📰 Curcumin nanoparticles found to shorten TB treatment time
Basic ingredient of turmeric, in the form studied, is understood to be five times more ‘bioavailable’ in mice than in the regular one
•Curcumin, the basic ingredient of turmeric, when administered in a nanoparticle formulation has several favourable properties in the treatment of tuberculosis in mice, researchers have found.
•Prof. Gobardhan Das from the Special Centre for Molecular Medicine, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) Delhi and his team found nanoparticle curcumin to be five times more bioavailable (which is the proportion of drug that enters circulation after introduction into the body) in mice, than regular curcumin, and was able to drastically reduce liver toxicity induced by TB drug isoniazid.
•More importantly, treatment of TB with isoniazid along with 200 nanometre curcumin nanoparticles led to “dramatically reduced” risk of disease reactivation and reinfection.
•Treatment with anti-tuberculosis drugs takes about six-nine months in the case of drug-sensitive TB and 12-24 months for drug-resistant TB. Besides improper use, the long duration to complete treatment substantially increases the risk of TB bacteria developing resistance.
Host-directed therapy
•Because of the increased bioavailability of curcumin, the duration of treatment to achieve complete eradication of the bacteria is reduced significantly.
•“The treatment time required for complete eradication of bacteria was reduced by 50% in the case of mice,” says Prof. Das.
•The results were published in the journal Frontiers in Immunology .
•Quite often, patients stop taking anti-TB drugs for a few days due to liver toxicity. Since the addition of curcumin reduces liver toxicity, there can be better treatment adherence and lesser risk of drug resistance emerging.
•Like diabetes drug metformin and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs that limit inflammation, curcumin is a host-directed therapy, where the body’s immune system is manipulated, rather than targeting the cause of the disease directly. Besides reducing inflammation, curcumin nanoparticles were found to enhance the immune system.
•Curcumin blocks the Kv1.3 potassium channel and prevents apoptosis, or cell death, of T cells that come up with an immune response. As a result, the protective, long-lasting memory cells called the central memory T cells get enhanced.
‘Faster clearance’
•“This leads to faster clearance of the TB bacteria, resulting in stronger host immunity against the bacteria and therefore less chances of relapse of the disease after treatment,” said Dr. Dhiraj Kumar Singh from the Special Centre for Molecular Medicine, Jawaharlal Nehru University and one of the lead authors of the study.
•Mice, which were treated only with isoniazid, displayed increased susceptibility to re-infection since the drug dampens the immune system. Mice treated with curcumin nanoparticles and isoniazid were able to clear the bacteria at an accelerated rate in both the lungs and spleen.
•“Curcumin nanoparticles are stable and can be administered both orally as well as intraperitoneally and, therefore, have greater potential for therapeutic use under different conditions,” they write.
📰 Weapons not for showing off, says High Court
‘Object of the Arms Act was to ensure that weapons were available to citizens for self-defence’
•One does not have a fundamental right to keep a weapon and its possession nowadays is more for “showing off” as a “status symbol” than for self-defence, the Delhi High Court has said.
•The observation by Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva came while rejecting a private company official’s plea for an arms licence, a request which was denied to him by the licensing authority of the police as well as Lieutenant-Governor Anil Baijal.
•Upholding the decisions of the licensing authority and the L-G, the court said, “We do not live in a lawless society where individuals have to acquire or hold arms to protect themselves.”
•It said that the object of the Arms Act was to ensure that weapons were available to citizens for self-defence, but it “does not mean that every individual should be given a licence” to possess a weapon.
•“The object of the Act is self-defence. The grant of Arms licence is a privilege conferred by the Act. There is no fundamental right of an individual to hold an arm [weapon].”
“Status symbol”
•The court further said that possession of arms had become a “status symbol” nowadays.
•“Possession of arms has become a status symbol. Individuals seek to possess arms mostly for the purposes of showing off that they are influential people. Arms are even being used indiscriminately for celebratory firing at marriages, etc.,” the court said.
•The petitioner had sought an arms licence on the grounds that he deals with cash ranging between Rs. 2-3 lakh on a daily basis and needs a weapon for his safety and to secure the money.
•The court rejected the contention, saying that the cash belonged to the company and if there was any need to protect the money, the company would take the requisite measures.
📰 Army in for the long haul in Dokalam
Soldiers pitch tents, and a steady line of supplies is being maintained for them
•The Army is ready for the long haul in holding onto its position in the Dokalam area near the Bhutan tri-junction, notwithstanding China ratcheting up rhetoric against India, demanding pulling back of its troops.
