📰 Working with China to resolve LAC issue peacefully, says MEA
Countries ‘engaged’ via diplomatic, military channels; no traction for Trump’s offer
•Indian and Chinese sides remain “engaged” through diplomatic and military channels in Delhi and Beijing and at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in order to resolve the situation along the boundaries in Ladakh and Sikkim, the government said on Thursday.
•Indicating that India would not accept U.S. President Donald Trump’s offer to mediate between the two countries, it said the matter was being discussed bilaterally.
•“We are engaged with the Chinese side to peacefully resolve the issue,” said Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Anurag Srivastava when asked about Mr. Trump’s assertion that he had conveyed to India and China his willingness to “mediate or arbitrate” on the “raging border dispute” between them.
Position of PLA troops
•While giving no details of the nature and extent of the standoff, which has been going on for weeks, the MEA said the contact between both sides on the issue included talks in “Delhi and Beijing”. The spokesperson did not respond to questions about whether Chinese troops remained in areas patrolled by India, particularly in the Galwan valley.
•“India is committed to the objective of maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas with China and our armed forces scrupulously follow the consensus reached by our leaders and the guidance provided. At the same time, we remain firm in our resolve to ensuring India’s sovereignty and national security,” Mr. Srivastava said.
•The MEA’s comments came a day after the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the situation at the LAC was “stable and controllable”. While declining to comment on the Chinese statement, the MEA spokesperson said the issues would be resolved according to five agreements on border management signed by India and China between 1993 and 2013.
•“Indian troops take a very responsible approach towards border management and strictly follow the procedures laid out in various bilateral agreements and protocols with China to resolve any issue that may arise in the border areas,” said Mr. Srivastava in the most extensive comments made by the government thus far.
It will empower Beijing to draft national security laws for the city; pro-democracy groups slam move
•China’s Parliament on Thursday passed new legislation for Hong Kong that will for the first time empower Beijing to draft national security laws for the Special Administrative Region (SAR).
•At the closing session of the annual National People’s Congress (NPC) in Beijing, the draft legislation was passed overwhelmingly, with 2,878 votes for, one against and six abstentions in the Communist Party-controlled legislature.
•The law, called the “NPC Decision on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to Safeguard National Security”, essentially empowers the NPC to draft new national security laws for Hong Kong. That could happen as early as June, when the NPC Standing Committee, which convenes every two months, holds its next sitting.
•The draft legislation said the scope of the laws could cover any activity that “seriously endangers national security”. It said it was aimed at enabling “measures to counter, lawfully prevent, stop and punish foreign and overseas forces’ use of Hong Kong to carry out separatist, subversive, infiltrative, or destructive activities”.
Basic law
•The NPC decision has been criticised by pro-democracy parties and some in the legal community in Hong Kong as undermining the “one country, two systems” model. Since 1997, Hong Kong has been governed by the Basic Law, which gives the SAR “executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication”. Only matters of defence and foreign affairs are handled by the central government.
•While the law says the state would “fully, and accurately implement the principles of one country, two systems”, it also enables organs of the central government “for the protection of national security” to set up “institutions in the HKSAR”, a provision that has been a particular source of concern.
•“It is entirely unclear how the proposed agencies set up in the HKSAR will operate under the laws of the HKSAR, whether they will be bound by the laws of the HKSAR, whether they have the power of enforcement, and whether such powers as exercised will be limited by the laws currently in force in the HKSAR”, the Hong Kong Bar Association said in a statement reported by the South China Morning Post .
•The law could also block foreign judges from sitting on national security cases, following the example of Macau, which has done so since 2018, Reuters reported. Hong Kong’s court of final appeal has 15 foreign judges, under a system aimed to ensure judicial independence for a global financial centre.
•At his annual press conference following the NPC, China’s Premier Li Keqiang said China “will still follow the principle of Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong”. He said “one country, two systems” is China’s “basic state policy” and Beijing would continue to ensure Hong Kong had “a high degree of autonomy”.
•On Thursday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified to Congress that it was the administration’s view that Hong Kong could no longer enjoy the special economic privileges it had received from the U.S. because of the erosion of its autonomy, a move that could hurt the SAR’s economy.
Mutual respect
•In his press conference, Mr. Li called on China and the U.S. to manage their differences and “discard a ‘Cold War’ mentality”. “I believe both countries should respect each other and develop a relationship on the basis of equality, respect each other's core interests and major concerns and embrace cooperation,” he said.
•He said China would aim for positive economic growth this year, although the government would rely on increased liquidity rather than any massive stimulus measures.
