finding report by Citizens Against Hate (CAH), a collective comprising public-spirited members of civil society, there is utter disregard in U.P. for the guidelines for investigation of extra-judicial killings laid down by the Supreme Court as well as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). The report, published in May 2018, titled ‘Countering the Silence — Citizens’ Report on Extra Judicial Executions in Uttar Pradesh and Haryana, India’ undertakes, inter alia, a detailed study of 16 extra-judicial killings in U.P. since March 2017. The findings reveal that the FIRs registered by the U.P. police in respect of the 16 killings contain similar, if not identical, facts, and seem to be modelled on a fixed template. The sequence of events leading to the killings are identical, with names being the only difference. CAH’s interactions with the family members of the victims of these killings suggest that rather than being spontaneous acts of self-defence by police officers, these are premeditated acts of murder. The report also documents how investigations into these killings did not follow the Supreme Court guidelines. For example, none of the 16 cases was transferred to the CID for investigation; final reports under Section 173 of the CrPC submitted to magistrates did not contain reports of forensic/ ballistics analysis; and in 11 out of the 16 cases, the family members of the deceased are not even aware about the magisterial inquiry being conducted, and their statements have not even been recorded by the magistrate concerned.
Ending the culture of impunity
•The extra-judicial killings in U.P. show that the NHRC and the Supreme Court guidelines need a reworking. The only way to stem the rising tide of extra-judicial killings is to end the culture of impunity and punish police officers who resort to such extra-legal means. This is only possible if the investigation into such cases is independent and fair. I was a counsel in the PUCL case and had suggested to the Court that the National and State Human Rights Commissions have an investigative arm to probe police encounters and custodial deaths. This would be one way of ensuring that the investigations are independent of police and political interference. Another way would be to handover investigation of such cases to an agency independent of the State government like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
•The Dubey killing is perhaps the last wake-up call for our democracy and the judiciary. If the higher judiciary wants to inspire respect in the rule of law, it must call out this extra-judicial killing. The U.P. government has announced the constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to undertake an inquiry into the episode. However, the SIT comprises Deputy Inspector General of Police Ravinder Goud who was himself charge-sheeted by the CBI for an extra-judicial killing many years ago. No body formed by the U.P. government to conduct an inquiry would inspire any confidence in this matter. The inquiry must be done under the aegis of a retired judge with some credibility and independence to go to the root of this matter and hold the police officers and other persons accountable. Only then can we begin to redeem the pledge of our Constitution-makers to establish a republic governed by the rule of law and protected by an independent judiciary.
📰 Make the right call on ‘Malabar’ going Quad
India’s plan for naval coalition building alone will not credibly deter China’s military power in the Indian Ocean
•There is speculation in the media that New Delhi could soon invite Australia to join the Malabar naval exercises to be held later this year. According to reports, the most recent being Sunday (Page 1, The Hindu , July 19, 2020), a key meeting on Friday of India’s Ministry of Defence discussed the issue of adding Australia to the trilateral Malabar naval exercise with Japan and the United States in the Bay of Bengal later this year. While no decision was reached, it appears a green signal to Australia could soon be given, making it the first time since 2007 that all members of Quad will participate in a joint military drill, aimed ostensibly at China.
Possible conflict point
•Beijing has long opposed a coalition of democracies in the Indo-Pacific region. The Chinese leadership sees the maritime Quadrilateral as an Asian-NATO that seeks only to contain China’s rise. Earlier last week, an opinion piece in The Global Times , the Chinese communist party’s mouthpiece, noted that at a time of strained bilateral ties with China, India’s intention to involve Australia in the Malabar drill could only be construed as a move directed against Beijing. By “putting more pressure on China” and moving to expand its “sphere of influence into the entire Indian Ocean and the South Pacific”, India, the article (“Strategic intent behind New Delhi’s plan to invite Australia to join Malabar drill”) suggested, was risking harsh consequences.