•The soldiers deployed in the disputed area have pitched tents, in an indication that they are unlikely to retreat unless there was reciprocity from Chinese personnel in ending the face-off at an altitude of around 10,000 feet in the Sikkim section.
•A steady line of supplies is being maintained for the soldiers at the site, official sources said, signalling that the Army is not going to wilt under any pressure from China. At the same time, they sounded confident of finding a diplomatic solution to the dispute, citing resolution of border skirmishes in the past through diplomacy.
•Though China has been aggressively asserting that it was not ready for any “compromise” and that the “ball is in India’s court”, the view in the security establishment here is that there cannot be any unilateral approach in defusing the tension.
Security implications
•Both the countries had agreed to a mechanism in 2012 to resolve border flare-ups through consultations at various levels.
•The mechanism has not worked so far in the current case as the standoff near the Bhutan trijunction, triggered by China’s attempt to build a road in the strategically important area, has dragged on for over three weeks.New Delhi has already conveyed to Beijing that such an action would represent a significant change of status quo with “serious” security implications for India. The road link could give China a major military advantage over India.
•Doka La is the Indian name for the region which Bhutan recognises as Dokalam, while China claims it as part of its Donglang region. China and Bhutan are engaged in talks. India argues that since it is a tri-junction involving the three countries, it also has a say in the issue.
📰 Two large groups bid to supply equipment for Chabahar port
India keen to expedite work on the strategic facility in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan
•Two major Indian conglomerates have bid for supplying key equipment for the strategic Chabahar Port in Iran, while the process is on to expand financial eligibility criteria to attract more bidders, an official said.
•This comes against the backdrop of India being keen on expediting work on this port, located in the Sistan-Baluchistan province on the energy-rich Persian Gulf nation’s southern coast that can be easily accessed from India’s West coast, bypassing Pakistan.
•“Two major Indian conglomerates have bid for supplying four key mounted quay cranes at Shahid Beheshti Port, Chabahar,” an official who did not wish to be named said. “The bids are under evaluation and a final call will be taken soon.”
•Bids were invited on behalf of India Ports Global Limited (IPGL).
•The official said apart from this, work is on to expand the financial eligibility criteria to attract larger participation by players.
•“We will be rationalising financial eligibility criteria to ensure larger participation in bids,” the official said.
•Shipping, Road Transport and Highways Minister Nitin Gadkari had earlier said the government was hopeful of completing the work on the first phase of the project in 2018.
•The Cabinet has already approved funds for development of the project.
Exim Bank credit
•For greater trade and investment flow with Iran and neighbouring countries, the Cabinet last year had cleared proposals for development of Chabahar port including through a $150 million credit from Exim Bank.
•It also authorised the Shipping Ministry to form a company in Iran for implementing the Chabahar Port Development Project and related activities.
•As per the MoU signed between the two nations in May last year, India is to equip and operate two berths in Chabahar Port Phase-I with capital investment of $85.21 million and annual revenue expenditure of $22.95 million on a 10-year lease.
•Ownership of equipment will be transferred to the Iranian side on completion of 10 years or for an extended period, based on mutual agreement.
•The Iranian side had requested for provision of credit of $150 million in accordance with the MoU.
•As per the pact, operation of two berths is to commence within a period of maximum 18 months after the signing of the contract.
📰 G20 hails India’s labour reforms, start-up policy
Hamburg Action Plan praisesefforts to boost innovation
•Acknowledging the steps being taken by India for sustainable and inclusive growth as well as support to global economy, the G20 has praised the initiatives in the country for promoting ease of doing business, start-up funding and labour reforms.
•In its Hamburg Action Plan, adopted at the G20 Summit, the group also noted that “in the financial sector, India is popularising a number of derivative instruments in exchanges or electronic trading platforms” as part of the measures to enhance resilience of its economy.
•It further said India is facilitating external commercial borrowings (ECBs) by start-ups to encourage innovation and promote ease of doing business, as part of the efforts being taken by the G20 members this year for maintaining momentum on structural reforms and sustainable growth.
📰 Demystifying debt funds as an investment option
What are debt funds?
•While equity funds invest mostly in shares of listed companies, debt funds invest in instruments like government bonds, commercial papers (CPs), certificate of deposits (CDs) and non-convertible debentures (NCDs). Debt funds invest in such securities and earn interest income that is shared among the investors after deducting the fund-management charges. By investing in such debt schemes, investors can indirectly invest in instruments like government bonds as well where direct retail investment is not possible.