•China for the first time has not set an annual GDP growth target citing the economic uncertainty, with the economy contracting by 6.8% in the first quarter, the first contraction since 1976. Both Mr. Li and the Foreign Minister Wang Yi did not field any questions on India in their annual NPC press meets.
📰 A brewing storm
Twitter did well to call out Trump, but fake news is an ecosystem by itself
•As political ironies go, U.S. President Donald Trump’s tirade against social medial platforms is a class apart. After Twitter flagged two of his posts as factually inaccurate, the President threatened to “strongly regulate” or “close down” all social media platforms. Like most of his statements, this one too appeared on Twitter where he has 80.4 million followers. When Mr. Trump entered the race for the Republican presidential nomination in 2015, critics scorned him as a mere, inconsequential Twitter handle, for his acerbic posturing on the platform. But outrage is richly rewarding on digital platforms, as he went on to prove. Twitter too was a beneficiary in the process. The crafty use of social media for incendiary politics the world over scraped the shine off these decentralised and unregulated platforms that were initially hailed as prodigiously democratising. Controversies erupted in quick succession, including their role in genocides and election rigging. The misuse of social media to spread falsehoods that often incite violence has been a particularly tricky question. These platforms have often declared their commitment to stop fake news, but any attempt to enforce content regulation comes with additional complications, as Twitter’s attempt to fact-check the President shows. The intention to ensure all political discussions are fact-bound and shorn of inflammatory rhetoric is laudatory, but no one body can be the enforcer in this.
•The current conflict between the President and social media platforms is only a component of the ongoing wider debate in the U.S. on the nature of large tech companies. Big tech companies such as Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft and Apple have given rise to concerns of privacy, data misuse, political bias, monopoly behaviour, tax avoidance and national security. In the U.S., there is a common ground among the Democrats and the Republicans that these tech companies need to be reined in. Republicans say social media platforms are anti-conservative. Democrats believe some of these platforms are easily manipulated by enemies of the nation and accuse them of unfair trade and labour practices, and call for breaking them up. Facebook’s attempt to launch a digital currency, Libra, has triggered sovereignty concerns among nations. It had to pay $5 billion in fines to settle investigations into its misuse of data in the Cambridge Analytica controversy. These companies boast of being global and able to fly above the eyes of government. Some reordering of that arrangement appears to be on the horizon. But it would be a pity if the trigger for the overhaul is one social media platform’s attempt to call out the irresponsible statements of the world’s most powerful leader.
📰 For a reset in India-Nepal relations
The urgent need today is to pause the rhetoric on territorial nationalism and lay the groundwork for a quiet dialogue
•Once again, relations between India and Nepal have taken a turn for the worse. The immediate provocation is the long-standing territorial issue surrounding Kalapani, a patch of land near the India-Nepal border, close to the Lipulekh Pass on the India-China border, which is one of the approved points for border trade and the route for the Kailash-Mansarovar yatra in Tibet. However, the underlying reasons are far more complex. Yet, Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s exploitation of the matter, by raising the banner of Nepali nationalism and painting India as a hegemon, is part of a frequent pattern that indicates that relations between the two countries need a fundamental reset.
Kalapani and the maps
•India inherited the boundary with Nepal, established between Nepal and the East India Company in the Treaty of Sugauli in 1816. Kali river constituted the boundary, and the territory to its east was Nepal. The dispute relates to the origin of Kali. Near Garbyang village in Dharchula Tehsil of the Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand, there is a confluence of different streams coming from north-east from Kalapani and north-west from Limpiyadhura. The early British survey maps identified the north-west stream, Kuti Yangti, from Limpiyadhura as the origin, but after 1857 changed the alignment to Lipu Gad, and in 1879 to Pankha Gad, the north-east streams, thus defining the origin as just below Kalapani. Nepal accepted the change and India inherited this boundary in 1947.
•The Maoist revolution in China in 1949, followed by the takeover of Tibet, created deep misgivings in Nepal, and India was ‘invited’ to set up 18 border posts along the Nepal-Tibet border. The westernmost post was at Tinkar Pass, about 6 km further east of Lipulekh. In 1953, India and China identified Lipulekh Pass for both pilgrims and border trade. After the 1962 war, pilgrimage through Lipulekh resumed in 1981, and border trade, in 1991.
