THE HINDU – CURRENT NOTE 21 March
Green nod for Neutrino project suspended
•The Southern Bench of the National Green Tribunal on Monday suspended the Environmental Clearance (EC) granted to the India-based Neutrino Observatory (INO) that was to come up in Theni and asked the project proponent to make a fresh application.
•During the arguments, the Tribunal was informed that the Madhikettan Shola National Park in Idukki district of Kerala was just about 4.9 km from the proposed project site and the Tamil Nadu-Kerala border was just a kilometre away, making it a Category ‘A’ project.
New facts
•The Bench comprising Justice P. Jyothimani and expert member P.S. Rao said: “In the light of new facts that have come to light during the arguments, it will be appropriate for us to keep the EC in abeyance.”
•The MoEF had called it a Category ‘B’ project, for which an Environmental Impact Assessment is not necessary, but the department processed it as an additional measure, a source said.
•However, under the guidelines laid down by the Ministry, any project that falls within 5 km from an inter-State boundary or within a notified national park or a sanctuary has to be considered a Category ‘A’ project that involves a number of processes before an EC is granted, the source said.
•Since it was near a national park, the INO was also asked to get clearance from the National Board for Wildlife. Taking into account these new facts, the Bench disposed of the petition and asked the INO to make a fresh application.
•“The claim is that the site is within 4.9 km of the Madhikettan Shola Natural Park. This is very close to the guideline limit of 5 km. So we have to verify that the project actually falls within this distance. If it does, we will surely get the clearance as instructed. We have no intention of flouting any rules,” said D. Indumathi, Spokesperson of the INO, Faculty at the Institute of Mathematical Sciences.
•Sekhar Basu, Chairperson of the Department of Atomic Energy said that as he had not seen the judgment, he could not comment. He, however, added that if the INO cannot come up anywhere in India, the people would just lose in terms of science.
•Dr. Basu also dismissed fears that there was a plan to store nuclear waste in the tunnels of the INO. “It is really a pity that such a fear exists, and it is a story without a basis,” he said.
•Dr. Indumathi also said, “The judge has requested to conduct the case expeditiously. So we are hopeful that things will move quickly now.”
Kishenganga off the menu in Indus talks
•India and Pakistan began discussions on the Indus Water Commission on Monday after 22 months amid optimism that the meeting may lead to resumption of the composite dialogue between the neighbours.
•After the first day of talks, officials on both sides said the meeting was held in a cordial manner, and they had frank discussions. P.P. Saxena, Indus Water Commissioner of India, is leading a 10-member delegation in talks with his Pakistani counterpart, Mirza Asif Baig.
Sanctity of treaty
•Prior to the meeting, Pakistan’s Minister for Water and Power Khawaja Asif expressed the hope that both countries would respect the sanctity of the Indus Water Treaty.
•Because of the Pakistani position, Kishenganga and Ratle were not discussed in the latest round of talks. But the designs of the Pakal Dul, Lower Kalnai and Miyar hydroelectric plants were taken up.
•The talks will conclude in Islamabad on Tuesday, though the earlier plan was to do so in Lahore.
•The talks were suspended in May 2015 after the Pakistani Commissioner objected to the designs of the Kishenganga and the Ratle hydropower projects of India.
•Last year, the secretaries of power of both countries agreed to third-party resolution through the World Bank. But the World Bank announced late last year that Pakistan and India should hold bilateral talks.
•Following the World Bank’s reluctance to pass an order, both sides would meet in Washington in April on the Ratle project.
Russia: Sound, fury, but not much clout
“Strategy is the central political art,” writes Lawrence Freedman in Strategy: A History. “It is about getting more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest. It is the art of creating power.” If this is so, consider the case of a country that is economically smaller than Italy, Australia, or South Korea. Its economy has indeed shrunk over the past two consecutive years, and income per capita sits below that of Malaysia or Slovakia. Male life expectancy is worse than in North Korea. Worse still, the country has been sanctioned by five of its six biggest export markets, and its currency has lost half its value over the past three years alone. And yet, this country — which is, of course, Russia — has somehow succeeded in projecting itself as a great power in virtually every corner of the world stage. But as Moscow turns its attention to South Asia, courting Pakistan and wading into Afghan diplomacy, we should ask whether it has truly created power, or merely spun an illusion.
Aggressive diplomacy
•Reasonable people can disagree on the strategic balance sheet. Territorially, Russia is in the black. It has annexed Crimea, controls a swathe of eastern Ukraine through proxy rebels, and enjoys access to military facilities in Syria, Iran, Egypt, and soon enough Libya. Diplomatically, it has driven a formidable wedge between Turkey and NATO, while deepening ties with Western allies from Israel to Japan. It has also persuaded China to sign an agreement on “global strategic stability”, while the two sides hold naval exercises in the South China Sea.