What are the different types of debt funds?
•Debt funds can be classified on the basis of the tenure of the bonds or instruments in which they invest. Liquid funds invest in instruments that have a tenure of less than 90 days. Then come the short-term funds that invest in instruments that typically have a tenure of three to six months. There are corporate debt funds too that could have a tenure of up to three years. The long-term funds would invest in bonds that have a tenure of three to five years or even more like in the case of government bonds (G-Secs).
Do retail investors invest in debt funds?
•The share of real retail money in debt funds is still minuscule though the share is rising as more and more investors take to financial planning wherein a certain portion of the investment fund is allocated to debt products. Most fund houses now offer systematic investment plan (SIP) facility for debt funds as well. Interestingly, debt funds are popular among high net worth individuals (HNIs) to park their money temporarily before moving to other asset classes, mostly equity. Debt funds are generally used by banks and corporates for their treasury operations.
Are they better than bank deposits?
•Debt funds offer more return than bank fixed deposits and that is one reason why many HNIs and institutions use such schemes for their treasury operations. While debt schemes offer comparatively higher returns, the risk is also higher compared to the safe FDs that offer assured returns. In the case of bonds, the price could fall due to various reasons thereby impacting its price and ultimately the return. There have been cases where the securities have been downgraded that has led to the scheme taking a hit. Taurus Mutual Fund, for instance, took such a hit early this year when Ballarpur Industries failed to honour its maturity obligation and the fund house had to mark down the CPs to zero.
What about tax liability?
•The gains made on the investment in debt schemes are taxable. If the securities are sold within three years, it is considered short-term wherein the gains are added to the income of the investor and taxed as per the applicable tax bracket. If the securities are held for more than three years before selling, there are long-term capital gains tax.
•The tax rate is 20% with indexation and 10% without indexation. Indexation refers to the mechanism wherein the gains are adjusted against the rate of inflation to derive the net taxable gains from the schemes.
📰 Process eased for exporters who have not paid IGST
Exports had come to a halt in the absence of clarity: PwC
•The Centre has, through a notification and a circular, eased the paperwork required to export goods without the exporter having paid the Integrated Goods and Services Tax (IGST).
•According to the GST Rules, traders who wanted to export without paying IGST had to provide a bond or letter of undertaking (LUT) promising to pay the tax. This requirement did not clarify who exactly needed to provide a bond and who was eligible to provide a LUT. It also involved complexity to do with the recipient of these documents.
•The notification and circular by the Government, both dated July 7, said that the IGST needs to be paid only for exports after July 1, 2017, and detail the eligibility of exporters to provide the necessary documents.
•“Various communications have been received from the field formations and exporters on the issue of difficulties being faced while supplying the goods or services for export without payment of integrated tax… because of which exports are being held up,” according to the circular issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs’ GST Wing.
Relief for exporters
•“These clarifications bring much needed relief for the exporters with regard to export without payment of IGST,” PwC said in a note. “Exports had come to a halt in the absence of clarity on procedure for submission of bond/LUT for exports. While exporters have the option to export on payment of IGST and subsequently claim refund of IGST paid, this would impact the cash flow.”
•The Centre allowed the bond or LUT to be submitted manually and not electronically on the GST portal.
📰 Easier access to H1N1 medicines raises fears of drug resistance
Doctors feel misuse will lead to a situation of anti-viral medications turning ineffective
•Concerns regarding a build-up of resistance to antiviral drugs used to treat swine flu are surfacing, after two such drugs — Oseltamivir and Zanamivir — were taken off the restrictive Schedule X of the Drugs and Comestics Rules. Now under Schedule H1, the drugs can be stocked by all chemists.
•Central health authorities have also advised doctors to prescribe the drugs based on strong symptoms, without opting for the swab test. Medical experts say these decisions could lead to misuse and eventually, severe drug resistance.
•Oseltamivir and Zanamivir are antiviral drugs that block the actions of influenza virus types A and B in the body. While Oseltamivir is available as tablets, Zanamivir comes in powder form.
•Dr. Vasant Nagvekar, a Mumbai-based infectious diseases expert, said, “We are already witnessing antibiotic resistance and related hazards. Resistance built up only because antibiotics were easily available and even sold over the counter. Now, we seem to be going the same way with antiviral drugs.”