•In 1961, King Mahendra visited Beijing to sign the China-Nepal Boundary Treaty that defines the zero point in the west, just north of Tinkar Pass. By 1969, India had withdrawn its border posts from Nepali territory. The base camp for Lipulekh remained at Kalapani, less than 10 km west of Lipulekh. In their respective maps, both countries showed Kalapani as the origin of Kali river and as part of their territory. After 1979, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police has manned the Lipulekh Pass. In actual practice, life for the locals (Byansis) remained unchanged given the open border and free movement of people and goods.
•After the 1996 Treaty of Mahakali (Kali river is also called Mahakali/Sarada further downstream) that envisaged the Pancheshwar multipurpose hydel project, the issue of the origin of Kali river was first raised in 1997. The matter was referred to the Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee that had been set up in 1981 to re-identify and replace the old and damaged boundary pillars along the India-Nepal border. The Committee clarified 98% of the boundary, leaving behind the unresolved issues of Kalapani and Susta (in the Terai) when it was dissolved in 2008. It was subsequently agreed that the matter would be discussed at the Foreign Secretary level. Meanwhile, the project to convert the 80-km track from Ghatibagar to Lipulekh into a hardtop road began in 2009 without any objections from Nepal.
•The Survey of India issued a new political map (eighth edition) on November 2, 2019, to reflect the change in the status of Jammu and Kashmir as two Union Territories. Nepal registered a protest though the map in no way had changed the boundary between India and Nepal. However, on November 8, the ninth edition was issued. The delineation remained identical but the name Kali river had been deleted. Predictably, this led to stronger protests, with Nepal invoking Foreign Secretary-level talks to resolve issues. With the Indian Ambassador Manjeev Puri in Kathmandu retiring in end-December and Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale retiring a month later, the matter remained pending despite reminders from Kathmandu.
Nepali nationalism
•By April 2020, Mr. Oli’s domestic political situation was weakening. Under the Nepali Constitution, a new Prime Minister enjoys a guaranteed two-year period during which a no-confidence motion is not permitted. This ended in February unleashing simmering resentment against Mr. Oli’s governance style and performance. His inept handling of the COVID-19 pandemic added to the growing disenchantment. Within the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) there was a move to impose a ‘one man, one post’ rule that would force Mr. Oli to choose between being NCP co-chair or Prime Minister.
•The re-eruption of the Kalapani controversy, when Defence Minister Rajnath Singh did a virtual inauguration of the 80-km road on May 8, provided Mr. Oli with a political lifeline. A subsequent comment by the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), General Manoj Naravane, on May 15 that “Nepal may have raised the issue at the behest of someone else” was insensitive, given that the Indian COAS is also an honorary general of the Nepal Army and vice-versa, highlighting the traditional ties between the two armies.
•Mr. Oli had won the election in 2017 by flaunting his Nepali nationalism card, the flip side of which is anti-Indianism. This is not a new phenomenon but has become more pronounced in recent years. Mr. Oli donned the nationalist mantle vowing to restore Nepali territory and marked a new low in anti-Indian rhetoric by talking about “the Indian virus being more lethal than the Chinese or the Italian virus”.
•A new map of Nepal based on the older British survey reflecting Kali river originating from Limpiyadhura in the north-west of Garbyang was adopted by parliament and notified on May 20. On May 22, a constitutional amendment proposal was tabled to include it in a relevant Schedule. The new alignment adds 335 sq km to Nepali territory, territory that has never been reflected in a Nepali map for nearly 170 years.
•This brief account illustrates the complexity underlying India-Nepal issues that cannot be solved by rhetoric or unilateral map-making exercises. Such brinkmanship only breeds mistrust and erodes the goodwill at the people-to-people level. Political maturity is needed to find creative solutions that can be mutually acceptable.
Rewriting the fundamentals
•Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often spoken of the “neighbourhood first” policy. He started with a highly successful visit to Nepal in August 2014. But the relationship took a nosedive in 2015 when India first got blamed for interfering in the Constitution-drafting in Nepal and then for an “unofficial blockade” that generated widespread resentment against the country. It reinforced the notion that Nepali nationalism and anti-Indianism were two sides of the same coin that Mr. Oli exploited successfully.
•In Nepali thinking, the China card has provided them the leverage to practise their version of non-alignment. In the past, China maintained a link with the Palace and its concerns were primarily related to keeping tabs on the Tibetan refugee community. With the abolition of the monarchy, China has shifted attention to the political parties as also to institutions like the Army and Armed Police Force. Also, today’s China is pursuing a more assertive foreign policy and considers Nepal an important element in its growing South Asian footprint.