•All this has come at a cost. As long as Russia continues to fuel a Kargil-type war in Ukraine, it will continue to be battered by European and U.S. sanctions. Yet Russia’s trade with Europe is still four times larger than that with China, suggesting that Beijing offers a rather limited safety net. Russian defence expenditure is likely to fall this year and next, with nuclear modernisation taking a larger slice of the budget. Meanwhile, Russia’s ‘victories’ have also prompted the first-ever deployment of NATO forces at the Russian border, without the presence of the Cold War-era Warsaw Pact buffer. Even neutral states are alarmed, with Sweden to reintroduce conscription next year. Meanwhile in Washington, Russia’s audacious election meddling has made it a toxic quantity in Congress and in parts of the administration, making it hard to envisage a grand bargain, even setting aside the serious differences over Iran and arms control.
•In short, Russia has gained diplomatic influence at the cost of goodwill and growth, while enmeshing itself in several open-ended wars. But whether or not one judges this trade-off to have been worthwhile, there is a deeper point: influence demands investment. Russia has created power only where it has been able to change facts on the ground, usually by force of arms, and only where larger, richer, and more cohesive Western forces have dithered or abstained.
•In Ukraine, Moscow’s initial arm’s-length low-profile intervention faltered until Russian troops flooded in. Russian advisers in Syria, who were present long before 2015, could not stop the rot — until Russian air power showed up. Russia has been flirting with renegade Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar for some time, hosting him aboard the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov in January as an eye-catching gimmick. But it is Russia’s deployment of special forces to Libya’s borders this month that’s far more important. In all these cases, from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, Russia is a bigger part of the conversation because it has taken risks, and put down chips.
The South Asian game plan
•In South Asia, by contrast, Russia’s presence is largely smoke and mirrors. Its flurry of activity in the region is by now well known. Last September, Moscow batted away Indian objections to hold its first-ever joint drills with Pakistani special forces, having earlier agreed to sell four attack helicopters to Pakistan. In next-door Afghanistan, Russia’s moves have been even starker. In December 2015, Russia’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, declared that “Taliban interests objectively coincide with ours”, while both Afghan and Western officials decried Russian support to parts of the insurgency. At the Heart of Asia conference a year later, Mr. Kabulov followed this up by playing down Pakistan’s role and rebuking an Indian journalist who had asked about this. Contrast this to the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, who told Congress in February that as long as insurgents’ “senior leaders remain insulated from pressure and enjoy freedom of action within Pakistan safe havens ...they have no incentive to reconcile”. Then, in the same month, Russia infuriated Kabul by holding a trilateral summit with Pakistan and China.
•Russia’s intentions are plain. In systematically exaggerating the Islamic State’s presence in Afghanistan, the aim is to weaken the U.S. and discredit what, in actual fact, have been remarkably successful U.S.-Afghan counterterrorism efforts.
•Meanwhile, Russia can pose as a powerful regional broker. But a campaign of disinformation, bluster, and summitry can only take Moscow so far in the absence of any actual leverage. NATO countries have 14,000 troops in Afghanistan, while Russia has none. Indeed, even Italy (over 1,037 troops), Germany (980) and Georgia (870) are all more important than Russia on the ground. If the new U.S. administration increases troop numbers in Afghanistan, as seems possible, this will further constrain Moscow’s ability to persuade Kabul to attend similar summits which cut out the combatant powers.
Steady economic slide
•Meanwhile, Russia is poorly endowed in other key respects. In economic terms, it is an irrelevance. Its trade with India, Pakistan, and Iran has actually fallen in recent years. Russian aid to Afghanistan is trivially low, and it is no position to offer concessionary terms for significant defence sales to Pakistan. While Pakistan hungrily absorbs Chinese investment and India looks globally for an infusion of capital, Russia has almost nothing to offer, beyond the politically opaque machinations of state-dominated energy companies.
•Much more meaningful is Russia’s defence engagement with India. Russian arms sales continue to be a strategic factor in Indian defence policy. One key aspect is the lease of a second nuclear submarine. A second is the sale of the advanced S-400 air defence system. These are significant long-run contributions to India’s subsurface operations and air power, respectively. Russia’s most advanced defence technology is certainly a rare and valuable asset. But these deals provide limited leverage. They are commercially important to Russia’s frail defence industry, and Russia’s market share is being ruthlessly shrunk by Israeli and American competition. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, it is Chinese arms — built on a Soviet legacy, Moscow would note, ruefully — that are cornering the market.