•His reaction to the government’s decision was mixed. “It is good, because when H1N1 cases are on the rise, the drug will be available to patients easily. However, it could backfire because in India, we don’t use caution. The doctors will prescribe these drugs so widely that eventually it will stop working.”
Restrictions in place
•Drugs under Schedule X require three copies of prescription for the doctor, patient and chemist, and can be sold by a chemist who holds a special Schedule X licence. Also, the chemist has to preserve the prescription copy for up to three years. In Schedule H1, only one copy of the prescription is required, and drugs in this category can be sold by all chemists.
•Hakim Kapasi, a chemist and wholesaler from Andheri, said, “Chemists will still need a prescription to sell the drug. The only difference is, the drug will be widely available. It all depends on doctors now. If they prescribe the drug with caution, there won’t be misuse.”
•Till date this year, India has recorded over 11,700 H1N1 cases and 561 deaths.
•Dr. Khusrav Bajan, a physician and intensivist at Hinduja Hospital, said, “Bacteria mutate much faster than viruses, so I don’t think resistance should be a cause of concern when there is a spurt in H1N1 cases.”
📰 Power games at the tri-junction
The current border stand-off suggests India is likely to become bolder in resisting the idea of power disparity
•We should by now be accustomed to Sino-Indian summits occurring with the backdrop of border trouble, and Friday’s G20 meeting between a smiling Prime Minister Narendra Modi and a less enthused Chinese President Xi Jinping was no exception. But the Doka La stand-off, at the southern tip of the Chumbi Valley where India, Bhutan, and China meet, is perhaps the most significant of all the border confrontations that have roiled the India-China relationship in recent years. This is not because of its size, dwarfed by the Sumdorong Chu crisis of 1986-87, or duration, still only a few days longer than the Daulat Beg Oldi stand-off of 2013. Rather, the importance of the incident is threefold.
What it implies
•One factor is the unique position of the Chumbi Valley, which is at once a dangerous conduit into the slender Siliguri Corridor and a dangerous choke point, exposed on both sides, for Chinese forces. A second factor is that this tussle is formally over the interests and rights of a third country, Bhutan, echoing the wider competition for influence in smaller countries — Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and elsewhere — across the Indo-Pacific region. Third, the stand-off comes in a period when it is clear that the wheels are coming off the India-China wagon, with Indian trust in Chinese intentions collapsing steadily and Beijing taking an ever-more strident tone.
•At the military level, India has good reason to prevent Chinese road building near Doka La. Chinese activity has steadily increased in the area beneath Bhutan’s claim-line, pushing the area under its de facto control about 5 km southwards, towards a crucial ridge-line. This has a number of implications. It would widen the area of Chinese control in an otherwise very narrow valley, from around 8-9 km (Batang La to the Amo Chu river) to 12-13 km (Gamochen to the river), thereby easing the logistics of moving large numbers of troops. Control of the dominating ridgeline would also give China a strong position, by some accounts even domination, over Indian posts to the west, and Bhutanese ones to the south and east.
•India is still well short of matching the impressive infrastructure development in Tibet over the past decade, with two-thirds of sanctioned roads on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) still un-built. But Chinese forces moving through the Chumbi Valley — 90 km from top to bottom — would have long, exposed flanks. India has a formidable set of forces arrayed to the west, with mountain divisions in Gangtok (17th), Kalimpong (27th), and Binaguri (20th) further to the south, all of which are part of the Siliguri-based 33 Corps. Furthermore, the 59th division of 17 Corps, India’s first mountain strike corps, raised for the purpose of offensive operations into Tibet, is headquartered in Panagarh and will reportedly be operational this year. It’s worth noting that former National Security Advisor (NSA) Shivshankar Menon has argued, in his 2016 book Choices, that Beijing backed down in the 2013 Depsang incident “to a great extent because of India’s improved capabilities, which left the Chinese in no doubt that India could embarrass them”.
The Bhutan advantage
•Another of India’s military advantages is its privileged relationship with Bhutan. This allows it to bring to bear large forces from the east. A sizeable Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) is permanently based in western Bhutan, while other units regularly cooperate with the Royal Bhutan Army. Bhutan’s involvement highlights the way in which Sino-Indian competition is increasingly channelled through third countries, as China relentlessly expands into India’s periphery through strategic investments, trading relationships and arms sales. India’s willingness to intervene forcefully in a bilateral Bhutan-China dispute is a reflection both of India’s own vital interests in the Chumbi Valley and of its commanding position in Bhutan, which might otherwise have ceded the Doklam plateau to China in a territorial swap many years ago. The India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, though revised in 2007 to give Thimpu more autonomy, still notes that the two countries “shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests”. In this sense, Bhutan is a special case. But in stepping across an international border and defying Chinese expectations, India has also signalled a degree of confidence that will resonate more widely. This in part explains the especially vituperative rhetoric that has seeped out of hyper-nationalist outlets like the Global Times in recent days, such as lurid promises to “liberate” Sikkim and Bhutan, as well as subtler steps such as this week’s travel advisory for Chinese citizens in India.