•The reality is that India has ignored the changing political narrative in Nepal for far too long. India remained content that its interests were safeguarded by quiet diplomacy even when Nepali leaders publicly adopted anti-Indian postures — an approach adopted decades earlier during the monarchy and then followed by the political parties as a means of demonstrating nationalist credentials. Long ignored by India, it has spawned distortions in Nepali history textbooks and led to long-term negative consequences. For too long India has invoked a “special relationship”, based on shared culture, language and religion, to anchor its ties with Nepal. Today, this term carries a negative connotation — that of a paternalistic India that is often insensitive and, worse still, a bully.
•It is hardly surprising that the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship which was sought by the Nepali authorities in 1949 to continue the special links it had with British India and provides for an open border and right to work for Nepali nationals is viewed as a sign of an unequal relationship, and an Indian imposition. Yet, Nepali authorities have studiously avoided taking it up bilaterally even though Nepali leaders thunder against it in their domestic rhetoric.
•The urgent need today is to pause the rhetoric on territorial nationalism and lay the groundwork for a quiet dialogue where both sides need to display sensitivity as they explore the terms of a reset of the “special relationship”. A normal relationship where India can be a generous partner will be a better foundation for “neighbourhood first” in the 21st century.
📰 From a stand-off to a stalemate
While the flare-up in Ladakh is likely to be resolved peacefully, there may be increased deployments along the LAC
•India’s construction of a road to Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) in the Galwan Valley has been suggested as one reason for the recent stand-off between India and China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China has said India was “attempting to unilaterally change the status quo” on the LAC. The Durbuk-Shyok-DBO road was under construction for more than 15 years. As per protocol, local commanders kept informing each other about the construction activities. China never raised any objection against it. In fact, construction work on China’s side of the LAC has been of a much higher scale. It appears that current activities by China are meant to put pressure on India, and are not based on any perceived transgression by Indian troops.
Changing lines
•China has a history of changing lines. In the late 1950s, the lines kept moving westward, and ultimately led to the 1962 war. More recently, in 2002, when maps were exchanged during the Expert Group meetings, China showed a claim line in the western sector which was different from what existed on the ground since 1962. Again in 2007, China’s perception of the border in Depsang in the Ladakh sector, in Sikkim, and in many other places appeared to change. In 2017, China wanted to unilaterally change the boundary and the trijunction with Bhutan and India, which sparked the Doklam stand-off. Until 2006, Chinese troops were positioned a few kilometres behind the LAC, except for a few places where they were deployed eyeball to eyeball with Indian troops. From 2007 onwards, we have seen a surge in defence infrastructure development along the LAC. At many locations, troops have been moved to forward areas.
•At the same time, bilateral military relations have improved, with annual defence dialogues and joint training. Patrol face-offs have been resolved with existing protocols, and issues resolved at the local commanders’ level. After the 1986-1987 Sumdorong Chu incident, it was only more than 30 years later, at Doklam, that Chinese transgression led to both sides moving up a brigade-sized force (around 5,000 troops) to the LAC. The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993 has helped limit the number of troops deployed near the LAC by both sides, and necessitates a mutual appraisal of any change in numbers. In Ladakh, both sides have, according to reports, moved up at least a brigade-sized force.
Problems with hotlines
•Such disputes should be peacefully resolved, as was done at Sumdorong Chu and Doklam. As a rule, cases of violation are resolved through a meeting of local commanders, which may be arranged through a conversation on hotlines established for that purpose. This arrangement has not been without problems. When a transgression is initiated by China, often the Chinese side does not answer the call on the hotline, as may have happened in this case. During the 2013 stand-off at Depsang, and the 2014 incident at Chumar which took place when President Xi Jinping was visiting India, the local Chinese commander did not pick up the hotline. It took several days to resolve the crisis, leaving some to ask if President Xi’s hold on the People’s Liberation Army was not as strong as assumed to be. Now, the situation is different. Named the ‘hexin’ or core, Mr. Xi has assumed total control. It will be unlikely that Mr. Xi will go against the spirit of Wuhan and Mamallapuram, in which he has been personally invested.
•The stand-off in Ladakh is likely to be resolved peacefully. Given the conventional strength of both sides, any skirmish will lead to a stalemate. China will not gain anything. On the contrary, it has much to lose. China is aware it cannot push India to a strategic alliance with the U.S., which will tilt the balance of power against Beijing. This current crisis may, however, have at least one lasting impact. We may see increased permanent deployments by both sides along the LAC, and a further erosion of trust in the agreements that both sides have built, with great effort, since 1993, which has for so long helped keep the peace.