•Where does all this leave Russia? To some extent, prestige is itself a currency of power. If Russia appears ascendant, thanks to land-grabs in Europe and air strikes in Aleppo, it will be so. It will be sought by friends, consulted by neutrals, and discussed by all. But these efforts must have some solid foundation. There must be the possibility, if not the promise, of some economic, political, or military effect. In an age of geopolitical uncertainty — the rise of China, the growth of nationalism, and the erosion of U.S. leadership — hedging is prudent. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India all have good reasons to reinforce ties to Russia, though each is differently placed to weather the potential consequences. But even if it had the resources, Moscow’s room for manoeuvre would be very limited. NATO is not going to pull out of Afghanistan entirely, China looms far larger in Pakistan and in the region more generally, and Russia’s Afghanistan-Pakistan gyrations have hardly endeared it to New Delhi. What are we left with? Sound, fury, but not much clout.
Framing the right prescription for health expenditure
•India spends close to 5% of its GDP on health. While this may appear low when compared to 18% of the U.S., data show that Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries spend 8-11%, middle-income countries close to 6%, and India’s peers, the lower-middle-income countries 4.5%. By these measures, India’s health-care spending, while still somewhat low, is not unusually so. However, on an index measuring country performance on the health-related Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicators, India ranks poorly at 143 out of 188 countries.
•If we look in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), a measure that more accurately corresponds with our actual standard of living, India is the third largest economy in the world, at almost PPP $8 trillion. Given the large size of our population, our 5% allocation to health translates to a mere $267 per individual, a number far lower than the OECD average of $4,698. Yet, countries with comparable or even lower per capita health expenditures, including Indonesia, Thailand, and Ghana, are ranked better on the SDG Index at 91, 112, and 141, respectively, out of 188, and offer us hope and a few lessons.
•Interestingly, two of the most important differences between India and these countries are the extent of pooling of health expenditures and the level of government control of the health system.
Pooling of expenditure
•First is the pooling of health expenditure: India has among the lowest pooled expenditure for health care; between 2004-2014, approximately 4-7% of households fell below the poverty line as a result of high out-of-pocket expense. Pre-payment and pooling of resources are critical to ensure financial protection against catastrophic health shocks. The extent of pooling is determined by the government’s tax allocation to health and insurance coverage in the country. India’s low tax to GDP ratio and allocations of around 5% of general government expenditure to health impact the total quantum of funds available. Countries such as Thailand which have a comparable tax to GDP ratio have prioritised health within their budgets and allocate 13% of it to health care. To increase pooled funds for health care, India needs to both provide a significantly higher level of allocation to health care in its annual Budgets, as in Thailand, as well as extend schemes such as the Employees’ State Insurance Scheme (ESIS) — currently a mandatory insurance scheme only for low-wage earners in the formal sector in India — to all employees. Gradually the informal sector, both in upper and lower income, can be included by making it mandatory for all residents to buy into national or state health insurance schemes as has been successfully done in Kyrgyzstan, China, and South Korea.
Government control
•Second is the control exercised by the government on the health system: Successful health systems, the world over, including in entirely free market developed economies such as Germany, Switzerland, South Korea, and Japan, do not necessarily have the government as a provider. Nevertheless, they all have a high degree of direct government control on the services that are offered; the pricing of health services, referral pathways, and treatment protocols that are followed. Governments such as those of Japan and Switzerland exercise direct price controls on services like how much physicians and hospitals may charge. Similar to the control in some mandated drug pricing, setting a price control on what hospitals and physicians may charge for their services, are critical elements that India may consider. The other area could be instituting licensing processes for hospitals, similar to the Certificate of Need process in the U.S., which can help a regionally-equitable distribution of hospitals by incentivising the setting up of facilities in poorly served areas.
•It is clear that significant, strategic shifts in the level of control that the government exerts on both the financing and provision of health are urgently required. India can build on learning from core design principles from global experiences, including prioritising resources for health within government budgets, pooling existing resources, and greater government control over the health sector. It can also allow for a customised approach based on its context. Such a path will allow India to deliver on quality health care and equitable health outcomes to all of its people.
Death of a fisherman
•At the fall of dusk on March 6, K. Britjo and his colleagues had set out from the Rameswaram fishing jetty in southern Tamil Nadu. They stayed in Indian waters, fishing off the coast until nightfall, but without much of a catch.
•It was dark when they decided to leave the safety of the waters patrolled by the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) and try trawling the rich Sri Lankan waters for seer fish and pompano. They struck it rich immediately, working silently under the cover of darkness. But they were soon challenged by Sri Lankan Navy officers riding water scooters.
•When the fishermen rammed their big vessel into one of the scooters, one of the Navy men on a water scooter was thrown over. The Navy men rescued their mate and retreated, but all hell broke loose when they returned soon. They allegedly began to fire at the Tamil fishermen, who had, meanwhile, continued fishing. Britjo, 21, the youngest of the six, took a bullet in his neck, just above the left clavicle. His captain was forced to retreat, while trying to contact through his cell phone his leader on the Rameswaram shore, to seek the Coast Guard’s help.