•There is a reasonable chance that this stand-off will end within weeks, with China quietly halting road construction and Indian troops returning westward to their posts. The risk of escalation appears low. More broadly, the thicket of border agreements accumulated over the past 30 years — in 1988, 1993, 1996, 2003, and 2013 — serve as an important cushion whose value is still not fully appreciated.
•But the wider context is one of relentlessly hardening attitudes, on both sides. Beijing is aggrieved by the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang in April, India’s aggressive repudiation of the Belt and Road Initiative in May, and India’s forward-leaning posture in the South China Sea — the latter underscored by Vietnam’s two-year extension of a 2006 oil concession to ONGC Videsh last week. India’s complaints are too numerous and familiar to elaborate, but they span international institutions (membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group), terrorism (Masood Azhar), sovereignty (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) and, in a more inchoate way, questions of the basic security order in Asia.
Relationship in a flux
•“India-China relations are undergoing a change,” wrote former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran on July 3. “China believes that India should acknowledge the power disparity between the two sides and show appropriate deference to China.” India has always repudiated this idea. But it is likely to become bolder in doing so. This is evident in last month’s U.S.-India joint statement, where China was unmentioned but all pervasive in areas from North Korea, to trade, to freedom of navigation. It is on display in the Bay of Bengal, where one of the largest-ever iterations of the Malabar exercise series is getting underway with aircraft carriers/helicopter carrier from India, the U.S., and Japan. We see it also in this weekend’s news, reported in this newspaper, that the government is conducting a national security review of Chinese investment in South Asia. Perhaps, in the coming weeks, 17 Corps will suddenly find that the purse strings have become looser too.
📰 Divided island
The UN must quickly pick up the piecesto restart talks on the reunification of Cyprus
•The failure in Geneva last week of a round of talks on the reunification of Cyprus is by all measures a huge diplomatic setback. This is not the first time the United Nations-backed dialogue between the breakaway Turkish-Cypriot state in the north and the Greek-Cypriot Republic of Cyprus has been deadlocked. Even so, the current stalemate is disappointing as the prospects for a final deal had been pinned on the two interlocutors — Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci, his counterpart in Northern Cyprus. Both represent a generation that regards the status quo as an everyday reminder of the memories of partition of the island, whose combined population is just about one and a half million. The split took place in 1974 when Turkey invaded the north after an Athens-backed coup in Cyprus aimed at annexing the island. Among the main challenges the two leaders face is the demand for restitution of the property rights of the Greek-Cypriots who had fled the north in the 1970s. The establishment of an institutional framework to secure the interests of both ethnic groups is another. Nicosia’s assurances of a rotating presidency between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots in a future federal union have not soothed anxieties in the north. Another challenge is Turkey’s refusal to guarantee the withdrawal of its troops stationed in the north. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insists on an indefinite Turkish military presence on the island.
•The record of stalled negotiations, in fact, is almost as old as the 1974 partition. An early test of the diplomatic and political resolve to reunite the region was the 2002 Kofi Annan plan for reconciliation. Its terms were rejected by Greek-Cypriots in a 2004 referendum, which coincided with Cyprus joining the European Union. Voters had counted on the increased leverage EU membership would allow them vis-à-vis the north. On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriots had ratified the Annan plan overwhelmingly, sensing enhanced prospects for a reunited island inside the bloc. The potential for reconciliation might also have been boosted by Turkey’s bid to join the EU, which was then high on the agenda in Brussels. More than a decade later, a reunion seems to be as elusive as ever. Yet, the economic incentives for reunification have, if anything, become more compelling. A united Cyprus would allow both parts of the island to realise their immense tourism potential. The prospect of exploitation of offshore gas reserves in the Mediterranean too is something the two sides could then realistically set their eyes on. But the imperative is not just economic — a successful settlement would allow Cyprus to be more in control of its affairs, without both the sides being so reliant on neighbouring powers.