•Expectedly, Indian commentators welcomed the development, hailing it as a long overdue move. Following the stand-off in Ladakh, many Indian analysts believe the time is right for India to shed its traditional defensiveness in the maritime domain. The realists advocate an alliance with the U.S., Japan and Australia to counter Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean.
•Yet, Indian decision-makers have reason to be cautious. At a time when India and China are negotiating a truce on the border in Eastern Ladakh, New Delhi’s invitation to Australia to participate in the Malabar exercise sends contrary signals to Beijing. If China responded churlishly — as is its wont — through aggressive posturing in the Eastern Indian Ocean, it could needlessly open up a new front in the India-China conflict.
The prospect of modest gains
•Indian decision-makers should also reflect on the strategic rationale of the military-Quad. Unlike the U.S. and its Pacific partners, whose principal motivation in forming a maritime coalition is to implement a ‘rules-based order’ in the Indo-Pacific littorals, India’s priority is to acquire strategic capabilities to counter a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. While India has acquired airborne surveillance assets from the U.S., the Indian Navy is yet to develop the undersea capability to deter Chinese submarines in the eastern Indian Ocean. With U.S. defence companies hesitant to part with proprietary technology — in particular, vital anti-submarine warfare tech — the pay-off for New Delhi, in exchange for signing up the ‘military-quad’, is modest. Maritime watchers know cooperation with the U.S. and Japan without attendant benefits of strategic technology transfers will not improve the Indian Navy’s deterrence potential in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
•In operational terms also, it might be premature for Delhi to initiate multilateral engagement with Quad partners. With the strategic contest between the U.S. and China in East Asia and Southeast Asia hotting up, there is every possibility that the military-Quad will be used to draw India into the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific. In recent days, China has stepped up its naval presence in the South China Sea, even as Washington directed three aircraft carrier groups — USS Theodore Roosevelt, USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan — to the region, in a seeming bid to counter the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The U.S. would expect its Indo-Pacific partners, including India, to assist the U.S. Navy in its South China Sea endeavour. Notably, neither Washington nor Tokyo believes China’s threats in the Indian Ocean equal the challenges the PLAN poses in the Pacific. While they may engage in the occasional naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal, the U.S. and Japanese navies have little spare capacity for sustained surveillance and deterrence operations in the IOR. Australia, ironically, is the only one ready and able to partner India in securing the Eastern Indian Ocean.
China has been cautious
•There is also the question of timing. A balancing coalition must come together when the nature and magnitude of the threat is wholly manifest. Again, it is worth pointing out that despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the PLAN is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea. Chinese warships have not challenged Indian sovereignty in its territorial waters, or ventured close to Indian islands with malign intent. Nor have PLAN assets impeded the passage of Indian merchantmen in the regional sea lanes and choke points.
•To the contrary, the Chinese Navy has avoided any entanglement with Indian naval ships in the subcontinental littorals, limiting its ventures to friendly countries in the region, many of which are happy to benefit from Beijing’s economic and military power. Sure, Chinese research and intelligence ship presence close to the Andaman Islands has relatively expanded, but Chinese maritime agencies have gone about their task cautiously, ensuring that operations do not cross the threshold of conflict with India. This also means that the onus of the first move to precipitate a crisis in the Eastern Indian Ocean lies with the Indian Navy. Were the Indian Navy to combine with friendly forces to raise the ante in regional littorals, it would need to be ready for the consequences.
Need for careful thought
•The sobering reality for New Delhi is that naval coalition building alone will not credibly deter Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean. Upgrading the trilateral Malabar to a quadrilateral, without acquiring the requisite combat and deterrence capability, could yield gains for India in the short term, but would prove ineffective in the long run. This is not to suggest that inviting Australia to join the Malabar is a bad idea; far from it. It is simply to posit that New Delhi should not sign up to quadrilateral engagement without a cost-benefit exercise and commensurate gains in the strategic-operational realm. What might appear politically sensible could be operationally imprudent.