•Nearly two hours passed, but no help came. Britjo succumbed to his injuries. His death has raised many eyebrows because this is the first time in five years that the Sri Lankan Navy has allegedly
•fired at Indian fishermen. The two countries had agreed not to harm fishermen who were caught in the other’s territory.
•What could have been the provocation? Did the ICG not respond fast enough? Could Britjo have survived if he had got timely medical help? Britjo’s captain blamed the Coast Guard. However, security agencies, the marine police of the Coastal Security Group and those knowledgeable about the style of fishing of the Rameswaram fishermen have a different story to tell.
•They point out that the GPS set handed over by the fishermen to the CSG contained no data pertaining to 2017 — an indication that an attempt was made to obfuscate the fact that they had indeed intruded into Sri Lankan waters deliberately.
•Moreover, the statements by Britjo’s surviving friends were not corroborative. While one said the firing took place at around 8.45 p.m., another said it was at around 9.45 p.m. One said the Navy came in water scooters, another said they had come in inflatable boats. One said they were in the company of other trawlers, another denied it. They all concurred, however, that the fishermen were in Indian waters near “Sethukaalvai” off Dhanushkodi when the firing took place.
•The captain insists that Britjo could have been saved, but doctors who performed a post-mortem examination of his body at 8.30 p.m. on March 7 said that the death occurred about 10 to 14 hours earlier, which meant that the SOS call from the captain would have been made only after he had re-entered the Indian maritime boundary. Whether the inquiries would throw light on this is anybody’s guess.
New Delhi, Kabul talks soon to boost trade
•India will soon hold talks with Afghanistan on ways to boost bilateral trade and investment.
•The first such meeting since January 2014 and the first during the tenure of the NDA Government led by Mr.Narendra Modi, is also aimed at mounting pressure on Islamabad to facilitate trouble-free transit of goods from India to Afghanistan through Pakistan (Wagah-Attari route), official sources told The Hindu.
•This is to help in the development of Afghanistan which is a land-locked and Least Developed Country (LDC) as well as to boost trade and investment in South Asia through better regional connectivity, the sources said. They said it will also help India to improve trade ties with Central Asian nations.
•In this regard, the ‘India-Afghanistan Joint Working Group on Trade, Commerce and Investment’ meeting will discuss ways to make use of the United Nations TIR (Transports Internationaux Routiers or International Road Transport) Convention to boost trade between India and Afghanistan through Pakistan.
•The TIR Convention facilitates trade and international road transport by permitting customs-sealed vehicles and containers to transit nations without them being generally inspected at border crossings. The Union Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi had earlier this month granted its nod for India’s accession to the TIR Convention. Pakistan and Afghanistan are also ‘contracting parties’ to the TIR Convention.
•Thanks to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), Afghanistan can use Pakistan’s territory for transit trade while Pakistan’s goods can move through Afghanistan to nations bordering Afghanistan. However, Islamabad has not agreed to allow using APTTA for goods to be transported from India to Afghanistan through Pakistan’s territory (via the Wagah-Attari route).
•India is keen to join APTTA and Afghanistan has backed India’s readiness to be an APTTA member but Pakistan has so far rejected such a proposal. The sources said while India is likely to soon make renewed efforts to be an APTTA member, it will also look at how the UN TIR Convention can help send goods to Afghanistan through Pakistan.
•While there have been informal proposals recommending India and Afghanistan joining the over $50 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), India has strategic concerns regarding the CPEC that would cover areas including Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir. CPEC is the so-called ‘flagship’ project of China’s One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) initiative. The OBOR is aimed at developing infrastructure in more than 60 countries.
Transit route
•In the absence of transit route through Pakistan, India depends on other countries, including Iran, to send goods to Afghanistan even though it increases time and costs for Indian exporters. India is also planning to strengthen air cargo links with Afghanistan as well as help expedite the development of Chabahar Port in Iran to bypass the Pakistan route to increase trade relations with Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asian countries. The India–Afghanistan trade and investment meeting will also consider more support from India to Afghanistan through Line of Credit, especially the Buyer’s Credit for project exports by Indian companies to Afghanistan.
•India-Afghanistan goods trade had jumped nearly 22% to $834.5 million in 2015-16 with India’s exports to Afghanistan being $526.6 million and its imports from Afghanistan worth $307.9 million. However, it is still far below potential. During April-December 2016-17, the bilateral trade was to the tune of $590.1 million with India’s exports to Afghanistan being $377.2 million and imports from Afghanistan worth $212.9 million. India’s main export items to Afghanistan are textiles, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, iron & steel and electrical machinery, while its imports from Afghanistan are fruits and nuts, gums and resins, coffee, tea and spices.
